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ABSTRACT

Conaway, Matthew Bolyn. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State
University, 2012. ―When ‗Boys Will Not Be Boys‘: Variations of Wartime Sexual
Violence by Armed Opposition Groups in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and Nepal.‖

Wartime sexual violence is often assumed to be inevitable during conflict yet empirical
evidence indicates that sexual violence varies in type and frequency within and across
conflicts as well as among armed groups. A solid understanding of what variable(s) and
causal pathway(s) permit the variation of systematic sexual violence in intrastate conflict
situations by specific groups has yet to be developed. What factors explain the variation
of sexual violence by certain armed opposition groups during conflict situations? This
comparative study employs process-tracing and the congruence method to consider the
utility of hypotheses drawn from the work of Elisabeth J. Wood and Kathryn Farr using
data from the Sri Lankan (1983-2009), Sierra Leonean (1991-2002), and Nepalese (19962005) civil wars. It finds that insurgent leadership prohibition of sexual violence against
civilians and equitable intragroup gender dynamics are correlated with a lower frequency
of sexual violence against civilian populations by insurgencies during civil wars. The
author theorizes that when leadership prohibits sexual violence, enforces strong internal
group discipline, and frames women‘s (equitable) participation as integral for achieving
the broader ideological and strategic goals of the insurgency (i.e., nationalist, leftist, etc.),
sexual violence against women and girls is less frequent during civil wars by armed
opposition groups vis-à-vis government armed forces.

Key Words: wartime sexual violence, rape, variation, masculinity, female combatants,
civil wars, insurgencies, repertoire of violence, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Nepal
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1. Variations of Wartime Sexual Violence
―[L]ooking at rape avoidance to break the conceptual lock of violence as definitive of the
matter of rape or sexual assault is important for advancing understanding of sexual
violence itself.‖– Robert M. Hayden1
1.1. Introduction
Wartime sexual violence has received attention from the Western media and
academia since the early 1990s with its widespread use by Bosnian Serbs against Bosniak
women and girls in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 civil war. Although
wartime sexual violence is not a new phenomenon, its systematic use as a strategy of
warfare has been noted by the international community only within the past two decades.2
Historically, sexual violence during warfare was treated as inevitable and rooted in men‘s
biological impulses for sexual gratification and reproduction—this is commonly
articulated in the saying ―boys will be boys.‖3 Because of women‘s traditional status as
the property of men—fathers, husbands, or immediate male relatives—sexual violence
has often been viewed as the ―looting‖ of men‘s property.4 Noticing that not all male
combatants committed acts of sexual violence during wartime, psychoanalytical theorists
pathologized perpetrators of sexual violence and regarded such behavior as deviant and

1

Hayden, Robert M. (2000) ―Rape and Rape Avoidance in Ethno-National Conflicts: Sexual Violence in
Liminalized States,‖ American Anthropologist, 102(1): 27-41, p. 28.
2
Skjelsbæk, Inger (2001) ―Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex Relationship,‖ European
Journal of International Relations, 7 (2): 211-237, p. 211.
3
MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1994) ―Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide,‖ in Alexandra
Stiglmayer (ed.) Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
4
Brownmiller, Susan (1994) ―Making Female Bodies the Battlefield,‖ in Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed.) Mass
Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

1

abnormal.5 During the 1970s, the U.S. feminist movement redefined sexual violence as a
means of enforcing traditional gender roles and a gender hierarchy in which men were
dominant (i.e., patriarchy).6 Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars began to
challenge biological and pathological explanations of wartime sexual violence, producing
a plethora of feminist-influenced theories which seek to explain why sexual violence is
used systematically as a weapon of war; these theoretical developments have challenged
the validity of biological and pathological theories through various case studies and
statistical analyses. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have both framed sexual violence as
crimes against humanity, and genocide, respectively. Also, several intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) have allocated human and financial capital to prevent and/or
monitor sexual violence during conflict and post-conflict situations.7 The United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 1820 in 2008, recognizing sexual violence against
women in conflict and post-conflict situations as a ―tactic of war to humiliate, dominate,
instill fear in, disperse or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic
group.‖8 These international developments have brought increasing media and academic
attention to the issue of wartime sexual violence during conflict and post-conflict
situations.

5

Skjelsbæk, Inger (2001), op. cit., p. 212.
Donat, Patricia L. N. and John D‘Emilio (1992) ―A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault:
Historical Foundations and Change,‖ Journal of Social Issues, 48(1): 9-22, p. 14.
7
Skjelsbæk, Inger (2001) op. cit., pp. 211-2. Such IGOs include the United Nations Commission on the
Status of Women, the United Nations Development Program, and the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, among other UN bodies that have implemented gender mainstreaming. Recently, several UN
bodies have been created—UN Women and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women—to monitor violence against women during both conflict and post-conflict situations.
8
Accessed at: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement.
6
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Interestingly, there have been some armed groups in now-discontinued
conflicts—e.g., the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN[M]) in Nepal—that rarely employed sexual
violence during conflict; this empirical pattern presents a theoretical challenge to many
scholarly explanations of wartime sexual violence. Armed groups that refrain from sexual
violence during wartime warrant academic attention because they may develop existing
theories of sexual violence which do not account for variations in the frequency and type
of sexual violence during wartime—particularly during civil wars. More importantly, the
variation of wartime sexual violence by armed groups may have significant legal and
political implications for promoting international gender justice. Elisabeth J. Wood
argues that ―[i]f some groups do not engage in sexual violence, then rape is not inevitable
in war as is sometimes claimed, and there are stronger grounds for holding responsible
those groups that do engage in sexual violence.‖9

1.2. The Research Questions
The literature focuses on which factors facilitate systematic sexual violence
during intrastate conflict, but little has been said about factors and conditions that cause
variation from the ―expected‖ violence during intrastate conflicts.10 Armed intrastate
conflict will be defined in this study as a political conflict that involves the armed forces

9

Wood, Elisabeth J. (2009) ―Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?‖ Politics
and Society, 37(1): 131-62, p. 136.
10
This study focuses on the variation of systematic sexual violence by opposition groups and its use by
government armed forces in Nepal and Sri Lanka; similar patterns of sexual violence by armed opposition
groups are found in the cases of Colombia and Peru—both of which warrant further academic study (see
Kathryn Farr [2009] for details, pp. 20-1).
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of at least one state and a rival, non-state group that seeks to gain control of all or a part
of the state‘s territory.11
Due to several armed groups refraining from the use of sexual violence during
wartime, a puzzling research question arises: What factors explain the variation of sexual
violence by certain armed opposition groups during conflict situations? With this
question posed, several corollary questions arise: How does the presence of women in
armed groups shape the organizational norms and use of sexual violence during wartime?
What role does leadership play in the prohibition of sexual violence and how does this
contribute to its variation? What influence does popular support of civilians for
opposition groups—both ideologically and materially—have on the variation of sexual
violence? Finally, how do gendered norms and practices within insurgent groups affect
the prevalence of sexual violence during intrastate conflict?
The above questions have been disregarded in the literature, with the exception of
Elisabeth J. Wood‘s and Kathryn Farr‘s scholarly works.12 Analyzing cases of wartime
sexual violence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone, this study will identify what
factors may have contributed to the variation of wartime rape by the CPN(M) in Nepal
and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. This thesis will also contrast the CPN(M) and LTTE with the
widespread use of rape by government armed forces in Sierra Leone, Nepal, and Sri
11

This study uses the terms ―intrastate conflict‖ and ―civil war‖ interchangeably; Farr, Kathryn (2009)
―Extreme War Rape in Today‘s Civil-War-Torn States: A Contextual and Comparative Analysis,‖ Gender
Issues, 26(1): 1-41, p. 3.
12
In her 2006 study, Elisabeth J. Wood analyzes variations in wartime sexual violence, including
frequencies among armed groups and across conflicts, typologies of sexual violence itself (gang rape,
torture, slavery, etc.), perpetrators of sexual violence, targets of sexual violence, and the intent of sexual
violence as a strategy of war (morale-boosting, genocidal, tactical, opportunistic, etc.). Woods argues that
wartime sexual violence varies across cases and that the dominance of single-case analyses of wartime
sexual violence limits the ability of researchers to discover common causal mechanisms and patterns of
sexual violence during wartime. This study aims to compare three cases of wartime sexual violence to
uncover important variables and causal paths that may not be observable when single-case studies are
employed. See Wood, Elisabeth J. (2006) ―Variation in Sexual Violence during War‖ Politics and Society,
34(3): 307-41, p. 308.

4

Lanka, as well as by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—the primary insurgent
group in Sierra Leone. Using a comparative, three-case research design, this study will
employ process-tracing and the congruence method to identify relevant independent
variables. Then, four hypotheses derived from the work of Elisabeth J. Wood and
Kathryn Farr—(1) cultural norms of combatants regarding sexual violence, (2) leadership
prohibition of sexual violence, (3) the material and ideological support of civilians, and
(4) the presence and role of female combatants—will be applied to cases of sexual
violence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone using the congruence method to test the
validity of these explanations. This thesis seeks to identify the specific variables, causal
mechanism(s), and causal pathway(s) that contributed to the variation of wartime sexual
violence by the CPN(M) in Nepal and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. It aims to test middlerange and contingent theories on variations of wartime sexual violence against women
and girls by armed opposition groups during intrastate conflicts.13

1.3. Literature Review
The literature on wartime sexual violence emerged with Susan Brownmiller‘s
seminal work in 1975, titled Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape. Rooted in
sociobiological theory, Brownmiller argues that wartime rape occurs because male
soldiers‘ biological impulses to rape are left unrestrained by social norms and judicial
institutions found in peacetime. Also, soldiers have newly-acquired power due to their
13

Sexual violence that targets men during intrastate conflict, while important for the fields of conflict
studies and gender violence, is beyond the scope of this study. A theoretical framework for the study of
wartime sexual violence against male noncombatants can be found in Jones, Adam (2006) ―Straight as a
Rule: Heteronormativity, Gendercide, and the Noncombatant Male,‖ Men and Masculinities, 8(4): 451-69.
This thesis may provide further insight as to what variables and causal paths explain the absence of wartime
sexual violence against women and girls in conflict by armed opposition groups. It may also offer policy
makers relevant and practical knowledge to prevent future acts of wartime sexual violence.

5

entry into elite military fraternities and their ability to employ state-sanctioned
violence—thus soldiers must prove their power to women, themselves, and, most
importantly, fellow male combatants through acts of sexual violence. Brownmiller,
illustrating her sociobiological theory of rape, documents cases of wartime rape from the
establishment of the Roman Empire to the end of the Vietnam War.14 Peggy R. Sanday, a
feminist anthropologist, challenges Brownmiller‘s argument by ―depart[ing] from the
familiar assumption that male nature is programmed for rape.‖15 She contends that rape is
constituted by sociological and cultural forces rather than solely by the biological
impulses of men.16 Sanday argues that (1) levels of rape vary cross-culturally and (2)
societies with high incidence of rape are distinguishable from societies with low levels of
rape by cultural and social factors. Categorizing cultures as ―rape-free‖ and ―rape-prone,‖
Sanday finds that in ―rape-prone‖ cultures, intergroup and interpersonal violence is
perpetuated by male sexual violence, the nature of parent-child relations is enacted in
male sexual violence, and rape is a reflection of ―a social ideology of male dominance.‖17
In ―rape-free‖ societies men are conditioned to value female characteristics and
experiences—which in turn provides less rigid guidelines for performing masculinity—
and consequently they commit fewer acts of rape relative to men in ―rape-prone‖
societies.18

14

See Chapter 3 of Brownmiller, Susan (1975) Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape. New York:
Fawcett Columbine.
15
Sanday, Peggy R. (1981) ―The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A Cross-Cultural Study,‖ Journal of
Social Issues, 37 (1981): 5-27, p. 5.
16
Sanday strongly questions biological explanations of rape (e.g., testosterone as a catalyst for sexual
aggression) because such theories cannot account for social and cultural factors that condone and
perpetuate rape as well as the variation in the frequency and typology of sexual violence across societies.
17
Sanday, Peggy R. (1981) op. cit., p. 18.
18
Sanday, Peggy R. (1981) op. cit., p. 19.
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Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the literature on wartime sexual
violence was limited to feminist scholars and activists. It was not until the early 1990s,
when sexual violence was used systematically during the 1992-1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina
conflict, that wartime sexual violence was studied among multiple academic disciplines
in the social sciences, including political science, sociology, anthropology, and
criminology. In 1994, an influential work edited by Alexandra Stiglmayer, titled Mass
Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, analyzed acts of systematic
sexual violence that occurred throughout the conflict. The book contained chapter
contributions from Susan Brownmiller, Ruth Seifert, Catharine MacKinnon, Rhonda
Copelon, and Cynthia Enloe—scholars who continue to influence the study of wartime
sexual violence.19 Inger Skjelsbæk systematically documented over 140 scholarly articles
published throughout the 1990s on wartime sexual violence among myriad academic
disciplines and social scientific methodologies.20 Presently, Elisabeth J. Wood, Kathryn
Farr, Robert M. Hayden, Jeremy M. Weinstein, Christopher K. Butler, Michele L. Leiby,
and other scholars of sexual violence contend that wartime sexual violence varies in
frequency and type across conflicts. The study of wartime sexual violence by political
scientists has brought new insight into the literature on sexual violence during war since
the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict.21 Conflicts in which sexual violence was relatively low
in prevalence (e.g., Columbia) may be juxtaposed with conflicts in which rape was
widespread (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo) to gain new theoretical insights, via
comparative political methodology, about the independent variables and causal

19

Alexandra Stiglmayer (1994) Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press.
20
Skjelsbæk, Inger (2001) op. cit., p. 211-2.
21
Ibid.

7

mechanism(s) that may explain the variation on the dependent variable, wartime sexual
violence.
The literature on wartime sexual violence is diverse and beset with competing and
contingent generalizations that seek to explain why sexual violence occurs systematically
during intrastate conflict. The three themes prominent in the literature are: (1) militarized
masculinity as the cause of sexual violence; (2) sexual violence as a strategy of war; and
(3) the variations in frequency and typology of wartime sexual violence.

Militarized Masculinity as the Cause of Sexual Violence
The first theme in the literature analyzes the link between militarized masculinity
and wartime sexual violence. Scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon, Susan
Brownmiller, Maria Ericksson Bazz, and Maria Stern argue that masculinity predisposes
men to commit sexual violence against women and girls during peacetime and
exacerbates sexual violence during wartime. Also, this vein of research often asserts that
women are disproportionately raped during conflict because stereotypically feminine
women become the targets of hypermasculine combatants primed to rape. Academics
who research masculinity and sexual violence argue that men and dominant discourses of
masculinity induce men to rape primarily to achieve a more dominant masculine status
within the group. Scholars of masculinity and sexual violence often emphasize a
continuum between peacetime and wartime sexual violence, claiming that the former is
invisible or normalized in the private sphere. Conflict makes sexual violence visible by
increasing women‘s vulnerability to sexual violence by groups of armed soldiers and

8

guerillas driven by hypermasculine group norms in the public milieu of intra- and
interstate conflict.22
Scholars often analyze gendered norms within military organizations to explain
wartime sexual violence. Ruth Seifert asserts that the ―glue‖ for the organizational
structure of Western armed forces is masculine norms and performance, which in war
zones includes the suppression of stereotypically feminine characteristics, such as
empathy, sympathy, and gentleness. Through the processes of masculine and
misogynistic socialization during training—which values physical power and
heterosexual conquest—soldiers become inclined (not predetermined) to rape women and
girls in conflict situations.23 Seifert argues that during conflict a certain group psychology
develops from a patriarchal society that associates masculinity with power and prestige
and, conversely, devalues femininity. Women are targeted not because they are enemies,
―but because they are the objects of fundamental hatred that characterizes the cultural
unconscious [of patriarchal psychology] and is actualized in times of crisis.‖24 Catherine
MacKinnon agrees, paralleling the pornography industry in Yugoslavia with the
systematic rapes that occurred by Serbian military and paramilitary personnel during the
1992-1995 conflict. She stresses that ―[w]hen pornography is this normal, a whole
population of men is primed to dehumanize women and to enjoy inflicting sexual
assault.‖25 Cynthia Enloe contends that the masculinity of soldiers is not as rigid and
monolithic as portrayed by MacKinnon and Seifert. Enloe argues that militarized

22

Skjelsbæk, Inger (2001) op. cit., p. 215-7.
Seifert, Ruth (1994) ―War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis‖, in Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed.) Mass Rape:
The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 54-72. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 5962.
24
Seifert, Ruth (1994) op. cit., p. 65.
25
MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1994) op. cit., p. 77
23

9

masculinity is ―class-dichotomized,‖ with rapists being depicted as lower-class and
lower-ranking soldiers—this stereotype shields and distances leadership (portrayed as
upper-class and senior-ranking) from allegations of sexual violence. Thus, Enloe asserts
senior leadership is able to orchestrate systematic sexual violence as a strategy of warfare
with impunity.26
Sexual violence also occurs because soldiers are unable to realize traditional
forms of masculinity and, consequently, overcompensate with sexual violence. Claudia
Card asserts that rape reinforces patriarchal relations between men and women. She
argues that the goal of rape, both during war and peace, is to (re)produce male dominance
in society through patriarchal behavior and discourse. Card further purports that rape is
employed against women during conflict due to their devalued social status and physical
weakness relative to men, which makes women as a distinct group the most vulnerable
targets of rape in a patriarchal society.27 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, in their
analysis of government soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), find
that rape by soldiers is justified by dichotomized discourses of (heterosexual) masculinity
which promote images of manhood that simultaneously require being economic
―providers‖ for their families and ―fighters‖ in the armed forces.28 Thus, soldiers in the
DRC rationalize rape due to their failure to realize an aspect of (heterosexual)
masculinity—particularly as an economic ―provider‖ for their wives and children.29 As
soldiers fail to realize their internalized concept of masculinity (adopted from Congolese
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discourses of masculinity that position men‘s sexual gratification as a reward for being a
―provider‖), Baaz and Stern argue that rape ―serves as a performative act that functions to
reconstitute their masculinity—yet simultaneously symbolizes their ultimate failure to do
so.‖30 Euan Hague and Silva Meznaric argue that ethnic groups can take masculine and
feminine identities, as one group becomes dominant over another, which both authors
assert contributes to systematic rape.31 The projection of power, domination, and
violence, often associated with hegemonic masculinity, allows the masculine group to
dominate the feminized, subjected group—the former includes Bosnian Serbs and the
latter Bosnian Muslims in Hague‘s study of wartime sexual violence in BosniaHerzegovina.32
Masculinity analyzed solely in terms of power provides additional explanations of
wartime rape. Dubravka Zarkov argues that the main element of masculinity is power and
that the use of rape is an attempt to construct the masculinity of (i.e., empower) the
perpetrator and feminize (i.e., disempower) the victim. In her analysis, the focus is not on
individual soldiers‘ sexual orientation, but rather on a social construction of masculinity
that assumes ―masculine = heterosexual = power.‖33 This argument, Zarkov contends,
allows scholars to explain the rape of both women and men in conflict zones.34 In other
words, rape is asexual and rather rooted in the perpetrators‘ desire to produce dominance
over individuals and communities. Zarkov‘s argument on rape, power, and sexuality
30

Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Maria Stern (2009) op. cit., p. 514.
Hague, Euan (1997) ―Rape, Power and Masculinity: The Construction of Gender and National Identities
in the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,‖ in Rotin Lentin (ed.) Gender and Catastrophe, pp. 50-63. London: Zed
Books, pp. 52-3; Meznaric, Silva (1994) ―Gender as an Ethno-Marker: Rape, War and Identity in the
Former Yugoslavia,‖ in Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.) Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertion
and Feminisms in International Perspective, pp. 76-97. Boulder: Westview Press.
32
Hague, Euan (1997) op.cit., pp. 52-3.
33
Zarkov, Dubravka (1997) ―War Rapes in Bosnia: On Masculinity, Femininity and Power of the Rape
Victim Identity,‖ Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 39(2): 140-51, p. 144.
34
Ibid.
31

11

contrasts sharply with Baaz and Stern, who argue militarized masculine discourses value
heterosexuality and prohibit male-on-male rape.
The ideological pressures of state nationalism and militarized masculinities,
however, do not exempt perpetrators from culpability under international law. Lisa S.
Price observes that ―similarly-located‖ combatants who do not commit acts of sexual
violence provides evidence that soldiers act out of choice when they commit sexual
violence against women and girls in combat zones.35 Thus, Price writes, ―where there is
agency, there must be responsibility.‖36
Wartime sexual violence may also serve as a group socialization tool among
forcibly recruited combatants. Dara Kay Cohen considers why gang rape, as a typology
of sexual violence, is employed so frequently during conflict but rarely during
peacetime.37 She argues, using the case of wartime sexual violence in Sierra Leone, that
gang rape is intended to socialize and create bonds of solidarity among forcibly recruited
combatants who are initially uncommitted to the goals of the insurgent group and
mistrustful of their fellow combatants.38 Such a theory can account for (1) why gang rape,
which is rare during peacetime, occurs so frequently during wartime and (2) how female
combatants (e.g., ―bush wives‖) may be active participants in gang rape. Using a crossnational data set of civil wars from 1980-1999, Cohen demonstrates through statistical
analyses that insurgencies and government armed forces which forcibly conscript
combatants are more likely to commit wartime rape.39
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The literature on wartime sexual violence and its link with militarized
masculinities of combatants in armed groups is beset with competing arguments across a
wide array of cases and methods. Scholars of masculinity and wartime sexual violence
focus on military institutions and the perpetuation of militarized hegemonic
masculinities, the fragility of militarized masculinities and soldiers‘ overcompensation
through acts of sexual violence, militarized masculinities analyzed exclusively as
sociopolitical power, and rape as a socialization tool. Although scholars may disagree
about how to link militarized masculinity with wartime sexual violence in a theoretical
sense, indicated by competing arguments among scholars of masculinity and war, a
gendered analytical lens is necessary during social scientific studies because it provides
important insights about causes of wartime sexual violence in single and comparative
case studies.

Sexual Violence as a Strategy of War
Sexual violence as a strategy of war became a focus of scholarly work in the mid1990s after the exposure of systematic and strategic acts of sexual violence during the
Bosnian and Rwandan conflicts. Silva Meznaric, Ruth Seifert, and other scholars contend
that sexual violence is employed as an organizational strategy to eliminate enemies based
on ethnic, political, or national group membership. The theme of sexual violence as a
strategy of war is a dominant and well-developed component of the literature on wartime
sexual violence.
Scholars argue that sexual violence is sometimes used as a strategy of war to
destroy specific groups based on their ethnic and/or religious identities. Ruth Seifert and
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Rhonda Copelon assert that wartime sexual violence is employed not only to destroy the
physical and psychological existence of targeted women, but also functions to inflict
harm on the collective identity of targeted groups, ethnicities, or nations. Women‘s
bodies are socially constructed to symbolize the nation as life-givers and guarantors of
ethnic groups‘ survival. Thus, the rape of women not only inflicts bodily harm on women
themselves, but acts as a ―symbolic rape of the body of that community.‖40 Seifert states
that strategic objectives of armed forces in specific conflicts—such as in Bosnia and
Rwanda—include the complete destruction of collective identity, which makes wartime
sexual violence a destructive means to realize organizational goals.41 In a similar fashion,
Silva Meznaric argues that rape was employed to polarize the interactions between
different ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. She contends that rape can be labeled a
political act—both in times of war and peace—because of the increasing polarization
between ethnic groups after acts of sexual violence and its use as a tool of ethnic
cleansing or genocide.42
The analytical focus on religious and ethnic identities, some scholars contend,
cannot explain why wartime sexual violence occurs primarily against women and girls.
Inger Agger and Soren Buus Jensen state that the use of systematic rape during wartime
is related to aspects of women‘s identity in the social context in which they exist;
women‘s identities—ethnic and religious—are politicized during the uncertainty of
violent conflict, sometimes leading to sexual violence as a strategy of ethnic cleansing or
40
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genocide.43 Allen strengthens the analytical emphasis on women‘s ethno-national
identities by demonstrating that the use of rape in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict must
be viewed as genocide. However, she views gender identity as an important aspect of the
genocide, claiming that Bosniak women were targeted for sexual violence because of
both their ethnic and gender identities. Furthermore, agreeing with Seifert‘s argument on
the symbolism of women‘s bodies, Allen asserts that rape jeopardizes reproduction in
patriarchal societies in which women are defined as men‘s property and their virginity as
men‘s sustained honor by portraying survivors of sexual violence as ―damaged goods.‖44
Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen concur with the genocide-themed argument
regarding Bosnian and Rwandan wartime sexual violence, arguing that it was utilized to
destroy Bosniak and Tutsi ethnic groups by killing women, preventing intraethnic births,
imbuing fear in female members, and forcibly removing women from their traditional
communities.45 Contrasting the scholars above, Rhonda Copelon warns against
conceptualizing rape as genocide, instead contending that rape and genocide are two
analytically separate crimes against humanity under international law. She argues that
rape must be viewed under international law as an act intended to ―humiliate, terrorize,
and destroy a woman based on her identity as a woman,‖ not only as a tool of violence
employed to destroy an entire ethnic population in whole or in part.46 Thus, according to
Copelon, wartime rape in the context of genocide must be considered two separate crimes
against humanity under international law.
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Focusing on one ethnic group‘s victimization fails to explain (or may implicitly
ignore) why additional ethnic populations are victimized by acts of sexual violence
during the same conflict. Doris E. Buss warns against the asymmetrical emphasis on
ethnic and religious identities during wartime rape in her study of the Rwandan genocide,
contending that focusing on one ethnic narrative of rape during conflict diverts questions
about why Hutu and Tutsi armed groups employed rape against both Hutu and Tutsi
women during the Rwandan genocide. Buss believes the dominant rape narrative in
Rwanda depicts the ―raped Tutsi woman‖ as the definitive raped woman during the
conflict, which renders Hutu women invisible in most analyses on wartime rape in
Rwanda.47 She proposes that deemphasizing the interethnic element of wartime sexual
violence allows one to consider ―how other social, political, and economic structures‖—
such as gender identity, socioeconomic inequalities, combatant masculinities, etc.—
shaped sexual violence against Tutsi and Hutu women.48
Certain cases of sexual violence as a strategy of war may have strong ideological
dynamics. Ximena Bunster-Burotto conceptualizes sexual and non-sexual violence
against civilians in Latin America as a weapon against states‘ political opponents,
deviating from ethnic or religious arguments of state-perpetrated (sexual) violence in
other regions. Bunster-Burotto argues that rape has an ideological element, as military
regimes in Latin America targeted and systematically raped women because of their
affiliation with guerilla movements resisting the policies and legitimacy of the state. She
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asserts that being a spouse, daughter, or cousin to male opponents of the regime is viewed
by the authoritarian government as associating with guerilla movements.49
But sexual violence may not serve the same purpose even within the same
conflict, let alone across cases. Michele L. Leiby complicates the strategic logic of sexual
violence, stating ―[o]ne key finding is that sexual violence does not serve the same
function in all civil wars across time and space‖ and can serve multiple purposes even
within the same case.50 In other words, Leiby argues wartime sexual violence is
employed for various functions other than genocide or ethnic cleansing; a study of
wartime sexual violence ―requires analysis sensitive to multiple and concomitant causal
pathways.‖51
International law scholars focus on categorizing wartime rape as criminal acts.
Rhonda Copelon, in her analysis of international law and acts of sexual violence, stresses
that rape viewed as a ―crime against dignity and honor‖ is problematic because acts of
sexual violence are then considered a violation of men‘s honor and their ―exclusive right
to sexual possession of [their women] as property.‖52 To promote gender justice in
international law, Copelon argues that all forms of wartime rape—not only tactical or
genocidal rape—should be charged as a ―grave breach‖ of the Geneva Conventions and a
crime against humanity. Furthermore, the author states that international law must
recognize violence based on gender (e.g., rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation,

49

Bunster-Burotto, Ximena (1986) ―Surviving Beyond Fear: Women and Torture in Latin America,‖ in
June Nash and Helen Safa (eds) Women and Change in Latin America, pp. 297-325. Massachusetts: Bergin
and Garvey Publishers, p. 297-303.
50
Leiby, Michele L. (2009) ―Wartime Sexual Violence in Guatemala and Peru,‖ International Studies
Quarterly, 53: 445-68, p. 465-6; Farr, Kathryn (2009) op. cit. Farr also acknowledges that patterns of
sexual violence are ―not fixed in stone‖ (i.e., static) during conflict situations—such patterns, rather, vary
across time, groups, type, and geographic location (p. 22).
51
Ibid.
52
Copelon, Rhonda (1994) op. cit., p. 200.

17

etc.) as a unique crime against humanity—only then, she argues, will gender justice be
prioritized in international law.53
National security goals and patriarchy prove an explosive mix which may
promote sexual violence as a strategy of war during conflict situations. Cynthia Enloe
conceptualizes ―national security rape‖ as a strategy of wartime sexual violence. Rather
than viewing wartime rape as ahistoric, nonpolitical, and inevitable, Enloe proposes that a
more analytically useful approach is to determine the policy decisions made by leadership
in concert with acts of wartime rape. By labeling women as ―subversives‖ or other
politically delegitimizing terms, military commanders and policy makers wrap local
forms of patriarchy in the ―flag of national security.‖54 Thus, national security rape—a
nexus of nationalist and patriarchal violence—is strategically employed to ensure strict
intraethnic conformity to traditional masculine and feminine gender roles. Interethnically,
national security rape is used to promote the power (and national security) of one group
over another.55
The use of sexual violence as a strategy of war is a prominent theme in the
literature and expands the analytical focus of wartime sexual violence in solely gendered
terms to include additional identities, including political, ethnic, and/or religious
memberships. Scholars of sexual violence as a strategy of war purport that groups are
targeted for rape based on their political, ethnic, or religious affiliation; others contend
that gender identity in part plays an important role in the use of tactical wartime sexual
violence. Furthermore, other scholars, such as Leiby, challenge univocal explanations of
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sexual violence as a strategy of war by pointing to the multiple purposes it serves within
the same conflict, across conflicts, and among armed groups.

Patterns and Variations of Wartime Sexual Violence
Recent theoretical developments in the literature on wartime sexual violence
explain why the use of sexual violence varies in level, type, and function across cases of
conflict. The literature builds upon Sanday‘s socio-cultural analysis of rape by extending
her ―rape-free‖ and ―rape-prone‖ concepts during peacetime to acts of wartime sexual
violence. Scholars who study variations of wartime sexual violence stress that not all
armed groups commit acts of sexual violence against civilians during conflict.
Several scholars have pointed to the complete absence of violence against
civilians to explain variations of wartime sexual violence. Macartan Humphreys and
Jeremy M. Weinstein argue that groups which exert little violence in general on civilian
populations do not utilize systematic sexual violence against civilians.
They hypothesize that these soldiers are prohibited by commanders from
employing violence, in all forms, because group leadership retains high levels of internal
discipline—therefore such groups do not commit acts of wartime sexual violence against
women and girls in conflict situations. Furthermore, Humphreys and Weinstein argue that
commanders prohibit violence against civilians in order to gain popular support and
sustain links between the group and larger community. Popular support allows groups to
acquire material resources, new recruits from the general population, and ideological
support for their organizational goals.56
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Seeking to explain variations in levels of sexual violence, Randy Thornhill and
Craig Palmer suggest that if soldiers have consistent access to women for sexual
intercourse, they will be less likely to commit rape against civilian populations.57
Militaries have historically sought to restrain rape by facilitating access to prostitutes (or
sex slaves) for soldiers—examples include the abuse of ―comfort women‖ by the
Japanese Army during World War II and the kidnapping and enslavement of ―bush
wives‖ by the RUF in Sierra Leone. While accepted among sociobiologists, Thornhill and
Palmer‘s theory is highly contested because of its cynicism, simplicity, and cases of
wartime sexual violence that falsify their sociobiological hypothesis. For example, Wood
notes that the RUF—despite having significant numbers of ―bush wives‖ who served as
sex slaves to male combatants—committed high levels of sexual violence against civilian
women and girls.58 Past explanations of the variation of wartime sexual violence have
been built upon by the theoretical insights of Wood, Farr, and other scholars who analyze
the variation of wartime sexual violence.
The external and internal environmental factors of conflicts themselves may
explain variations in wartime (sexual) violence against noncombatants. Jeremy M.
Weinstein proposes that insurgent groups‘ violence varies based on the initial
environmental conditions that each group faces during civil wars. Weinstein argues that
the availability of material resources to finance warfare shapes the type of individuals
who participate, the kinds of organizations that emerge in civil wars to fight, and the type
and function of violence that are employed—including sexual violence. His central
finding is that rebel groups who engage in conflict in areas of high material wealth or
57
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with external material support are prone to commit high levels of indiscriminant violence
against civilians. Also, Weinstein suggests that insurgent groups who emerge from
resource-poor environments engage less in violence and rather use violence selectively
and strategically against state actors and sympathizers—and avoid utilizing sexual
violence against civilians.59 Claire Metelits challenges Weinstein‘s resource argument by
stating that insurgent ―violence is not so much a response to resources as it is a response
to the threat of survival.‖60 Rather than resources shaping the nature of insurgents‘
violence against civilians, Metelits contends that the severity of insurgent competition
determines the means by which actors access and utilize resources. As other armed
groups challenge an insurgent group‘s control over resources—and thus their
organizational survival—the insurgency‘s behavior will shift toward an escalation of
(sexual) violence against civilians and rival armed groups to obtain resources by
coercion.61 The debate over resources as a determinant of insurgent groups‘ behavior
toward civilian populations is a well-developed body of literature explaining the variation
of wartime sexual violence among armed groups.
Ethno-national polarization or coexistence may in part explain the variation of
wartime sexual violence. Robert M. Hayden, using Bosnian and Indian data, shows that
sexual violence during ethno-nationalist conflicts is rare—what he terms as ―rape
avoidance‖—when the state itself is not threatened by partition and the continued
coexistence between ethno-national groups within the state is expected by all actors.
When the state is in an uncertain condition as polarized ethno-national groups vie for
59
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control of state territory after partition, sexual violence during ethno-nationalist conflicts
is more likely because future coexistence is not expected between ethno-national
groups.62
Other scholars examine armed groups as a unit of analysis—rather than
environmental factors—to explain variations in wartime sexual violence. Elisabeth J.
Wood expands the current literature on sexual violence by analyzing the variation of
sexual violence in frequency, type, and function. Wood argues that when opposition
groups depend on the ―provision of support‖ from civilians—i.e., supplies and
intelligence—they do not engage in sexual violence if such groups have a strong
command hierarchy and accountability mechanisms that deter sexual violence.63 She
disagrees that armed groups with high levels of female personnel less often engage in
sexual violence against civilian populations (e.g., ―bush wives‖ in the RUF did not
correlate with a decrease in sexual violence). Wood believes that the material support and
intelligence from female civilians and personnel offered to insurgent organizations in part
explains variations of wartime sexual violence across cases. 64
Wood presents two additional hypotheses which seek to explain the rarity of
sexual violence by certain armed groups. First, Wood argues that group leaders may
forbid the use of sexual violence against women and girls because they view such acts to
be counterproductive to the realization of the organization‘s goals. She theorizes in her
study of the LTTE that leadership prohibition of rape is the greatest deterrent of wartime
sexual violence. Prohibition of sexual violence is enforced through a tightly controlled
military command structure as well as severe punishment of LTTE personnel who are
62
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implicated in acts of sexual violence.65 Wood‘s finding of leadership prohibition of
sexual violence confirms Christopher K. Butler et al.‘s discovery that contends that in
security forces ―where agents are more accountable and subject to tighter control [by
group leadership], sexual violence is less likely.‖66 Second, Wood asserts that ―the
observed (as opposed to commanded) repertoire of violence exercised by combatants
may depend on their own norms concerning violence against civilians.‖67 Wood
highlights that macrosocial norms on sexual violence may proscribe male-perpetrated
sexual violence, but she is unable to determine the influence of Sri Lankan cultural norms
on LTTE group norms and their infrequent use of sexual violence.68 Nonetheless, the Sri
Lankan Army (SLA) and LTTE existed within similar socio-cultural environments but
sexual violence was disproportionately committed by the SLA.
In her comparative survey of wartime rape in 27 ongoing or recently ended
conflicts, Kathryn Farr identifies four patterns of war rape, the fourth being ―StateLed/Enemy-Targeted Pattern.‖69 In the ―State-Led/Enemy-Targeted Pattern,‖ Farr argues
that war rape was prevalent by government security forces against women due to their
ideological affiliations and activism against the state. However, the most powerful rebel
groups in these cases ―appear to have committed very little war rape.‖70 Farr, deviating
from Wood, argues that all of these rebel groups enjoyed considerable popular support
from women (an independent variable) who are committed to the cause of the insurgent
groups, a ―factor which likely is related to the low rape rate [the dependent variable]
65
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among them.‖71 She also highlights that while these rebel groups engaged in violence
against pro-government women, sexual violence was rare in these instances as well.72
Farr argues the variation of war rape in the four cases is likely related to the large
presence (and combat support) of female personnel within the ranks of the CPN(M),
LTTE, SL, and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).73 Finally, except for
the FARC, Farr notes that the insurgent groups are ideologically motivated (as opposed to
materially).74 Wood confirms this argument by pointing to the LTTE in Sri Lanka and
other Marxist-Leninist groups that employed ―significant levels of other forms of
violence against civilians but rarely engage[d] in sexual violence‖ during intrastate
conflicts.75
Little has been written about the role that leftist and nationalist ideologies play in
insurgent groups‘ (non-)use of wartime sexual violence. Both Wood and Farr
acknowledge that the four insurgencies which committed relatively few acts of wartime
sexual violence—the FARC, CPN(M), LTTE, and SL—are ideologically as opposed to
materially driven (although the ideology of the FARC is still disputed by scholars).76
Ronald Osborn, in his study of Karl Marx‘s and Abimael Guzmán Reynoso‘s (the
ideological theorist of the SL) writings on violence during proletarian revolution and a
case study of the SL in Peru, finds that ―revolutionary violence, even when apparently
wasted in defeat, can actually serve as a progressive function by unveiling or unmasking
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the bourgeoisie‘s true character‖ by state overreaction to insurgent violence.77 Orthodox
Marxism, Osborn claims, views surgical violence against bourgeoisie (and state) actors
as justified in realizing a communistic society. Thus the ideological framework of the SL
justified the use of violence against state actors—including politicians, the army, police,
and paramilitaries—and its civilian supporters (including the business elite).78 But
indiscriminate violence wielded by an insurgency may be detrimental to the sustainability
of its revolution. The SL was responsible for 53 percent of the 69,280 total deaths during
the 1980-2000 conflict, in large part causing the insurgency to collapse ―under the weight
of its own internal contradictions as large numbers of Andean peasants reclaimed their
own agency and took up arms against the senderistas themselves.‖79 Female members of
the SL were respected by male SL combatants so long as they suppressed their feminine
traits and killed without emotion or remorse, thereby adopting machismo behavior and
norms. Furthermore, women were allowed to participate in the ―People‘s War‖ in Peru if
they rejected motherhood for the sake of the revolution.
Scholars who analyze the variation of wartime sexual violence point to the
prohibition of sexual violence by group leadership, the prominent role of female
combatants within armed groups, insurgencies‘ reliance on popular support, and
organizational ideology to explain variations in wartime sexual violence. Theories on the
restraint of violence in general against civilians or soldiers‘ access to prostitutes to
explain variations in sexual violence have largely been disproved through various case
studies by Farr, Butler et al., and Wood.
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Brief Analysis of the Literature
The literature presents many explanations for the cause(s) of wartime sexual
violence during intrastate conflict. Scholarship on wartime sexual violence tends to focus
on: (1) the causes of sexual violence; (2) the function of sexual violence (e.g., as a
strategy of war); and (3) variation in levels of sexual violence by armed groups.
However, the last dimension of the literature is underdeveloped and its hypotheses
remain largely untested. A solid understanding of what variable(s) and causal pathway(s)
permit the variation of systematic sexual violence in intrastate conflict situations by
specific groups has yet to be developed. Also, Farr‘s and Wood‘s hypotheses have only
been applied to the critical case of Sri Lanka; extending the study to Nepal will allow
further testing of the theories and comparative testing between the two cases.80
Furthermore, Farr‘s and Wood‘s hypotheses have not been tested in cases where sexual
violence does occur in high quantity, as such comparative testing with ―worst cases‖ of
sexual violence (e.g., Sierra Leone) may strengthen the logic and theoretical rigor of
Farr‘s and Wood‘s explanations. And finally, Wood and Farr have largely ignored the
role that leftist and nationalist ideologies play in framing a group‘s use of (sexual)
violence against civilian populations—although they have highlighted empirical patterns
in which leftist and nationalist insurgencies employ sexual violence less frequently.81
Such a study may yield surprising results for policy makers, scholars, and human rights
advocates.
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1.4. Case Selection
Three cases will be incorporated into the study: (1) a brief synopsis of sexual
violence against women and girls by the SLA and other Sri Lankan pro-government
groups and a more rigorous investigation of the variation of sexual violence by the LTTE
in the 1983-2009 Sri Lankan civil war; (2) a thorough outline of the use of sexual
violence by the RUF and a précis of sexual violence by the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) and additional pro-RUF and pro-government groups in Sierra Leone
during the 1991-2001 civil war; and (3) a concise analysis of sexual violence against
women and girls by the Nepalese Armed Police Force (NAPF), the Royal Nepalese Army
(RNA), and Nepalese paramilitary groups, and a comprehensive analysis of the variation
of sexual violence employed by the CPN(M) during the 1996-2006 civil war. These
cases will provide the empirical data to test the hypotheses by Elisabeth J. Wood and
Kathryn Farr, explained below. First, by presenting data from the cases of Sierra Leone
and Sri Lanka this study intends to draw conclusions from a comparative analysis of each
case, one in which sexual violence was widespread by the RUF and the other where a
variation of sexual violence by the LTTE was evident. Second, data from the case of
Nepal will be presented in which a variation in sexual violence by the CPN(M) occurred
relative to state-perpetrated sexual violence against civilian women and girls. In the final
chapter of the study, the Sierra Leonean, Sri Lankan, and Nepalese cases will be used
comparatively to test four hypotheses—via the congruence method—derived from
Wood‘s and Farr‘s theories of wartime sexual violence.
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1.5. Variables and Operationalization
What factors cause the variation of widespread wartime sexual violence by armed
groups during intrastate conflicts? The dependent variable is wartime sexual violence; the
independent variables are: (1) the masculinities of soldiers; (2) overall levels of gender
equity between men and women in each country; (3) intensity of class, caste, ethnic, or
communal rivalries between armed groups; (4) the existence of laws and other
accountability mechanisms to punish perpetrators; (5) the material, human, and
ideological support of all armed groups from civilian populations; and (6) leadership
policies on sexual violence for all involved armed groups.

Dependent Variable
Wartime sexual violence, the dependent variable, will be defined as a broader
category that ―includes rape, coerced undressing, and non-penetrating sexual assault such
as sexual mutilation.‖82 The study will consider acts of sexual violence, both random and
systematic (i.e., employed as a deliberate organizational policy by armed combatants).83
Rape, a subcategory of sexual violence, is characterized by ―the coerced (under physical
force or threat of physical force against the victim or third person) penetration of the anus
or vagina by the penis or another object, or of the mouth by the penis.‖84 Sexual violence
is notoriously difficult to measure due to underreporting and overreporting.85
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Furthermore, difficulty accessing conflict zones often prohibits researchers from
accurately measuring the prevalence (or variation) of sexual violence during conflict.86
Nevertheless, this study adopts Wood‘s assumption that ―the extreme variation in the
incidence of sexual violence across conflicts and groups, together with the existence of
well-documented low-incidence cases, suggests that there are cases of relatively low
sexual violence: Not all the apparent absence is an artifact of our ignorance.‖87 Utilizing
an analytical framework developed by Wood, the dependent variable will be
contextualized within each group‘s ―repertoire of violence.‖ 88 Although underreporting
and overreporting of wartime sexual violence may be a possibility within the three cases,
a ―repertoire of violence‖ provides an analytical framework that compares the frequency
of wartime sexual violence in proportion to other forms of violence against civilian
populations—e.g., kidnapping, assassinations, massacres, torture, and forced
displacement.89
This study will analyze reports on wartime sexual violence compiled by human
rights organizations, truth commissions, international tribunals, and other IGOs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).90 Aside from the quantification of frequency, which
has severe limitations due to underreporting or overreporting of sexual violence, this
study will record and fit wartime sexual violence into typologies—i.e., gang rape, sexual
slavery, opportunistic rape, rape camps, rape in public to terrorize populations, etc.—and

propaganda strategies utilized by Serbian commanders to enflame Serbian nationalism and hatred of
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report the context in which it occurred. In each act of sexual violence, there may be more
than one perpetrator and acts may fit into more than one typology of wartime sexual
violence. Repeated acts of sexual violence against the same individual will be treated as
multiple acts of wartime sexual violence. This work will present interview data of the
survivors and perpetrators of sexual violence, their socio-political identity (group
membership based on gender, ethnicity, and political or social affiliations), and, wherever
possible, when and where systematic sexual violence took place.91

Independent Variables
There are six independent variables that will be analyzed which may influence
the use of systematic sexual violence in intrastate conflict. First, I will employ Laura
O‘Toole‘s sub-cultural framework of sexual violence for analyzing gender relations
within each group to be examined. 92 The masculine norms of armed personnel (both
state and non-state actors) will be assessed across the three cases, especially with regard
to the relative aggressiveness encouraged, levels and types of violence, group
socialization, beliefs about male sexuality, and gendered expectations of men and women
within the armed opposition groups to be examined.93 This study will also identify the
proportion of women in the armed groups and their roles, as this is important for
91
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determining the level of masculine socialization and the acceptance of women as
legitimate actors in armed conflict. The number of female combatants in leadership
positions will also be recorded. Also, the compiled ethnographic data of each armed
group will be contrasted against macrosocial norms of gender relations (the second
independent variable) to examine intragroup differences vis-à-vis societal norms and
practices of gender. When testing the hypotheses presented by Wood and Farr, this work
will explore leadership framing of gender equality in addition to various secondary
analyses of the armed groups in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone. Process-tracing and
the congruence method will enable the researcher to explore the context—and thus
improve the external validity—of the cases to be analyzed. This method will be utilized
to study the masculinity of opposition and government armed groups.94
Second, the relative socioeconomic status between men and women, and the
socially-valued ideals of masculine and feminine gender roles will require an analysis of
macrosocial gender relations. The macro-level analysis of gender relations in each case
will complement the group-level analysis presented above and allow the study to contrast
gendered norms and practices of armed groups against gendered societal norms and
practices. The identification of this variable will consist of both qualitative and
quantitative measurements. R.W. Connell states that ―at any given historical moment
there exists at a societal level an ordering of masculinity and femininity that produces
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controlling conceptualizations for public consumption.‖95 This gendered ordering is
based on the structural dominance of men over women.96 Structural dominance explains
how hyper-masculine men (―hegemonic masculinity‖) are able to dominate men
perceived to be less masculine (―complicit, marginalized, and dominated masculinities‖)
and all women (―emphasized femininity‖) in society, as a cult of masculinity—composed
of hypermasculine men that embody the most dominant and socially-glorified
masculinities—forces most men and all women into marginalized socioeconomic roles
and statuses.97 The use of Sanday‘s indicators to determine between ―rape-free‖ and
―rape-prone‖ societies will be employed to determine relative levels of gender equity in
each society. These indicators include: (1) which gender predominantly rears children
(and is expected to); (2) behavior indicating sexual repression of a particular gender; (3)
asymmetrical perpetration of interpersonal and intergroup violence by a specific gender;
(4) sexual separation of the sexes; and (5) ―glorification of the male role and an
undervaluation of the female role.‖98
This study will refer to government and World Bank statistics to determine the
percentage of men and women in the labor force (both formal and informal sectors), the
percentage of women voting, women‘s representation in government, and the percentage
of men and women in poverty. Additional quantitative indicators, such as the United
Nations Development Program‘s (1) Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and (2)
Gender-Related Development Indicator (GDI), will be documented.99 These indicators
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will help the researcher assess the relative levels of gender inequality and strength of
patriarchy between the groups involved in each case and where these groups are situated
vis-à-vis macrosocial norms of gender.
Third, the presence or absence of ethnic, class, or political conflicts will be
important to identify, as this independent variable may encourage the use of systematic
sexual violence to eliminate ethnic, class, and/or political rivals. This study will examine
statements made by members of opposition groups and government declarations directed
toward opposition groups in order to determine each actor‘s political, ethnic, and/or class
interests. Moreover, this work will investigate secondary sources and newspaper sources
to establish public attitudes toward the government and opposition groups. Testimonies
of sexual violence survivors will also be useful, as they often report on statements made
by the perpetrator: these may contain explicit and/or implicit racist, ethnic, or political
messages.
The fourth independent variable is the presence or absence of laws and their
implementation as well as the existence of other accountability mechanisms to punish
perpetrators of sexual violence. An absence of this variable may in part encourage the
systematic use of sexual violence during conflict by promoting a culture of impunity.
This study will compare accountability mechanisms in wartime to those found in
peacetime to determine if a breakdown in accountability mechanisms for perpetrators of
rape was present. Also, this work will identify existing intragroup accountability
mechanisms that punish personnel who commit acts of sexual violence. To establish
conviction rates for sexual violence in each case, this study will compare the number of

Related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/.
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wartime sexual violence convictions during the time period to the levels of sexual
violence reported by NGOs.100 The treatment of survivors of wartime rape in the judicial
process will be included in the analysis of accountability mechanisms. However, it must
be noted, underreporting or overreporting (for political purposes and to win sympathy
from specific ethnonationalist groups) of sexual violence may ultimately reduce the
external validity of such a comparison and thus the internal validity of this study. 101
Fifth, this study will evaluate levels of civilian support for the government and
opposition forces. The assessment includes a media analysis of the level of popular
support for the tactics, operations, and ideologies of both government and insurgent
actors. Also, this work will determine the extent of material support—both human
intelligence and economic goods—that each insurgent group obtained from the general
population, particularly women. Popular support, both ideologically and materially, will
be an important independent variable to test Wood‘s ―provision of support‖ hypothesis in
the three cases.102
The final independent variable is the group leadership‘s policy and directives on
the use of systematic sexual violence as a weapon of conflict. The strength of leadership
hierarchy and the authorization or prohibition of sexual violence will be important to
consider, as leadership may give permission for the use of systematic wartime sexual
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violence as an organizational strategy.103 Also, group leadership may punish group
members who have committed acts of sexual violence against women and girls. This
study will analyze statements by the leadership of each group concerning the use of
sexual violence and the ability of command hierarchy to influence the behavior of lowranking armed combatants.
Table 1.1. Independent Variables
Independent Variables

Operationalization of Independent
Variables
Intragroup Gender Dynamics
Gender norms of male combatants;
intragroup interactions of male and female
combatants; presence of women in
leadership, combat, and/or support roles;
forced or voluntary recruitment of women
and girls; gender violence by male
combatants; male attitudes toward female
cadre
Macrosocial Gender Dynamics
Prescribed gender role expectations and
behavior predominant in society;
percentage of women in the workforce;
percentage of women voting; women‘s
representation in government; population
percentages of men and women in poverty;
GEM and GDI indexes
Ethnic, Class, or Political Cleavages Leadership and combatant statements on
ethnic, caste, class, ideological, and/or
communal rivalries between armed groups
and state actors
Accountability Mechanisms
Levels of punishment of armed combatants
by intragroup or governmental judicial
mechanisms for acts of sexual violence
Civilian Support of Insurgencies
Material, intelligence, and/or ideological
support of armed groups by noncombatants
Leadership Directives on Sexual
Statements by group leadership on sexual
Violence
violence and gender equality/equity;
strength of organizational hierarchy to
enforce decisions
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The aim of this research project is to analyze what independent variables and
causal pathways cause the variation of wartime sexual violence by opposition groups.
This research project aims to test Farr and Wood‘s hypotheses—(1) ―provision of
support‖ from civilians, (2) macro-cultural norms of combatants, (3) leadership
prohibition of sexual violence, and (4) the presence and role of female armed combatants.
Although many other factors may in part explain rape in the three cases, there is one
dependent variable and six independent variables that will be considered in the study.
These variables were drawn from the literature because of their relevance to systematic
wartime sexual violence and to retain some level of parsimony when process-tracing in
each case.

1.6. Research Design
Using the cases of wartime sexual violence in Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Nepal,
this study will use process-tracing to ―uncover a causal chain‖ in the presence and
variation of systematic wartime sexual violence by armed groups in the cases.104 This
work will utilize a longitudinal study, over the course of each conflict, to observe changes
in the variables—via process-tracing and the congruence method—throughout the
development of the conflicts.105 Process-tracing ―offers an alternative way for making
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causal inferences when it is not possible to do so through the method of controlled
comparison.‖106 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett argue that utilizing a
comparative case study with the congruence method and process-tracing ameliorates the
problem known as underdetermination or the degrees of freedom problem—i.e., ―too
many variables, too few cases.‖107 This is important considering that the study has three
cases, with one dependent variable and six independent variables in each case. Also, this
work will account for equifinality (i.e., ―multiple causality‖) in each case of sexual
violence, in which the same outcome can be present in various cases via different sets
and/or interactions of independent variables.108
Sexual violence during intrastate conflict is notoriously complex, but this research
design will provide a rigorous means for identifying additional independent, antecedent,
and intervening variables through process-tracing each case. Combining process-tracing
with the congruence method may improve Farr and Wood‘s hypotheses, which posit a
Press. The two chapters present a thorough explanation of the congruence method and process-tracing
which will be utilized in the three case studies of this thesis.
106
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relationship between independent and dependent variables but have little to say about the
antecedent and intervening variables and the causal process that link them.109

Hypotheses
This thesis will use the congruence method in concert with process-tracing to test
four hypotheses developed by Wood and Farr:
(H1) When the macro-cultural norms of societies are gender equitable,
sexual violence during combat is less frequent and vice versa. 110
(H2) Group leadership may prohibit or authorize wartime sexual violence,
which may explain the low and high frequency, respectively, of systematic
rape by armed groups during conflict.111
(H3) When armed groups depend on the ―provision of support‖—supplies,
ideological support, and intelligence—from civilian populations and
intend to govern them, such groups do not engage in widespread sexual
violence against civilians.112
(H4) Insurgent groups with (a) high numbers of female combatants, (b) an
equitable sexual division of labor, and (c) female combatants in
leadership roles engage less in wartime sexual violence and vice versa.113
This study will look for a presence of leadership prohibition or authorization of sexual
violence in each organization‘s documents as well as human rights reports of the armed
groups in this study—for the armed forces of Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Nepal with
précis analyses and the RUF, LTTE, CPN(M) insurgencies with in-depth analyses. It is
expected that this study will demonstrate that group leadership‘s prohibition of sexual
violence (H2), armed groups‘ reliance on material and ideological support from civilian
populations (H3), and female combatants‘ presence and role in armed groups (H4)
explain, in large part, the collective variation of wartime sexual violence by specific
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armed groups. It is also anticipated that the influence of macrosocial gender dynamics on
insurgent groups‘ use of sexual violence (H1) fails to explain, in part, the variation of
wartime sexual violence in the Sri Lankan and Nepalese cases.

Ideology and Framing Processes
It must be noted that the four hypotheses may reflect the ideological influence of
Marxist socialism—which both the LTTE and CPN(M) claim as ideological roots,
although the LTTE was predominantly driven by Tamil nationalist ideology—if in fact
these hypotheses are confirmed in the study. In short, left-wing ideology may frame the
factors (i.e., as an antecedent variable) by fostering the presence and manipulating the
levels of certain independent variables and causal paths which lead to variations in
wartime sexual violence within and across conflicts as well as among armed groups.114
Framing processes for collective action—in this thesis, revolutionary insurgent
mobilization—are defined as ―action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization.‖115
Several caveats in the linkage of ideology and framing processes for insurgent
collective action, identified by David A. Snow, must be noted. The first problem with this
linkage is that ideology must not be assumed away as a set of beliefs and values that
function in a coherent, monolithic, and static fashion. The second pitfall is the assumption
of univocal adherence by members of an organization to its ideological character—rather
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than the common phenomenon of intragroup dissent via discursive processes among
group members. A third difficulty in the study of ideology and framing processes is the
tendency for scholars to assume a greater correspondence between group ideology and
members‘ behavior than what occurs in practice.116 Even despite strong ideological
coherence in some social movements, the fourth mistake by scholars is to associate
collective action framing processes as solely derived from group ideology rather than
cultural values and beliefs.117 These four caveats must be considered to examine carefully
the effect of leftist and nationalist ideologies in the insurgent groups under study.
Ideology as an analytical lens highlights the factors by which groups are mobilized and
how groups wield violence against both civilian and state actors.

1.7. Chapter Outline
Chapter one provides an introduction to the research question, a literature review
of competing explanations of wartime sexual violence, and concludes with a
methodological plan for the remaining chapters. This framework will guide the
examination of wartime sexual violence variation by insurgent groups in the Sri Lankan,
Sierra Leonean, and Nepalese intrastate conflicts.
The second chapter examines wartime sexual violence by the LTTE and the RUF.
It considers a brief history of the conflict, the state and non-state actors involved,
independent variables, and the variation of sexual violence by the two insurgent groups
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throughout each conflict. Chapter two concludes with a comparative examination of the
working independent variables and causal paths which may have influenced differing
levels on the dependent variable—wartime sexual violence—in the Sri Lankan and
Nepalese cases.
Chapter three presents a history of the Nepalese civil war, examines the armed
groups involved, documents the independent variables, and traces the variation of sexual
violence by the CPN(M) throughout the 1996-2005 period. It also briefly inspects sexual
violence perpetrated by the NAPF and RNA—the state‘s armed forces. In conclusion,
chapter three examines the independent variables and causal pathways which influenced
the variation of sexual violence by the CPN(M).
The fourth chapter compares the working independent variables and causal
pathways found in the three cases presented in chapters two and three. It considers, via
the congruence method, the explanatory power of Wood‘s and Farr‘s hypotheses on the
variation of wartime sexual violence. Once these hypotheses are tested, the study aims to
generate new theoretical insights and/or modifications for why sexual violence varied in
the Nepalese and Sri Lankan cases. Chapter four concludes with an assessment of the
explanatory power of Wood‘s and Farr‘s hypotheses, suggests areas for future research,
and offers policy recommendations based on the study‘s major findings.
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2. Wartime Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone
This chapter traces the variation of wartime sexual violence by insurgent groups
during the civil wars in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) and Sierra Leone (1991-2002). It presents
the historical backgrounds of the Sri Lankan and Sierra Leonean conflicts, outlines the
armed groups involved in each case, traces the interaction of six independent variables
throughout the conflicts, and observes the variation of wartime sexual violence by the
LTTE and RUF insurgencies between the cases. Chapter two concludes with a
comparative analysis of (1) macrosocial and (2) intra-group gender dynamics, (3) ethnic,
national, and/or class rivalries, (4) accountability mechanisms, (5) level of reliance on
civilian support, and (6) leadership directives which may have influenced the variation of
the wartime sexual violence between the two cases. This chapter will provide the data to
inform the hypotheses testing, theory development, and policy recommendations
presented in the final chapter.

2.1. History of the Sri Lankan and Sierra Leonean Conflicts
The colonial policies of Great Britain set the stage for political conflict in both Sri
Lanka and Sierra Leone by creating an environment where violence was viewed as a
legitimate means for political change due to a politically unresponsive and repressive
post-colonial state. This section uncovers the historical processes which led to the
formation of violent insurgencies which participated in the protracted civil wars in Sri
Lanka and Sierra Leone.
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The Historical Foundations of the Sri Lankan Civil War
The territory of present-day Sri Lanka (formerly called Ceylon) has a rich yet
violent history. Mistakenly, the current ethnic tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils
have been extrapolated from the ancient history of Sri Lanka by nationalist scholars,
politicians, and activists. But communal tensions and violence, especially during the
British colonial period (1796-1948), were based on religious, not ethnic grounds, between
Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, and Christians. Sinhala-Tamil tensions were altogether
absent until the late 1800s when communal policies implemented under British rule
created the first divisions between the Sinhala and Tamil populations.118 Contemporary
ethno-religious demographics are impossible to obtain due to the conflict preventing a
national census since the early 1980s. Despite this, in the latest national census
administered by Colombo in 1981, the population was 74 percent Sinhalese
(predominantly Buddhist with a Christian minority), 12.6 percent Sri Lankan Tamil
(predominantly Hindu, also with a Christian minority), 5.6 percent Indian Tamil (Hindu),
and 7.5 percent ―Moors‖ and Malays (Muslim).119 Christians comprised 7 percent of the
total population and were from Tamil, Sinhala, and other ethnic groups.120 Figure 2.1
below provides a geographical break-down of ethnicity and religion in Sri Lanka from
1975 census data.
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Figure 2.1. Map of Ethno-Religious Groups in Sri Lanka
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What are the distinguishing characteristics of the two dominant ethnic groups in
Sri Lanka? What, then, are the historical roots of Sinhala-Tamil polarization which led to
the 1983-2009 civil war? It is instructive to consider how the dominant Sinhala-Tamil
narratives of Sri Lanka influenced post-colonial Sinhala-Tamil tensions to the point of
civil war.
The Sinhalese are said to be of Indo-Aryan decent and are attributed to the rise of
Prince Vijaya, a mythical figure who is believed to have created the first Sinhala
kingdom in Ceylon circa 543 B.C.E. – 505 B.C.E. after his migration from northeastern
121
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India.122 Individuals of Sinhalese identity speak Sinhala, a language derived from IndoEuropean languages specifically of the Indo-Iranian branch. But the Sinhalese have not
always practiced Buddhism, and in fact largely practiced Hinduism before the third
century B.C.E. (although this varied by geographical location).123 A noted Sri Lankan
historian, R.A.L.H. Gunawardena, in his seminal study of Sinhalese Threravada Buddhist
identity, found that ―only after about the seventh century [A.D.] that prerequisite
conditions matured making it possible to link Sinhala identity with Buddhism and to
present Tamils as opponents to Buddhism [and proponents of Hinduism].‖124 Sinhala
narratives of Sri Lankan history emphasize that, although not the first settlers on the
island, they were the first ―civilized‖ settlers of the island they called ―Lanka.‖125 The
Sinhalese did not convert in large numbers to Buddhism until the third century B.C.E.,
but a large and vibrant Sinhala-Buddhist population flourished on Lanka until the ninth
century A.D. It is said that the state governing Lanka came under continuous threat from
Indian Tamils (located in the present-day Indian state of Tamil Nadu), and eventually, by
the ninth century A.D., Indian Tamil invaders had captured large swaths of the northern
and eastern parts of Lanka.126 The dominant Sinhala historical narrative also claims that
Tamil immigrants rarely, if ever, formed political units separate from the Sinhalese
kingdom (a principal claim of historical legitimacy for the LTTE‘s goal of an
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independent Tamil Eelam). Tamil ―immigrants‖ accepted the legitimacy and directives of
Sinhala monarchical rule.127
The Tamils are the second largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka. A large majority of
the Tamil population speaks Tamil, a Dravidian language originating from the peninsula
of southern India. However, Tamils are sub-divided by Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian
Tamils. Sri Lankan Tamils are said to have migrated from the present-day territory of
Tamil Nadu during ancient times; Indian Tamils were exported from India by the British
as forced laborers in the agricultural sector of Ceylon beginning in the early nineteenth
through twentieth centuries. In regard to religious practice, it is currently estimated that
80 percent of Sri Lankan Tamils and 90 percent of Indian Tamils practice Hinduism.128
The core claim of Tamil historical narrative is that, while not the first settlers on the
island, Tamil populations formed autonomous political units in the northern and eastern
parts of Lanka (after the ninth century A.D.). This narrative also claims that Sinhala
peoples were originally of Tamil origin, only later gradually converting to Buddhism and
adopting the Sinhala language in large numbers by the third century A.D.129 When
considering Sri Lankan precolonial history, Elizabeth Nissan and R.L. Stirrat write that
―[b]ecause much of Sri Lankan history is written from a partisan Sinhala or Tamil point
of view, it is often difficult to disentangle the historical evidence from the nationalist
framework imposed upon it.‖130 Additionally, because the Sinhala population is the
numerical majority, the Sinhala historical narrative tends to dominate historical
discussions of Sri Lanka to the present day.
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By the end of the sixteenth century, the island of Ceylon was divided into three
major kingdoms: (1) the Tamils of Jaffna; (2) the lowland Sinhalese in Kotte; and (3) the
highland Sinhalese in Kandy. During this time period, Portuguese conquerors subjected
the regions of Jaffna and Kotte to their rule, sparing the central kingdom of Kandy from
colonial rule.131 But Sinhala-Tamil relations were rarely violent and in general both
groups coexisted in Sri Lanka. Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, an expert on Tamil
nationalism, noted that ―[u]ntil the 1870s, we thus find an awareness of being Tamil,
even an awareness of a historical tradition that differs slightly from that of the Sinhala,
yet attached to one political unit, Sri Lanka, and a wider cultural region, India.‖132 In
other words, the notion of an independent Tamil Eelam had yet to gain support among the
Tamil population.
Sri Lanka, established as a British colony in 1802, is a small tear-drop shaped
island off the southeastern coast of India with an ethnically diverse population of about
19.3 million. It was initially a Portuguese and later a Dutch possession (both states used
the coast as a trade and shipping route) until the coastal territory of the island was
captured by the British in 1796. The central Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy—stretching
across the entire interior of the island—was eventually annexed by the British in 1815.133
Colonial authorities differentiated the native population on communal grounds (race,
language, dress, and religion)—a concept foreign to native Sri Lankans. Nissan and
Stirrat point out that by the end of the nineteenth century:
―A large number of distinct ‗races‘ were recognized by the [British]
authorities in colonial Sri Lanka. Besides the Tamils and the Sinhala, who
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were further divided into ‗Up Country‘ and ‗Low Country‘ Sinhala, and
‗Ceylon‘ and ‗Indian‘ Tamils, there were also ‗Moors‘ (i.e. Muslims,
again divided into Ceylon Moors and Coast Moors), Malays, Eurasians
and Europeans. Furthermore, other groups were also considered ‗races‘ at
times: the Mukkuvars, the Vagga, the Rodiya and so on.‖134
Sinhalese-Tamil tensions increased during the late 1800s until the final years of
British colonial rule as a result of rising Tamil nationalism, Sinhala overreaction to
electoral victories by Tamil parties, and British colonial policies of divide and conquer
that exploited communal divisions. The initial event which is attributed to the rise of
Tamil nationalism took place at Jaffna during the late 1870s. The Tamil population
violently expelled the Sinhala and Moors from the territory, either because (1) Sinhala
and Moors were deemed to be polluting temple grounds or (2) Sinhala populations had
been fomenting Buddhist rebellions in Jaffna throughout the 1870s.135 Subsequently,
Tamil-Sinhala tensions increased in this northern-most area of Sri Lanka. It was not until
1921 to 1924, when British Governor William Manning introduced policies that became
known as the Manning reforms. These reforms implemented ―communal representation‖
of all groups—the first time communalism became politically institutionalized in Sri
Lanka due to British attempts to stabilize colonial rule.136 Additionally, central power of
the colonial government was devolved—but only in the areas of local administrative
services—to provincial governments. Therefore, as groups tried to define their ethnoreligious identities to distinguish themselves from other communal groups, Tamil-Sinhala
competition in the colonial government structure became increasingly intransigent as the
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Tamils were disproportionately appointed to administrative positions in the colonial
government.137
Several communally-based political rifts arose after the Manning reforms. The
Manning reforms, according to the Governor himself, were designed so that ―no single
community [could] impose its will on others.‖138 Thus, throughout the 1930s and 1940s
the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) advocated for communal quota system in which
the Sinhala would receive 50 percent of parliamentary seats while other ethnic groups
received the remaining seats. The Ceylon National Congress (CNC)—the Sinhaladominated political party in opposition to the ACTC—refused to accommodate demands
for ethnic quotas which would jeopardize future Sinhala preponderance in the colonial
government.139 The founding president of the CNC and a Tamil, Ponnambalam
Arunachalam, left the party and formed the Ceylon Tamil League, the first political party
which mentioned Tamil Eelam (although he was speaking of increasing Tamil solidarity
and welfare) in its stated aims for ―Tamil evolution.‖140 Aside from the Manning reforms,
the British also formed the Donoughmore Commission, which was sent to Sri Lanka in
late 1927 and early 1928 to investigate ways in which London could devolve political
power to indigenous Sri Lankans. Although the British Governor would retain suzerainty,
the Donoughmore recommendations established universal suffrage with Westminsterian
winner-take-all parliamentary districts that disproportionately benefited the Sinhala
majority. According to A. Jaeyaratnam Wilson, the failure by the British to establish a
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stable, multiethnic system occurred because ―the Donoughmore Commissioners tended to
look the other way on the problems caused by multiethnicity.‖141
The northern Tamil population boycotted the first general election in 1931
because the new Sinhalese-led government, even after the Donoughmore proposals,
showed no intentions of sharing power with Tamils and other minority groups when
forming government and selecting ministers. More radical Tamil leadership boycotted
elections until 1934 because they would not participate in the state as a ―provincial elite
or minority interest group‖—a Sinhalese-proposed political alternative for Tamil
participation in lieu of a communal quota system. 142 It was during this time that the goal
of Tamil Eelam as a separate political entity in northern and eastern Sri Lanka became
increasingly attractive among many disenchanted Tamils.143
Sinhalese nationalism rose during the 1920s and early 1930s in response to an
economic crisis and high unemployment—which the Sinhalese population blamed on
Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils who moved south seeking employment—which further
strained Sinhalese-Tamil communal relations. Northern Indian Tamil migrants had
dominated the labor-intensive work force on estates, whilst educated northern Sri Lankan
Tamils became government and private sector employees. Rising unemployment led
many Sinhalese to believe that ―getting rid of the Tamil interlopers‖ would ameliorate
Sinhala economic woes.144 British communal policies, rooted in the logic of divide and
rule to promote stable colonial governance, highly polarized the post-colonial
government and Sri Lankan society. Nissan and Stirrat note:
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―What began as a series of claims by both Tamils and Sinhala against the
British was transformed into claims directed against each other. While the
British were present there was relative calm; but only eight years after
Independence communal violence broke out between Sinhala and Tamils
for the first time.‖145
By the time of Sri Lankan independence in 1948, Sinhala nationalism proliferated
and elites in government refused outright to accommodate Tamils and other minority
groups. British colonial policies—in the areas of political, religious, and educational
practices—had caused widespread discontent among Sinhalese Buddhists. This counterreaction to British policies, which challenged the core teachings of Buddhist doctrines,
had ―a profound impact on the shape and dynamics of Sri Lankan politics by the time the
British granted Sri Lanka independence in 1948.‖ 146 Tamil nationalism correspondingly
rose during the post-independence period, largely in reaction and opposition to expanding
Sinhala nationalism.147 Two major Sinhala political parties—the United National Party
(UNP) and the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP)—vied for Sinhalese votes by
marginalizing the Tamil population and promoting chauvinist Sinhalese (and Buddhist)
nationalism.148 The UNP, a reformist Sinhala party, governed from 1948 until 1956 when
it was defeated by the MEP (People‘s United Front) coalition in which the SLFP was the
principal party. The SLFP promoted stauncher pro-Sinhala goals than the UNP,
campaigning for the return of Buddhist preponderance and the establishment of Sinhala
as the official language of Sri Lanka.149 The predominant Sinhalese narrative at the time
of independence accused the Tamils of disproportionately benefiting from British
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colonial policies—particularly in the areas of government employment and higher
education. This Sinhalese perception in large part led to post-independence politics which
marginalized Tamils and other ethnic minorities.150 The Soulbury Commission, which
failed to provide political institutions to protect minority interests, allowed the Sinhala
majoritarian to implement pro-Sinhala policies in the period following decolonization
because of a strong centralized government coupled with Sinhala preponderance in the
legislative branch.151 Wilson describes the ethnocentric Sinhala philosophy formed
during the first years of post-colonial governance:
―The Sinhalese elite justify their claims on the national treasury by
arguing that they were persecuted by foreign rulers over several centuries.
The argument, therefore, is that they must now have it for good. The surest
way of obtaining access to the coffers is by tight, well-knit centralized
government, and an internal colonialism [i.e., Sinhala dominance of
Tamils and other minority groups] which permits no alternative centers of
power.‖152
Once in power, Sinhalese political parties implemented reforms which
marginalized the Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil populations in the areas of citizenship,
language, and education. The Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistani
Residents Act of 1949 usurped citizenship from one million Indian Tamils (eleven
percent of the population at that time). As a result, from 1964 until 1988, over half of the
Indian Tamil population left Sri Lanka for the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.153 The second
reform imposed a ―Shinala only‖ language policy that marginalized non-Sinhala speaking
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ethnic groups. Initially, a 1953 policy under the UNP institutionalized a two-language
system in the public sphere: Tamil for Tamils and Sinhala for Sinhalese. However, with
the victory of the SLFP in 1956, the ―Sinhala only‖ policy made Sinhala the sole official
language in the public sector—excluding Tamil speakers from government employment
and education.154 The third governmental policy was the standardization of university
entrance examinations in 1970, which barred many Tamils from higher education
entrance (who were disproportionately attending universities prior to the policy). The
policy allowed university administrators to admit Sinhalese students over Tamil students
of equal educational qualification. Even with an ethnic quota system installed in 1973,
Tamils were disproportionately underrepresented in higher education from the mid-1970s
onward.155 As a result of these post-independence policies, Robert I. Rotberg notes that
―[f]rom 1956 to 1970, the proportions of Tamils employed by the state fell from 60 to 10
percent in the professions, from 30 to five percent in the administrative services, from 50
to 5 percent in the clerical services, and from 40 to one percent in the armed forces.‖156
A final policy implemented by the state ultimately tipped the balance toward
widespread communal violence between the Sinhalese and Tamils. This policy, executed
by Colombo in the 1950s, established government-sponsored land resettlement for
Sinhalese populations in the northern and eastern (i.e., Tamil-dominated) territories of Sri
Lanka. This erroded Tamil voting strength in these territories and caused many moderate
Tamils who had advocated working with the Sinhalese to radicalize and support an
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independent Tamil homeland rather than Tamil provincial autonomy from the central
state.157 There were outbreaks of violence by Sinhalese nationalists against Tamil
populations in the riots of 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983. The violence was
perpetrated by Sinhalese rioters largely in reaction to Tamil electoral victories in the
northern territories. This is not to say that all Sinhalese were radicalized and anti-Tamil.
In fact, the majority of ethno-national polarization occurred in the border areas of TamilSinhalese territories—e.g. the northern, eastern, and north central provinces of the island.
This polarization occurred in these territories ―where the conflict has been most brutal
and population displacement has resulted in the construction of de facto ethnic enclaves
[i.e., homogenized Tamil and Sinhala internally displaced person camps] and embittered
identity politics.‖158 The victory of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)—a Tamilbased political party—in 1977 was the first instance of state security forces participating
in violence against both Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils in the north. The rape and murder
of Tamils were the primary forms of violence utilized by state actors from 1977
onward.159 On 24 July 1983, the LTTE killed 13 SLA personnel in Jaffna and, in
response, the SLA killed approximately 50 civilian Tamils. Anti-Tamil riots spread
throughout Jaffna in which over 400 Tamils were killed and over a million were
displaced by Sinhalese violence. The SLA did nothing to quell the violence for over a
week; some witnesses reported that SLA soldiers even participated in the anti-Tamil
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riots.160 The excessively violent riots of 1983 by the Sinhalese, which most scholars agree
as the beginning of the 26-year Sri Lankan conflict, ―was particularly instrumental in
stimulating reactive militant Tamil nationalism.‖161
The logic behind Sinhala political preponderance during postcolonial governance
was twofold. The first was that the Sinhala population felt threatened by the 60 million
Tamils living in India in the state of Tamil Nadu. The historical legacies of Indian Tamil
invasion during the ninth century A.D. no doubt inflamed this fear and led to the
repression of all Tamils by Colombo. The second source of resentment fueling Sinhala
chauvinism, and most importantly according to many scholars of Sri Lanka, was the
Sinhala perception that Tamils had been disproportionately favored by the British
colonists. Anti-Tamil policies from the 1950s through 1970s reflected the Sinhala elites‘
desire to redress the perceived oppression experienced by the Sinhalese during the
colonial period.162
The history of Sinhala-Tamil relations is essential for understanding the roots of
the Sri Lankan civil war. British colonial policies, which introduced the Western concept
of communalism, ultimately hardened Tamil and Sinhala positions in relation to the other
during colonial rule and served as a catalyst for Tamil-Sinhala communal violence in a
post-colonial Sri Lanka. As a result, policies implemented in the 1950s through 1970s by
a Sinhala-dominated government caused widespread Tamil rioting and violent
overreaction by Sri Lankan security forces and Sinhalese paramilitaries. By 1983, an
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outright civil war would devastate the country for the next twenty-five years as the LTTE
consolidated its power and launched its revolution.

The Historical Foundations of the Sierra Leonean Civil War
Sierra Leone is a small, coastal West African state situated between Liberia to the
south and Guinea to the north and east. The country has a diverse terrain including
mangrove swamps along the coast, mountains in the east, and wooded hill country and
sweeping plateaus throughout the center of the territory. Today, Sierra Leone is more
commonly known for its poor governance, extreme poverty, and alluvial diamond
deposits—a prime example of the ―resource curse.‖163 But alluvial diamonds were not
what initially attracted European colonizers to the territory of Sierra Leone. The
Freetown peninsula was initially utilized as a shipping center for slaves bound to Great
Britain (and later to the Americas) by the mid-1400s.164
Sierra Leone contains over seventeen distinct ethnic groups, many of which can
be categorized by two distinct languages. On the one hand, there is the Mande group,
which includes the Mende, Vai, Loko, Kono, Yalunk, Susu, and Mandingo. On the other
hand, there is the Mel group, which includes the Temne, Bullom/Sherbro, Kissi, Krim,
Koranko, and Gola. The remaining ethnic groups cannot be categorized by language, but
include the Fula, who are present throughout West Africa, as well as the Limba, who are
believed to be the original settlers of the region and speak a language different from other
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ethnic groups. The last major ethnic group is the Krios, who are descendants of liberated
slaves from Europe and the Americas.
Figure 2.2. Map of Ethnic Groups in Sierra Leone (c. 1969)
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Bearing in mind these various ethnic groupings, Chris Coulter notes that ―[e]thnic groups
in Sierra Leone do not form bounded cohesive groups, and migration and intermarriage
are and have been a prevalent feature of the region.‖166 Ethnic cleavages in post-colonial
Sierra Leone were much less pronounced than in Sri Lanka‘s post-independence period.
The legacy of Portuguese and British colonialism in Sierra Leone created a postindependence state that operated on patronage and corruption; its inability to administer
the rural territories—where the RUF would launch its ―revolution‖—in large part allowed
the RUF to consolidate power in the hinterland before it reached Freetown. The
165

Accessed at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/sierra_leone_ethnic_1969.jpg. This map of Sierra
Leone shows the ethnic divisions present in Sierra Leone as of 1969.
166
Coulter, Chris (2009) op. cit., pp. 32-3.

57

Portuguese were the first European power to make contact with the peoples of the
territory in the 1400s, although the exact date is disputed by historians. In one of the first
descriptions of what the Portuguese named Serra Leoa (i.e., ―Lion Mountains‖),
Portuguese explorer Duarte Pacheoco Pereira wrote in 1506 about the successes of Henry
‗the Navigator,‘ who had made first contact with peoples of the territory in the midfifteenth century:
―as far as, and including, Serra Leoa, when the trade of this country was
well ordered, it yielded yearly 3,500 slaves and more, and many tusks of
elephant ivory, gold, fine cotton cloth and much other merchandise‖
(emphasis added).167
The Portuguese government initially claimed a trading monopoly and built a military fort
and trading post in Sierra Leone, although the center was later abandoned and Portuguese
traders ignored the monopoly. These defiant individuals inhabited the territory of Sierra
Leone‘s coast, traded goods as intermediaries, and intermarried with the local
inhabitants.168 In the mid-1500s, the coastal inhabitants of Sierra Leone, called Sapes or
Çapijis by the Portuguese, were invaded by the inland Manes, who devastated the trading
centers along the coast.169 Despite this, the Portuguese were able to gain advantage by
enslaving inhabitants displaced by the warring ethnic groups in the traditional colonial
modus operandi: divide and rule. The Manes‘ king, ―Flansiré,‖ (as the Dutch called him),
knew the Manes were too few in number to occupy the conquered costal territory and
thus devolved power to sub-kings as he retreated back to the Sierra Leone inland.170
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The slave trade during the colonial period of Sierra Leone was a lucrative
business that attracted many European merchants and traders. The total number of
African slaves shipped to the Americas is estimated to have been 8 to 20 million.171
According to John Matthew, a lieutenant in the Royal Navy, in the areas between the Rio
Nunez and the Sherbro (approximately present-day Sierra Leone), 3,000 slaves were
traded annually.172 In a lucid description of the West African trade system, Laray Denzer
writes:
―Such an immense trade was the result of mutual co-operation between
African Kings, nobles, war-chiefs and merchants (the sellers of slaves),
and the European traders (the purchasers). Only the West African political
élites possessed the institutional means, political authority and wealth to
organize the scale of enterprise required for the collection and delivery of
slaves to the factories, forts and barracoons on the coast. This trade was a
straightforward economic transaction. Slaves were exchanged for a variety
of currencies (gold, cowrie shells, manillas, guines and iron bars), textiles,
firearms, ammunition, and manufactured goods. The terms of commerce
were dictated by African kings and merchants who maintained tight
control over their interior sources of slave supplies. Rarely did they allow
Europeans to travel freely, but confined them to their coastal settlements
or ships while slave cargos were accumulated.‖173
The European powers that fostered the demand for slaves were unable to access the
supply of slaves in the interior and thus exploited warring groups in the Sierra Leone
hinterland by purchasing their prisoners of war as slaves. Along the coastal territory of
Sierra Leone, it was common for indigenous elites to sell criminals to the European
powers as slaves.174 When the price of slaves declined, the Fulas and Mande—the two
dominant indigenous groups responsible for the majority of the internal slave trade—

171

Drenzer, Laray (1987) ―Abolition and Reform in West Africa,‖ in J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder
(eds) History of West Africa: Volume Two, pp. 48-85. Essex: Longman Group UK Limited, p. 49.
172
Matthews, John (1788) A Voyage to the River Sierra-Leone, on the Coast of Africa. London: B. White
and Son, pp. 145 and 175.
173
Ibid.
174
Drezner, Laray (1987) op. cit., p. 50.

59

forbade the shipping of slaves from the hinterland to the coast to artificially raise the
price of slaves, much to the dismay of European merchants. It was also during the early
nineteenth century that the domestic African slave trade grew as indigenous elites bought
slaves to labor in their vast swaths of farmland.175
The Portuguese had exploited Sierra Leone by extracting precious metals,
artwork, timber, foodstuffs, and slaves from the territory while thwarting indigenous
resistance by providing vast amounts of wealth to indigenous elites. Yet Great Britain
initially failed to establish a viable trade industry in Sierra Leone throughout the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By the late 1620s, English traders of the
Royal African Company (RAC) had established a trading post, but it was consistently
plundered by local inhabitants. In the 1660s, the Company had built several stone forts
with heavy armaments, all of which fell by 1704 to Dutch and French warships seeking to
expand their influence along the coast of West Africa. The RAC, in a final attempt to
control established trading networks, built a fort on Bence Island which had over fifty
cannons. The governor of the territory sought to suppress all trading rivals, including
mixed Afro-Portuguese and indigenous populations through a policy of divide and rule.
Walking this tightrope proved to be impossible due to the governor‘s insistence on
violent suppression: this policy united the Afro-Portuguese with indigenous Sierra
Leoneans. The fort was destroyed in October 1728; consequently, the RAC abandoned
Sierra Leone.176
The Sierra Leone Colony was founded in May 1787 by 377 white and free black
settlers. Yet this colonial experiment would fail due to the harsh Sierra Leonean milieu of
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the Freetown peninsula. By 1791, only forty-eight settlers remained alive, the rest having
died from starvation and disease.177 When the English abolitionist movement succeeded
in outlawing slavery in Great Britain, the abolitionists chose Sierra Leone as the territory
to resettle former slaves who became known as Creoles and, later, Krios.178 Also in 1791,
the Sierra Leone Company (SLC) was founded by British bureaucrats and businessmen
to: (1) take control of the Freetown colony; (2) establish a government; and (3) trade with
the colony and interior ethnic groups. Interestingly, as the British abolition movement
gained momentum in England, the SLC Board of Directors sought to disrupt the slave
trade—and replace it with a ―legitimate‖ trade in commodities.179 However, the slave
trade, much to the dismay of British abolitionists, would continue—and increase from
levels (i.e., 3,000 per year) common in the eighteenth century—in the Colony until 1835.
Additionally, the trade of slaves continued in the absence of Britain: Portuguese,
American, and French traders continued to operate until slavery was abolished in each
respective country.180
However, it is estimated that over 68,000 to 70,000 British slaves were liberated
and sent to Sierra Leone from 1803 until 1863, the majority coming from the Canadian
territories or by Royal Navy interceptions of slave ships.181 The Creoles, as these freed
slaves were then known, developed a unique socio-political system that mirrored a caste
arrangement vis-à-vis indigenous groups in West Africa by the turn of the nineteenth
century. Ethno-religious polarization, although rampant during the height of the slave
177
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trade, relaxed during the last century of the colonial period; instead, intergroup tensions
were present between (1) Creoles—who were disproportionately favored by colonial
British administrators—and (2) multiethnic Sierra Leoneans in the rural interior.182 The
Creoles adopted many traditional Sierra Leonean customs—such as polygamy— while
continuing their practices of Christianity, western customs, and western-styled education,
which ultimately led to their assimilation and participation in colonial governance and
commerce.183 Fourah Bay College, founded in 1827, pioneered higher education in West
Africa and Creoles were the principal ethnic group to attend the college.184 As a result of
their rising power in the colonial administration, Krios, as they would be called, entered
government service in rural areas of Sierra Leone that could not be filled by
undereducated, indigenous populations.185
London expanded its military presence into the hinterland of Sierra Leone as the
entire present-day territory was declared a British protectorate in 1896.186 Additionally, a
British company that was part of the De Beers‘ diamond cartel—the Sierra Leone
Selection Trust (SLST)—obtained exclusive rights to diamond mining after bountiful
alluvial deposits were discovered in the Kono district in 1935. The SLST monopolized
the diamond trade until 1956 although illegal mining was widespread during this time
period, as there were an estimated 70,000 Sierra Leoneans who were mining illegally by
1953. 187 Consequently, violence between SLST security forces and Sierra Leoneans
increased in frequency, as both groups were competing for diamond revenues.
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Widespread migration was also common during the diamond boom and rising cash crop
production of the1950s created a ―floating population‖ that was impossible for the
colonial administration to track and control.188
After World War II, the British began to implement measures toward self-rule and
political decentralization in Sierra Leone, reforming political institutions to become more
inclusive and representative—much to the dismay of the local Krio population who had
asymmetrically benefitted from political appointments and monopolized economic
opportunities during British rule.189 The British withdrew from Sierra Leone in large part
because of their inability to finance the administration and security of the majority of
their colonial territories after heavy economic and human losses during WWII.190 In
addition, popular protests against British economic policies in Freetown put pressure on
London to cede power to indigenous elites.191
Despite official independence, the SLST continued to operate in Sierra Leone for
a decade. At the peak of its diamond mining operations during the 1960s, the SLST was
exporting roughly 1.7 million carats per year on the world diamond market. By 1971, the
SLST was nationalized by the Sierra Leonean government and renamed the National
Diamond Mining Company under the post-colonial Stevens regime.192
During the early years of independence (1961-1968), the rise of a vibrant press
and a quasi-competitive electoral system (which, with interruptions, was partly free and
fair until the consolidation of Siaka Stevens‘s power post-1968) politicized ethnic
188

Keen, David (2005) op. cit., pp. 11-12.
Kandeh, Jimmy D. (1992) ―Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone,‖ African Studies Review,
35(1): 81-99, p. 88.
190
Kleiman, Ephraim (1976) ―Trade and the Decline of Colonialism,‖ The Economic Journal, 83(343):
459-80, p. 460.
191
Abdullah, Ibrahim (1998) ―Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary
United Front/Sierra Leone,‖ The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36(2): 203-235, p. 205.
192
Ibid.
189

63

relations. Stevens, however, closed down media outlets and imprisoned political leaders
who were critical of his de facto policies of patronage and corruption. Because of
ethnicity‘s instrumental use by politicians to mobilize potential voters around ethnic
identity, political liberalization backslid as an opportunist Stevens regime gained
hegemony by the support of populist Temnes who were marginalized by the dominance
of pro-Mende political parties from 1961 through 1967. David Keen explains the rise of
ethnically-based electoral politics in Sierra Leone‘s post-colonial system:
―Before independence, rivalry between the Temne speakers of the north
and the Mende speakers of the south and east had often been subordinated
to common opposition to the Creoles. But post-independence politics was
to be significantly shaped by this Temne-Mende rivalry… After Sierra
Leone acquired independence in 1961, appeals to ethnicity became one of
the easiest ways to recruit supporters in elections.‖193
The politicization of ethnic identity during the post-independence period fostered the
development of two ethnically-based political machines: the Mende were dominant in the
Sierra Leone People‘s Party (SLPP) while the All People‘s Congress (APC) enjoyed
widespread support from the Temne.194 Milton Margai, the first prime minister of Sierra
Leone from 1958 to 1964, was a dominant force within the SLPP and provided patronage
to the southern Mende population by disproportionately allocating government resources
to the south and buying off corrupt northern chiefs who tolerated abuses against and
economic deprivation among their Temne constituents. The second prime minister of
Sierra Leone, Albert Margai of the SLPP who ruled from 1964 until 1967, increased the
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number of Mendes serving in the military and government administration by 52 percent
(as opposed to Milton Margai‘s 26 percent increase).195
The dominance of the SLPP and disproportionate representation of Mendes in
parliament, state bureaucracy, and the military caused widespread discontent among
Temne peoples. This disgruntled population voted overwhelmingly for Siaka Stevens of
the APC in 1967—who won by a narrow margin—because of his anti-Mende campaign
which appealed to the economically deprived and politically-subordinated Temne
population in the north.196 Immediately after the election, Siaka Stevens was ousted by a
Mende-led military coup by Brigadier John David Lansana for a year-long period;
however, junior Temne officers in the armed forces overthrew the unpopular Lansana
regime and restored Stevens and the APC to power in 1968.197 After his return to power,
Stevens purged the military and political administrations of Mendes, granting a
disproportionate number of high-level officer and administrative positions to Temnes.198
Thus Sierra Leone became a one-party state under Stevens‘ rule, most notably
after the SLPP withdrew from the 1973 elections because of widespread APC-instigated
electoral violence against SLPP supporters in the south.199 A combination of political and
economic patronage was provided to elite Temnes and Krios by the Stevens regime
which bolstered their socioeconomic and political standing in Sierra Leone. Extrajudicial
killings, kidnappings, and other forms of violence were directed toward both Temne and
Mende opponents of the Stevens regime. Such state-sanctioned violence was employed
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by Stevens regime against political opponents and dissidents until Stevens stepped down
in 1985 and announced his successor—Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh, commander
of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF)—who continued the repressive
policies of the Stevens regime.200
By the early 1980s, the Sierra Leonean economy was in shambles due to both
internal and external factors. Because of poor domestic economic policies, the
agricultural sector was privatized, which led to the growth of a large black market
agricultural sector that avoided taxation by the central government. Through economic
patronage, Stevens shored up his economic power—and those of business elites who
were loyal to his regime—by controlling import and export licenses and monopolizing
various markets in the private sector.201 While only a few political insiders of the regime
benefited from the proliferating informal economy, the state exchequer was depleted of
tax revenue and the rural areas of Sierra Leone experienced increasing levels of poverty
vis-à-vis Freetown. Inflation became unmanageable and agricultural production declined,
steeply increasing the cost of food for Sierra Leonean consumers. The supply of
agricultural labor decreased due to the rising demand for laborers in the alluvial diamond
industry which sharply increased the price of food commodities.202 Stevens‘ hosting of
the Organization for African Unity (OAU) summit during 1-4 July 1980 in Freetown—
which cost the state $200 million to build infrastructure that was subsequently abandoned
after the summit—is indicative of the state‘s economic adventurism and waste during the
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1980s.203 The unofficial slogan pejoratively adopted by Sierra Leoneans for the 1980
OAU summit was ―OAU today, IOU tomorrow.‖204
External factors also brought disaster to the economic sphere in Sierra Leone.
Predominantly an export-driven economy, Sierra Leone was highly vulnerable to
oscillations in international commodity markets and the exploitation of natural resources
by monopolistic enterprises associated with the Stevens and Momoh regimes. This
situation was further exacerbated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
sought to impose structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on the Sierra Leonean economy.
The IMF and World Bank, in an attempt to restructure the crippled economy, demanded
the Stevens and Momoh governments to devalue the Sierra Leonean currency, reduce
public spending in social services, repay a buldging national debt, and strengthen the
―drive against smuggling‖ in the informal economy (e.g., Momoh‘s 1987 ―State of
Economic Emergency‖ and 1990 ―Operation Clean State‖).205 Because of the economic
crisis, exacerbated by Sierra Leone‘s SAPs, David Keen found that ―Sierra Leone was
spending more on servicing its debt than on its combined budget for health, education,
and other social services‖ during the 1986-87 fiscal year.206
The dismal state of governance and the economy in Sierra Leone—predominantly
driven by: (1) the impact of British colonial policies that pitted Krios against other
multiethnic groups; (2) the instrumental use of ethnic polarization by dominant political
parties in post-colonial Sierra Leone; (3) the rise of a repressive one-party state under
Stevens; (4) patrimonial economic policies; and (5) SAPs imposed by international
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financial institutions—sowed the seeds for widespread discontent, particularly among
Sierra Leonean youth, and the use of violence to exploit economic resources. The Sierra
Leonean civil war would begin as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—the principal
insurgent group in the 1991-2002 civil war which was sponsored by Charles Taylor‘s
Liberian government—crossed the shared Sierra Leonean-Liberian border into Kailahun
District of Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991.

2.2. The Formation and Hegemony of the LTTE and RUF Insurgencies
The LTTE and RUF were the dominant insurgencies during the civil wars in Sri
Lanka and Sierra Leone, respectively, and were responsible for the majority of non-state
violence against civilians. This section seeks to explain the formation and eventual
dominance of these two violent insurgencies while also considering their ideological
objectives and organizational structure.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
When Sinhala was made the sole official language of Sri Lanka and barriers were
raised to block Tamils from higher education, several Tamil political parties called for
parity status for the Tamil language and proportionate quotas for Tamils in higher
education.207 The Tamil Federal Party, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, the Tamil
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Progressive Front, and Ceylon Workers Congress formed the Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF), and by May 1973 the TULF called for an independent ―Tamil Eelam‖ to
be obtained by constitutional amendment—a reformist rather than revolutionary
process.208 Because the TULF was a reformist political party, it marginalized more
extreme segments of Tamil society who viewed violence (and revolution) as an
appropriate, if not the only, means for an independent Tamil Eelam. Jerrold M. Post
observes that ―[t]he Tamil base was loath to depart from the democratic system, but the
state‘s failure to protect them inevitably pushed them defensively to the path of
nationalism.‖209 Largely due to the failures of the TULF to secure Tamil rights via the
legislative process—coupled with Sinhalese-perpetrated violence against Tamil
populations after TULF electoral victories—violent Tamil insurgencies began to form by
capitalizing on the rising Tamil popular support for their revolutionary cause in the early
1970s.210
The Tamil armed struggle against the Sri Lankan state, although weak and
disorganized, began in 1972. The LTTE, initially named the Tamil National Tigers
(TNT) until 1976, was formed by Vellupillai Prabhakaran in 1973 and was a
revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization that spearheaded violent Tamil national
separatism in Sri Lanka.211 Prabhakaran was born in 1954 in the Jaffna Peninsula and
witnessed widespread discrimination of Tamils at the hands of the Sri Lankan state. In
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one of the few interviews he gave to journalists, Prabhakaran explained his path to
revolutionary action:
―It is the plight of the Tamil people that compelled me to take up arms. I
felt outraged at the inhumane atrocities perpetrated against an innocent
people. The ruthless manner in which our people were murdered,
massacred, maimed and the colossal damage done to their property made
me realize that we are subjected to a calculated program of genocide. I felt
the armed struggle is the only way to protect and liberate our people from
a totalitarian Fascist State bent on destroying an entire race of people‖
(emphasis added).212
Prabhakaran was influenced by the revolutionary philosophy of Che Guevara, and in
particular he believed that guerilla warfare was a legitimate means of revolutionary
struggle. Although the LTTE espoused both Marxist-Leninist and nationalist (i.e., an
independent Tamil Eelam) ideologies in public, Prabhakaran extolled violence and
nationalist ideology as the appropriate path toward an independent Tamil Eelam. The
number two man in the hierarchy of the Tigers, Anton S. Balasingham, spearheaded
Marxist-Leninist ideology within the LTTE, much to the chagrin of Prabhakaran who
viewed leftist revolutionary theory as ineffective in Sri Lanka compared to a nationalistic
armed resistance.213
As the government responded with state-sanctioned terrorism against Tamil
populations suspected of supporting and/or participating in the escalating Tamil
insurgencies, the LTTE (and other violent Tamil insurgent groups) adopted the goal of an
independent Tamil Eelam in the northern and eastern territories of Sri Lanka in 1977.214
In response to the 1975 assassination of a Sinhalese mayor in Jaffna peninsula (a Tamil
majority district), allegedly by the LTTE, Colombo passed (1) the Proscription of
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar Organizations and (2) the Prevention
of Terrorism Act—and thus Sri Lanka was to be under a state of emergency for over
fifteen years in which Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils were systematically discriminated,
kidnapped, and/or killed.215 As noted above, the civil war is generally believed to have
started in 1983 due to Sinhalese-initiated riots (in response to TULF electoral victories in
Jaffna) against Tamil populations that became excessively violent.216 Consequently, the
LTTE and other Tamil insurgent organizations exploited a surge of Tamil popular
support for their cause of, and revolutionary means toward, an independent Tamil
Eelam.217
The ―Tamil Five,‖ as the principal revolutionary Tamil insurgent groups were
called, were aided by Tamil politicians in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu (who had
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political autonomy vis-à-vis the Indian central government) and the Indian Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW)—the Indian external intelligence agency, akin to the U.S.‘s
Central Intelligence Agency. The logic of the RAW‘s support of the LTTE is best
described by what Saubhagya Shah calls ―strategic coercion:‖ By supporting Sri Lankan
opposition movements, Delhi was able to coerce Colombo into compliance with Indian
national security interests by weakening the legitimacy of a state beleaguered by a
formidable insurgent movement.218 To strategically coerce Colombo into a weak
bargaining position vis-à-vis Delhi, Sri Lankan Tamil paramilitaries received arms and
combat training from the RAW and politico-military connections in Tamil Nadu. Once
Tamil-Sinhalese and intra-Tamil violence escalated, India, shifting its support from the
―Tamil Five‖ to the Sri Lankan government, sent the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF)
from 1987-1990 to quell Tamil-perpetrated violence in the northern and eastern areas of
Sri Lanka when linkages were discovered between the LTTE and violent groups in Tamil
Nadu—which Delhi viewed as a national security threat.219
Despite the increase of Tamil popular support for the Tamil insurgencies,
ideological (and caste) differences in large part led to intra-Tamil violence among the
―Tamil Five‖ throughout the mid- to late-1980s. These organizations included the LTTE,
the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People‘s Revolutionary
Liberation Front (EPRLF), the People‘s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization (ERO). The LTTE obtained
hegemony over the other Tamil paramilitaries by destroying the TELO, forcibly
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disbanding the EPRLF and PLOTE, and coercively absorbing the EROS into the LTTE.
By 1990, the LTTE was dominant in the north and east of Sri Lanka and was uncontested
by the remnants of other Tamil paramilitaries. The Tamil insurgencies that survived
LTTE violence became anti-LTTE (although, oddly enough, still retaining the ideology
of Tamil nationalism) and participated in military campaigns with the SLA to defeat the
LTTE. These new paramilitaries of the Sri Lankan state became anti-LTTE due to the
excessive violence wielded against them by the LTTE and Prabhakaran‘s unwillingness
to cooperate with other Tamil insurgencies. The LTTE, once outbidding other Tamil
insurgencies, remained the only Tamil insurgency striving for an independent Tamil
Eelam by 1990.220
The organizational hierarchy of the LTTE situated Vellupillai Prabhakaran as
primus inter pares of the violent struggle for Tamil Eelam. In this centralized hierarchy—
with Prabhakaran as the unchallenged leader—organizational units, or ―wings,‖ were
differentiated by function, with the LTTE leadership as delegators of the operational
function of the various wings of the LTTE.221 The organizational wings of the LTTE
included the Black Tigers (suicide bombers), Sea Tigers (navy attack units), Baby Tigers
(child soldiers), Air Tigers (air force), and the Women‘s Front of the Liberation Tigers
(WFLT).222 Each branch of the organization was divided by gender and female leadership
was present in every wing of the LTTE. Women were under the operational control of
their respective wing, but under the administrative control of the WFLT leadership.223
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Because of Prabhakaran‘s cult of personality—and unchallenged leadership throughout
the conflict—within the organization, the LTTE was not factionalized between various
wings of the organization. Neil DeVotta describes the organizational prowess of the
LTTE after it solidified its position as the vanguard of Tamil national-separatism:
―At its apogee between the mid-1 9 9 0 s and 2 0 0 6 , the LTTE
controlled nearly one-quarter of Sri Lanka‘s territory; comprised an
army of over 2 0 ,0 0 0 with redoubtable conventional capabilities;
commanded a navy with speedboats and nearly a dozen ships for
ferrying weapons and supplies, as well as rudimentary submarine
capabilities and an experienced sea cadre; and operated a nascent air
force whose bombing raids embarrassed the government and caused
the island widespread angst .‖ 2 2 4
Why was the LTTE successful in obtaining hegemony over other Tamil
paramilitaries? The LTTE was wary of Indian intentions and built up arms separately
from the stockpiles received from RAW and Tamil Nadu connections. Also, the
asymmetrical frequency of violence wielded by the LTTE against rival Tamil
organizations caused the anti-LTTE Tamil insurgencies to disband or seek Colombo‘s
protection by integrating into the Sri Lankan armed forces as paramilitary units.225
Therefore, by 1990, the LTTE was the only remaining Tamil insurgency that sought an
independent Tamil Eelam by employing violence against state security forces, soft
targets, and Sinhalese politicians.

The Revolutionary United Front
How and why did the RUF emerge as a challenger to the Mohmoh regime in
1991? What was the ideological makeup of the organization? And what was the
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organizational structure of the insurgency? This section traces the formation of the RUF,
its structure, and leadership.
The RUF initially sought to address grievances among marginalized youth who
were discontent with patron-client relations that were rampant during the Stevens and
Momoh regimes. The beginnings of anti-Stevens movements in the late-1960s and
1970s—from which the RUF (deceptively) claimed to have derived many of its
officers—have been categorized by Chris Coulter as a ―student movement or student
culture.‖226 During this time period, a Krio-based student movement at Fourah Bay
College in Freetown—comprised predominantly of middle-class men—espoused a
populist ideology and protested against the Stevens regime, which at the time was stifling
inclusive political participation and equitable economic distribution. Unemployed male
youth joined the Krios‘ protests at Freetown‘s Fourah Bay College and voiced their
resentment against state repression of political opposition parties, increasing economic
inequality between urban and rural regions, and the patrimonial hegemony of the ACP
under President Stevens.227 As Sierra Leonean youth became active in Freetown, various
revolutionary texts were circulated, including Muammar Qaddafi‘s Green Book which
argued that populist politics and pan-Africanist solidarity were vital aspects of
revolutionary action. The student protests intensified as Sierra Leone became a one-party
state under Stevens but ultimately they failed to create linkages with other segments of
society, thus marginalizing the movement itself.228 Additionally, the ideological character
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of this movement was vague in that it emphasized opposition to Stevens‘ regime yet
offered no concrete means to overthrow Stevens. Many of these former protesters went to
Libya where they received ideological and military training from the Libyan armed
forces. One of these men was Foday Sankoh, who later became the undisputed leader of
the RUF by the early 1990s.229
During the late 1980s, after returning from Libya, Sankoh had not yet become
primus inter pares within the RUF and its organizational structure consisted of a loose
coalition of individuals. Sankoh, along with Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray, the other
cofounders of the RUF, decided to move their operations into rural Sierra Leone and
began initial contact with Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), who was waging a civil war against the Liberian regime of Samuel Doe.230 An
agreement was crafted between Taylor and Sankoh which proposed that if the RUF aided
the NPFL in its revolution against the Liberian state, Taylor would provide the RUF with
a base from which to launch their revolution against the Momoh regime.231 The original
RUF rebels first served as combatants in the NPFL, including RUF cofounders Kanu and
Mansaray. The RUF, then an insurgency comprised of roughly one hundred combatants
led by Sankoh, crossed the Liberian border into the rural Kailahun District of Sierra
Leone on 23 March 1991 and began its military campaign against the Mohmoh
government.
The ideological character of the RUF has been contested by many scholars of
insurgencies. In its manifesto, Footpaths to Democracy, the RUF argued that:
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―We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a
generation of crooked politicians and military adventurists… It is our right
and duty to change the present political system in the name of national
salvation and liberation… This task is the historical responsibility of every
patriot… We must be prepared to struggle until the decadent, backward
and oppressive regime is thrown into the dustbin of history. We call for a
national democratic revolution—involving the total mobilization of all
progressive forces. The secret behind the survival of the existing system is
our lack of organisation. What we need then is organised challenge and
resistance. The strategy and tactics of this resistance will be determined by
the reaction of the enemy forces—force will be met with force, reasoning
with reasoning and dialogue with dialogue.‖232
The ideological character of the RUF, shown above, was in direct opposition to patronage
politics of the Momoh regime and sought to topple the status quo through mass
mobilization. Yet mass mobilization against the Freetown government never occurred.
Participants in the RUF were often forcibly conscripted and civilians did not support the
means through which they pursued their revolution (although many supported the goal of
a liberal democratic and distributive economic system).
The political agenda of the RUF was widely disputed by Sierra Leoneans due to
the indiscriminate violence it committed against civilians throughout the war and the
central government‘s intransigence in recognizing that the RUF did in fact have a
ideological agenda.233 The RUF permitted intellectual discourse in the early and mid1990s, requiring ―ideological education‖ of all new combatants using Qaddafi‘s Green
Book (which exemplified the RUF‘s Libyan roots). The ―youth problem‖ of Sierra Leone
was manifest by young, uneducated, and (previously) unemployed combatants within the
RUF who blamed local ―big men‖—such as chiefs and the business elite who were
labeled as cronies of the Momoh regime—for their miserable socioeconomic status.234
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Although the RUF may not have had strong ideological grounding in nationalism
or Marxism, Ibrahim Abdullah notes that the revolutions in the hinterland (RUF) and
urban areas (the AFRC overthrew the Kabbah regime in 1997 and formed an alliance
with the rurally-based RUF) were ―oppositional‖ in the sense that ―[b]oth were products
of a rebellious youth culture in search of a radical alternative (although without a
concrete emancipatory programme) to the bankrupt the All People‘s Congress (APC)
regime.‖235 Young soldiers who voluntarily joined the RUF said that the ability to wield
small arms and light weapons provided them with respect from their elders as well as
food and shelter by coercing noncombatants. With their social and familial lives
disrupted by war, child soldiers were ―brave and loyal‖ combatants for the RUF, AFRC,
Sierra Leonean armed forces, and paramilitaries. However, the vast majority of youth
combatants who participated in the RUF were forcibly conscripted by rebel cadre.236
The RUF‘s emphasis on Muammar Qaddafi‘s Green Book stemmed from its
espousal of populism and pan-Africanism which was co-opted by Sankoh and RUF
leadership during their ideological training in Libya. Sankoh initially believed this
ideological view would resonate with marginalized Sierra Leoneans who grew frustrated
with patronage politics and widening economic inequality under Stevens and Momoh.
However, without a tradition of post-colonial radical politics in Sierra Leone to offer an
ideological alternative for revolution, and compounded by the rebellious youth culture
among RUF recruits, Ibrahim Abdullah argues that the RUF leadership valued
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combatants who would wield indiscriminate violence in the name of revolution.237 In
addition, the RUF had no revolutionary intellectuals and the original student
revolutionaries who participated in the Fourah Bay College movement were not involved
in the RUF‘s revolution.238 This lack of ideology and discipline among young RUF
recruits in large part explains why the RUF espoused ―terror and anarchy in the name of
revolution.‖239

2.3. Government Armed Forces in the Civil Wars
Government armed forces that participated in the Sri Lankan and Sierra Leonean
civil wars were also culpable of wielding violence against civilians, suspending civil and
political liberties, and, in the case of Sri Lanka, committing asymmetric wartime sexual
violence against women and girls during the conflict.240 This segment presents the
organizational structure, ideological makeup, and other intragroup dynamics of the major
state military forces during the Sri Lankan and Sierra Leonean civil wars.

The Sri Lankan Armed Forces
The Sri Lankan Army (SLA), under the auspices of the Sri Lankan president (who
serves as both head of state and head of government), is the coercive apparatus of the
state that grew increasingly authoritarian in character as the civil war raged throughout
the island (see Table 2.1. below). Ideologically, the government of Sri Lanka extolled
237
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Buddhism: the 22 May 1972 constitution articulated that ―[t]he Republic of Sri Lanka
shall give Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to
protect and foster Buddhism.‖241 Since most Sinhalese practiced Buddhism—and viewed
the entire island as sacred Buddhist territory—the government considered a potential
Balkanization of Sri Lanka as an affront to the official religion of the state. Therefore,
Colombo even viewed calls for provincial autonomy of Tamil Eelam as a threat to
Buddhist religious values—a military solution was the only way to approach Tamil
insurgencies.242 As the Tamil insurgencies proliferated (before the LTTE emerged as the
radical Tamil vanguard), military spending increased from 1.5 percent of Sri Lanka‘s
gross domestic product (GDP) and 4 percent of total government spending in 1983 to
5.79 percent of GDP and 18 percent of total government spending by 1987.243 Figure 2.2
shows military spending as a percentage of GDP by Sri Lanka throughout the 1983-2009
civil war. The initial increase in military spending arose as Colombo increasingly viewed
the Tamil insurgencies as a national security threat and feared a Tamil-led Balkanization
of Sri Lanka. The total number of personnel in the SLA—including both combatant and
support personnel—rose from 37,660 in 1986 to 167,000 by 1996; with the Sri Lankan
police included, this number was approximately 235,000 by 1996.244
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Figure 2.3. State Military Spending in Sri Lanka as a
Percentage of GDP
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The SLA was comprised almost entirely by Sinhalese personnel, as the anti-Tamil
post-colonial policies left only one percent of SLA fighters consisting of Tamils.246
Because of the failure of multiple peace talks during the early 1980s, by 1986 the
government viewed its SLA as the only solution for pacifying the LTTE. Yet the SLA
has been characterized by Rotberg as ―weak strategically, poorly led, poorly paid,
demoralized by danger and sustained lack of success, and allegedly riddled with
corruption.‖247 When Lieutenant General Srilal Weerasoriya took command of the SLA
in 1998, he pledged to ―defeat [the LTTE] as a military force,‖ root out corruption, and
enforce stricter discipline on an army that had been beleaguered by desertion, corruption,
and unprofessionalism.248
245
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Table 2.1. Regime Type and Quality of Sri Lanka During the Civil War
Regime Leader

Regime Duration Political Party

Junius Richard
Jayewardene

1978 –1989

Ranasinghe Premadasa

1989 – 1993

Dingiri Banda Wijetunga

1993 – 1994

United National
Party
United National
Party
United National
Party

Chandrika Kumaratunga

1994 – 2005

People‘s Alliance

Mahinda Rajapaksa

2005 – present

United People‘s
Freedom Alliance

Political
Rights/Civil
Liberties (FH)249
2.8/3.8
4.0/5.0
4.0/5.0
3.2/4.0
3.8/3.8

Women played a minor role within the SLA in the Sri Lankan Army Women‘s
Corps (SLAWC), founded in 1979, which situated women as unarmed support
personnel—primarily as medics, nurses, clerical workers, lawyers, logistics personnel,
information and communication technology technicians, and other noncombatant roles.
Within the regular army, two units (the First and Seventh) of the SLAWC participated in
support roles throughout the civil war; five units (the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth) of the SLAWC were part of the volunteer army, again, limited to support and
technical roles. Lankapuvath, a pro-government news source, recently described how
women were viewed by SLA leadership and Colombo:
―Though the number of women soldiers who sacrificed their lives on
behalf of the country is meager in figures they have dedicated their whole
life for the sake of the country. They did their utmost during the
humanitarian operation in the battle field to serve civil people, tend
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children without parents and protect people as mother [sic] and as a
daughter‖ (emphasis added).250
Female personnel, as shown above, were viewed as traditionally feminine, particularly
for their humanitarian tendencies, unwavering service, and motherly dispositions—
despite their participation in the SLAWC. There were no instances of women
participating in combat against the LTTE during the civil war, although the roles they
filled were integral to the daily operations of the SLA.251 Female personnel were unable
to marry during their military service and, both as enlisted and commissioned officers,
women in the SLAWC were held to the same standards of military service as men—with
the sole exception of rarely receiving training in the use of small arms and light
weapons.252
The SLA and its SLAWC corollary was a formidable opponent of the LTTE that
extolled Buddhist ideology, viewed a military option as the sole solution to the Tamil
question, and was riddled by unprofessionalism and widespread corruption. Women
appear to have been paid lip service by the SLA yet were unable to participate in combat
operations. Additionally, there were no reports of sexual assault against female personnel
within the SLAWC. The role of women in the SLAWC was limited to support and
technical professions, both as officers and enlisted personnel.
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The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) was a relatively weak,
ceremonial army consisting of only 3,500 personnel before the civil war. Military
spending was relatively low at only 0.7 percent of GDP in 1990 prior to the start of the
civil war in 1991; spending subsequently rose as the RUF became a threat to the
Freetown government, reaching its peak at 3.7 percent of GDP by the last two years of
the civil war (see Figure 2.3). The patronage system, entrenched during the Stevens‘
regime, guaranteed employment in the military for loyalists of the existing regime, while
merit mattered little for promotion among officers of the RSLAF. The RSLAF lacked
basic military hardware and the majority of its personnel were foot soldiers—there were
no armored vehicles, tanks, or heavy weapons. When the civil war broke out in 1991,
many officers in the RSLAF deserted their posts and remained in Freetown. As a result,
the government hastily recruited opportunistic individuals as officers and enlisted
personnel who were both unprofessional and disloyal to the Freetown government. A
case in point was the sobel—soldiers who participated in the RSLAF by day and with the
AFRC-RUF rebels at night—which was a common phenomenon among disloyal
personnel in Sri Lanka‘s military ranks.253 Rule of law was absent and civil and political
liberties were greatly curbed (see Table 2.2 below). The instability of the Sierra Leonean
state—and its legacy of corruption during the rule of the British and Siaka Stevens—in
large part contributed to a culture of impunity in which human rights violations, and in
particular wartime sexual violence, was rarely, if at all, prosecuted by state judicial
mechanisms. Four regime changes occurred throughout the Sierra Leone war,
253
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complicating the state‘s stance toward and strategic advantage against the RUF
insurgency. Under Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC, the regime entered a powersharing agreement with Foday Sankoh and the RUF, in which both armed groups, at one
time adversaries, formed temporary peace to fight ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, and Executive
Outcomes (a South African private military corporation).254
Table 2.2. Regime Type and Quality of Sierra Leone during the Civil War
Regime Leader

Regime
Duration

Political Party

Major General
Joseph Saidu
Momoh
Captain
Valentine
Strasser
Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah
Major Johnny
Paul Koroma
Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah

1985—1992

APC

Political
Rights/Civil
Liberties
(FH)255
6.0/5.0

1992—1996

NPRC
7.0/6.0

1996—1997

SLPP

1997—1999

RUF-AFRC

1999—2002

SLPP

254

4.0/5.0
4.3/5.3
4.0/4.6

Kandeh, Jimmy D. (1999) op. cit., p. 352.
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Figure 2.4. State Military Spending in Sierra Leone as
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The military staged several coups throughout the civil war. After the election of
Ahmad Kabbah and the SLPP in 1996, the SLPP regime, usurping power from Valentine
Strasser‘s National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military government, attempted
to stabilize the government‘s power and end the civil war. Executive Outcomes, a South
African private military corporation (PMC), was hired by Strasser and the contract was
continued by the Kabbah regime. The successful operations of Executive Outcomes
routed the rebels from Freetown, but the multimillion-dollar contract could not be met by
the fiscally-mismanaged Sierra Leonean government. Executive Outcomes withdrew and
the RUF regained the majority of its territory previously lost to the PMC.257 But the
SLPP-led government failed to restructure the RSLAF and in 1997, the AFRC—
comprised of both RUF and RSLAF combatants—initiated a military coup and a fragile
alliance was negotiated between the AFRC and RUF.
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External military actors prevented a complete AFRC-RUF takeover of Sierra
Leone. The AFRC-RUF alliance survived until 1998 when the Nigerian-led Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force
restored power to the democratically-elected SLPP government. When General Maxwell
Khobe, Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff and then-commander of ECOMOG died in 1999,
Nigerian operations in Sierra Leone were greatly reduced by succeeding Nigerian officers
(as Khobe was the primary advocate for Nigerian military hegemony in West African
security arrangements). As a result, ECOMOG command withdrew from Sierra Leone
and its personnel were integrated into UN peacekeeping operations.258 To prevent an
RUF takeover of Freetown, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was
deployed in late-1999 (initially 6,000 personnel) and at its apex consisted of 17,500
peacekeepers with an annual budget of $744 million. Additionally, 600 officers from the
United Kingdom trained 8,500 new recruits in the RSLAF throughout 2001 to build the
capacity of the national army to enforce security in the country and maintain
professionalism toward future civilian-led governments.259
What was the role of women in the RSLAF? The RSLAF forcibly recruited
women and girls into its ranks and findings suggest that 1,167 girls were participants in
the RSLAF as support personnel and active participants in combat where they employed
violence against noncombatants. Girl soldiers were particularly valued by RSLAF
officers because of their obedience and ferocity in combat. Based on data compiled by
Cohen, 1,167 individuals—approximately 8.8 percent of fighters in the RSLAF—were
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women (compared to 24.4 percent or 7,500 women in the RUF).260 Women were not,
however, present in the upper-leadership of the RSLAF throughout the civil war—they
were limited to field commanders of female-only combat units, enlisted combatants, or
support personnel throughout the war.261
Initially a ceremonial force, the RSLAF expanded greatly at the start of the Sierra
Leonean civil war leading to its composition as a highly unprofessional and poorly paid
national army a year into the conflict. Relative to the RUF, the RSLAF was similarly
undisciplined yet committed only 8.3 percent of rapes throughout the civil war.262 There
were no reports of sexual violence against female combatants (e.g., ―bush wives‖) in the
RSLAF as well as their participation in sexual violence against civilians. Despite more
equitable intragroup dynamics vis-à-vis the RUF, women in the RSLAF were
underrepresented (8.8 percent of total personnel) and were relegated to field commander,
enlisted combatant, and support roles.

2.4. Gender Dynamics of the LTTE and RUF
How were female combatants in the LTTE and RUF treated intra-organizationally
vis-à-vis women and girls in broader Sri Lankan and Sierra Leonean society? What were
their roles in relation to the men who participated in these two insurgencies? Were
women able to participate in leadership positions or decision making during combat?
This section aims to present both macrosocial and intra-group data on gender relations in
order to determine the role and treatment of women within the two insurgencies.
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Particular attention will be paid to the reasons why women joined the violent movements,
their active participation in combat, and the insurgencies‘ integration of women within
their male-dominated ranks.

Women in Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
In Tamil society in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, women inhabited a patriarchal
society which circumscribed female behavior in their daily lives before the conflict.
Predominantly Hindu in their religious practices, young Tamil women and girls were
expected by their parents to enter ―good marriages‖ while education was emphasized for
their male siblings.263 Through the process of Sanskritization, high-caste Hindu norms
and values (i.e., Brahmanism) were adopted by all castes, even by low- and backwardcaste Hindus. According to Brahmanism:
―the goals of marriage are dharma (―religious duty‖), praja (―progeny‖)
and rati (―pleasure‖); thus sex is last in importance, and only a low caste
sudra would marry primarily for pleasure… To sum up: according to
Brahmanic theory the ideal woman is pativrata [wifely devotion]: its
concomitants are virginity at marriage, chastity as the wifely goal,
unassertiveness and submissiveness, and unquestioning loyalty to the
husband‖ (emphasis added).264
In addition, conservative Hindu beliefs prohibited the remarriage of widows and required
that male family members be present at the burial of Hindu women.265 A ―good
marriage‖ depended on a woman‘s social and sexual reputation as well as the ability of
the family to produce a large dowry for a male suitor.266 To protect women‘s sexual
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reputations, Tamil families prohibited fraternization between men and women to prevent
sexually impure behavior before marriage.267 Tamil women were expected to be passive
actors in the private sphere (e.g., the home) while men were delegated active roles in the
public sphere. Childrearing was seen as a women‘s duty, while men were viewed as the
breadwinners of households.268 The sexual separation of the sexes—via the public-private
dichotomy—was, and remains, a gendered practice in broader Tamil society largely
influenced by conservative Hindu religious beliefs.269 The gendered norms and practices
of Tamil society in large part exemplify the qualities of Sanday‘s conceptualization of a
―rape prone‖ society.270 The only instance of Tamil women‘s participation in the public
sphere before the civil war was at Jaffna University in the 1970s, where they engaged in
peaceful protests against anti-Tamil legislation with their male colleagues.271 Ironically,
the Sri Lankan civil war was to provide a space for women‘s empowerment as fathers,
sons, and male relatives were killed, disappeared, or recruited into the ranks of the LTTE.
There were also localized Tamil superstitions—predominately in rural areas of
northeast Sri Lanka—which proscribed women‘s autonomy vis-à-vis men. Women were
not allowed to ride bicycles, to go to the sea, or ride boats; these beliefs were grounded in
the assumption that women would bring disaster to themselves and their families if they
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engaged in such activities.272 Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that throughout the Sri Lankan
conflict by year, women as a group were less equal than men (although they enjoyed
more equality than women in Sierra Leone). The spike in the Gender Empowerment
Measure during 2001 is indicative of widespread women‘s political participation in
anticipation of the Norwegian-led peace deal, the details finally agreed upon by both the
SLA and LTTE by 2002.273 This lull in the conflict (2002-2007) caused a shift in LTTE
supporters‘ tactics from advocacy of violence (radical means) to politics and civil protests
(reformist means): many Tamil and Sinhalese women protested the civil war and became
more politically active; the LTTE established an effective de facto state in northern and
eastern Sri Lanka; and Colombo refrained from challenging the LTTE‘s administrative
and military capabilities of the de facto Tamil state in the north and east.274
However, when the category of women is complicated by divisions between
Tamil and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sinhalese women were much more
socioeconomically empowered before and during the conflict than Tamil women.275
Sinhalese women—especially urban, middle-to-upper class, and university-educated—
have participated in local and national politics in Sri Lanka with the help of male
relatives who provide them access to political venues and resources. The world‘s first
female prime minister was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, a Sinhalese woman from an elite
272
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background, who succeeded her husband as prime minister of Ceylon after his
assassination by a Buddhist monk in 1959.276
Violence was overwhelming perpetrated by men leading up to the 1983-2009 civil
war among both the Sinhalese and Tamils. Jonathan Spencer notes that:
―Overt violence is most obviously patterned in terms of gender: women
very rarely have recourse to physical violence and very few murders are
committed by women; more murders are committed on women, but
generally speaking murder is something that happens between male
acquaintances. A higher and growing proportion of women commit
suicide, and suicide provides an alternative outlet for aggression against
those whom it would be unthinkable to attack more directly, people like
parents and husbands‖ (emphasis added).277
This statement in large part points to the asymmetrical violence perpetrated by Sinhalese
and Tamil men yet also highlights societal norms regarding women‘s use of violence.
Violence against oneself—rather than against others—was viewed as appropriately
feminine and appears to have been exploited by the LTTE with its use of female suicide
bombers in Black Tiger cadre throughout the civil war.
Sri Lankan women experienced gender inequality before the civil war, although
Tamil women were disproportionately subjected to gender inequality because of the
intersection of their gender and Tamil identities. Tamil women earned 10 percent less
than their male counterparts in comparable forms of employment; other ethnic women,
such as Moors, earn an average of 56 percent less than their male counterparts.278
Because of women‘s access to primary education (and social norms emphasizing its
importance for both boys and girls), forced marriages are not as common, especially in
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town and cities; however, in rural areas, forced marriages are more common. The average
age of marriage for Sri Lankan women during the 1990s was 25. Because of universal
access to public health care services, the maternal mortality rate in Sri Lanka was 60 per
100,000 live births throughout the war, one of the lowest in the developing world
(compared to 1,800 in Sierra Leone).279
Figure 2.5. Sri Lanka Gender-Related Development Indicators
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GEM Score (1.0 being perfect equality)

Figure 2.6. Sri Lanka Gender Empowerment Measure
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Tamil women‘s active participation in the LTTE began in 1984, when the LTTE
aggressively recruited and trained women in Tamil Nadu, India. Why were women
recruited into the LTTE? The shift in LTTE policy to the recruitment of women is largely
a result of: (1) the need for additional combatants to engage state security forces; (2) the
tactical advantage women provided against the Sinhalese states, particularly in passing
through SLA checkpoints and engaging in suicide terrorism; (3) the ideological and
symbolic need to demonstrate that the LTTE was in fact working for women‘s
emancipation; and (4) the in-group pressure female Tigers placed on leadership to
participate in combat against the Sinhalese state.282 To avoid any loss of support from
conservative Tamil populations, the LTTE initially utilized women in support roles while
gradually liberalizing these restrictions to include women in combatant ranks as the
281
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Tamil Tigers eliminated or absorbed Tamil insurgencies that claimed to be more
representative of Tamil cultural (and patriarchal) values. Adele Ann writes that ―great
care was taken [by LTTE leadership] not to upset the cultural values of the society at
large. First aid, cooking, etc. were the overt functions… As time went on, the birds of
freedom [e.g., female LTTE cadre] began to participate in the fighting also.‖283
How were women integrated into the ranks of the LTTE? Tamil women were
integrated into the highly-disciplined LTTE ranks via several policies: (1) male and
female combatants were separated during daily operations and even during combat
operations; (2) sexual relations and marriage (until Prabhakaran relaxed this policy in
1986 after his wedding) among LTTE combatants were prohibited; and (3) the official
ideology of the LTTE was revised to include the complete emancipation of all Tamil
women from patriarchy and the Sinhalese state.284 In short, the LTTE ―mimicked [Tamil]
familial relations‖ to maintain intragroup discipline and prevent the loss of conservative
Tamil supporters.285 To garner conservative Tamil support, noncombatant Tamil women
were treated differently by the LTTE as cadre reinforced patriarchal relations among
them, particularly by policing Tamil women for sexual chastity and even banning
women‘s wearing of trousers to prevent sexual temptation among Tamil men.286 This
paradox of gender (in)equality within and outside LTTE ranks is indicative of the
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instrumental role that women played within the organization while LTTE rhetoric of
women‘s emancipation was subordinated to the nationalist struggle for Tamil Eelam.
Women‘s early participation consisted of propaganda work, medical care,
information collection, fundraising, and recruitment—traditionally feminine roles in
Tamil culture. This was because initially, both male leaderships and enlisted combatants
in the LTTE did not view women as capable of combat and the reinforcement of societal
gender roles within the group made the LTTE more palatable to conservative Tamil
supporters.287 However, in 1983 the LTTE formed a combat unit comprised entirely of
female LTTE personnel called the Vituthalai Pulikal Munani (Women‘s Front of the
Liberation Tigers [WFLT]). The WFLT began training in Tamil Nadu in 1985 and by
July 1986 a WFLT cadre engaged in their first battle with Sri Lanka armed forces.288
Sensing a growing need for additional combatants in the LTTE, Prabhakaran
implemented the first all-women training camp in Jaffna in October 1987; the training
camp was designed to expand the WFLT by increasing the number of combat-ready
female cadre. Adele Balasingham, an Australian national and wife of the LTTE chief
political advisor Anton S. Balasingham, was the undisputed female commander of the
LTTE. She argued that women‘s incorporation was a natural evolution of the Tamil
struggle:
―Young women too experienced the horrors of the racial riots… The
forces of social constraint which had obstructed their deeper participation
earlier, had left them exposed and defenceless in the face of violent racist
hatred and State terror. Deepening genocidal oppression now propelled
them out of their established social life into a new revolutionary world.
Young women broke the shackles of social constraints, they ripped open
the straight jacket of conservatives images of women. The militant
patriotism of Tamil women finally blossomed as they entered into a new
287
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life of revolutionary armed struggle… The credit for providing and
creating the facilities and opportunities for women to complete a
comprehensive military training programme has to be given to the leader
of the Liberation Tigers Mr. Velupillai Pirabakaran [sic].‖289
Therefore, the WFLT had a fully autonomous leadership structure by 1989,
separate from the male-dominated leadership of the LTTE.290 The stated ideological goals
found in the WFLT charter were:
―to secure the right to self-determination of the Tamil Eelam people and
establish an independent democratic state of Tamil Eelam; to abolish
oppressive caste discrimination and divisions, and semi-feudal customs
like dowry; to eliminate all discrimination against Tamil women and all
other discrimination, and to secure social, political, and economic
equality; to ensure that Tamil women control their own lives; and to
secure legal protection for women against sexual harassment, rape, and
domestic violence‖ (emphasis added).291
The goals of Tamil women‘s emancipation were reiterated by Prabhakaran in speeches
which prioritized the national Tamil struggle and concomitantly claimed that women‘s
liberation from the structural patriarchy of Tamil society was dependent upon the broader
independence movement. Thus, Alison argues that ―it is clear that the independence
struggle [for Tamil Eelam] fundamentally frames the struggle for [Tamil] women‘s
rights.‖292 Similar instances of women‘s emancipation from patriarchy as subordinate to
or dependent on the nationalist struggle are common in other revolutionary nationalist
movements, including the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade in Chechnya.293
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There was significant resistance by many male LTTE combatants when women
first entered into the ranks of the LTTE in 1985. These men were products of a
conservative Tamil society that forbade fraternization between young men and women
and sexual relations before marriage. Miranda Alison interviewed fourteen Tamil women
who had participated in the LTTE. She found that many young female combatants sought
to ―prove themselves‖ to male cadre, who were initially skeptical about their combat
abilities and were uneasy with the prospects of women being killed or maimed in combat
operations.294 Teresa, a female LTTE cadre, explains how mixed women‘s reception
initially was among enlisted men in the Tamil Tigers:
―Now there would‘ve been other people in the Army who would‘ve been
very dismissive of women bein‘ in the Army… I had a very positive
experience in the Army but that‘s not to say there weren‘t men who were
Neanderthals, you know, thought ‗what‘s a girl doin‘ in the Army?‘‖295
Teresa also explained how male cadre often argued for having better weapons than
women and several men refused to go on operations with female colleagues.296 Women
were also separated from men in the LTTE. Thamilvily, a female LTTE cadre, notes that:
―men and women train and live separately because the movement is very
conscious of discipline. Society is not quite happy to have women join the
movement, so to have men and women train together would raise
eyebrows. It is better to have separate camps. Also, when girls first join
they are shy and need coaxing—this is easier separately. Also there are
problems specific to women. Also because the LTTE is so strong on
discipline, they want to avoid questionable behavior.‖ 297
In the late-1980s and early-1990s, male LTTE combatants initially saw themselves as the
protectors of women—rather than viewing their female comrades as highly trained and
capable combatants. Thamilini, a female Tiger, argued that women‘s active participation
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in the LTTE provided opportunities for men‘s acceptance of women‘s role in the
insurgency:
―When we do something then men get to know about our capabilities, but
our country‘s attitude towards woman [sic] is different and men are
always praised for doing harder and clever jobs, so on seeing women
doing the work it will kindle men‘s ego and ego tends to stop women‘s
growth in this aspect, but on that situation we need to be courageous and
patient.‖298
Tamil women were eager to engage in combat missions and LTTE leadership supported
the deployment of women in combat operations; thus, Tamil women won the case to
participate in combat by 1986 despite occasional protest by conservative male LTTE
cadre. Adele Balasingham, also known as Adele Ann, notes that: ―[a]s mutual confidence
and comradeship grew from the battle experience the gender distinctions in the
allocations of responsibilities and military duties started to melt away.‖299
The turning point for male cadre accepting the full participation of women in the
LTTE was in the north of Sri Lanka (c. 1995-6) when the SLA conducted its victorious
campaign to usurp the territory of Jaffna from LTTE control. The male LTTE members
initially thought that women would be unable to bear the brunt of the fighting in such
horrendous combat conditions, as the men themselves considered the situation extremely
precarious. The female cadre, however, saw the defense of Jaffna as their duty and sought
to prove themselves to the male colleagues. Tamilachi, who enlisted in 1991, and other
female LTTE combatants ―felt that the women proved their abilities and earned a lot of
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respect from their male comrades‖ despite losing the territorial stronghold of Jaffna to the
SLA.300
During the 2002-2007 period of fragile peace between the government and
insurgency, the LTTE appointed five female officers with years of combat experience
within the WFLT ranks to participate in the Subcommittee on Gender Issues (SGI)—a
symbolic move initiated by Prabhakaran that emphasized women‘s importance as
combatants, leaders, and administrators within the LTTE ranks. The Sri Lankan
government, in contrast, appointed only men to participate in the SGI, a committee which
was tasked with including women in the Norwegian-led peace negotiations.301 By the
time the Sri Lankan conflict ended in 2009, there were reports that five of the top twelve
leadership positions of the LTTE‘s central committee consisted of women, although little
is known about their ability to influence decision making during the latter stages of the
civil war due to the secrecy of central committee dynamics regarding decision-making
processes.302 Adele Balasingham and Colonel Yarlini (Vithusha), commander of the
WFLT throughout the civil war, were the two most influential female members of the
central committee decision-making processes.303
Female combatants in the LTTE gained considerable agency via their
participation in the WFLT and other women-based LTTE activities as the need for
additional combatants rose during the mid-1980s. However, several scholars challenge
the ―liberation‖ of Tamil female combatants in the Tamil national struggle and have
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questioned whether these women are ―agents or victims, liberated or subjugated,
emancipated or oppressed.‖304 Kamala Liyanage argues that similar to women‘s
participation in other nationalist struggles, the LTTE viewed Tamil nationalism as a
primary goal with women‘s emancipation as a secondary consequence after Tamil
independence. She points to previous national struggles in Algeria, Palestine, and
Zimbabwe in which female combatants were relegated to their previous traditional
gender roles after violent conflicts dissipated. As women become participants in
nationalist struggles, Liyanage asserts, male leadership defines and projects nationalist
visions while female combatants ―fight to fulfill men‘s nationalistic aspirations.‖305
Rajasingham-Senanayake challenges such a pessimistic analysis of women‘s
disempowerment through their participation in violent nationalist movements—and
particularly in the LTTE. She argues that female Tamil combatants are neither truly
liberated nor subjugated, but that:
―[t]he reality of LTTE women is probably somewhere in-between. For
while they may have broken out of the confines of their allotted
domesticity and taken on new roles as fighters, it is indeed arguable that
they are held captive both to the patriarchal nationalist project of the
LTTE leader Prabhakaran and the history and experience of oppression by
the Sri Lankan military. However, to deny these Tamil nationalist women
their agency because they are nationalist is to once again position them
within the ‗victim‘ complex, where the militant woman is denied her
agency and perceived to be acting out a patriarchal plot.‖306
Thus, women in the LTTE joined the movement because the sought revenge against the
Sinhalese state which they viewed as waging a genocidal campaign against the Tamil
people (e.g., the perceived genocidal use of rape against Tamil women). The female
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combatants were not subjected to sexual slavery, as in the RUF, and the LTTE leadership
punished male combatants who raped or sexually harassed both civilian and combatant
women. Additionally, female cadre wielded small arms and light weapons from 1986
until the LTTE‘s defeat in May 2009.
These intragroup dynamics confirm Alisa Stack-O‘Connor‘s observations that
women in the LTTE ―refute popular portrayals of women as duped into terrorism or too
emotional to make a rational decision‖ and would ―often show rationality in their
decision to take up arms.‖307 By the mid-1990s, female cadre, in large part, had been
accepted as full participants in the national struggle yet the organizational structure of the
LTTE separated the sexes during combat and training. Despite opportunities for women‘s
empowerment during the civil war, it is impossible to argue that the organizational
practice of ―separate but equal‖—separate training, camps, and combat units—amounted
to true gender equality and liberation for LTTE women. It also shows how the influence
of conservative Tamil cultural norms and practices limited the empowerment of women
intraorganizationally despite the LTTE‘s ideological rhetoric of gender equality.

Women in Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
Although it is difficult to generalize the macrosocial gender dynamics of Sierra
Leone due to the multiple identities which intersect with within Sierra Leonean society,
gendered commonalities—both in gendered norms and behavior—are present across the
population of Sierra Leone. 308 This section compares and contrasts marcosocial gender
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dynamics in Sierra Leone to intragroup gender dynamics of the RUF; traces the role of
women in the insurgency; and analyzes the (in)consistency of leadership statements and
directives on gender (in)equality.
Leading up to the civil war in Sierra Leone, men and women were assigned
complimentary (i.e., binary) gender roles by older Sierra Leonean men and women (i.e.,
agents of patriarchy) who sought to uphold traditional notions of gender, but such
gendered norms and behavior were not equitable, as men enjoyed dominance in the
political and legal spheres. Restricted by customary tribal law in the rural north, women
were unable to own property—especially land—as property was inherited via a
patrilineal process. Older women in the rural north—acting as agents of patriarchy—
often said that younger women should subordinate themselves to their fathers and
husbands ―because that is how we met [sic] it.‖309 Despite formal law (e.g., the 1991
Constitution) in Sierra Leone which granted women de jure equality with men,
customary law deemed women as legal minors in judicial processes, including ―adoption,
marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death, or other interests of personal
law.‖310
Age was another important aspect of identity which complicated the seemingly
unequal status of women. Deference toward elders was a common practice in Sierra
Leone, which allowed older women to exert power over younger Sierra Leonean men.
The emphasis on age as an important aspect of identity also led to widespread rebellion
of disgruntled youth (many of whom participated in the RUF, AFRC, or RSLAF) who
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targeted local ―big men‖ who were extolled for their elder status and/or wealth. As
polygamy was a common practice in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, senior wives had
authority over junior wives. Older sisters were often granted a higher status than their
younger male siblings in the family hierarchy by fathers and mothers.311
A rural-urban divide between women in Sierra Leone was also present before and
during the conflict. The experience of rural women contrasts sharply with educated Krio
women in Freetown who have worked for socioeconomic equality and political
participation since independence. Urban women knew the language of human rights
discourse and were often involved in local politics as community organizers, politicians,
or in secret societies; rural women, in contrast, were predominantly involved in the
agricultural sector, performing the majority of manual labor.312 Rural women in Sierra
Leone were extraordinarily resilient, engaging in the most difficult agricultural tasks such
as planting, weeding, and harvest, in addition to meeting men‘s expectations of their
duties in the kitchen and childrearing. Despite women‘s disproportionate participation in
agricultural labor, Coulter finds that:
―Male stereotypes about women… were that they were always gossiping,
they were lazy, they were also dangerous and needed to be controlled
(which is why they are circumcised, according to both men and women),
and they ‗belonged in the house.‘ It was understood that a woman cannot
be for herself; she is always of or for someone else‖ (emphasis in
original).313
Compounding societal stereotypes of women‘s behavior, the notion of rape as a
crime was a relatively new phenomenon in Sierra Leone by 1991; rape was once recently
defined to be perpetrated solely against virgins. Rape or sexual violence against non311
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virgins, according to Human Rights Watch, was justified by the misconception held
among a dominant majority of men that ―the woman must have consented to the act or is
a seductress.‖314 Within established marriages, ―[m]arital rape [was] not recognized under
either customary or general law in Sierra Leone.‖315
Two other forms of gender violence were widespread in Sierra Leone before and
during the civil war. Forced early marriages were common in the rural provinces of
Sierra Leone, and as these young girls‘ bodies had not reached maturity, maternal
mortality rates were 1,800 deaths per 100,000 live births.316 Young married girls were
often economically vulnerable and dependent on their husbands due to their lack of
education and/or vocational skills.317 Another socially-condoned form of gender violence
common to Sierra Leone throughout the war was female genital cutting (FGC). During
FGC, the genitalia of young girls are removed in order to ensure that they do not become
sexually promiscuous as they reach puberty. Secret women‘s societies and midwives
usually conducted FGC for adolescents, teenage girls, and women. Men and women in
Sierra Leone viewed this practice as an ―initiation‖ into womanhood and bachelor men
would not consider women marriageable until they had undergone FGC. Nearly 90
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percent of women in Sierra Leone have undergone FGC while they were young girls or
adults.318
Despite gendered norms and practices that were detrimental to women, rural
Sierra Leonean women (both Mende and Temne) often maintained separate economic
livelihoods from their husbands and/or male family members. This was a traditional
practice in Sierra Leone, Leach writes, as ―[h]usbands and wives have always maintained
separate income streams and expenditures.‖319 Regardless of their economic
independence, women were tied to the kinship structure which provided both benefits and
disadvantages to Sierra Leonean women. Coulter found during the war years that
―although women in Sierra Leone in general [were] less educated, [made] less money,
and [were] legally and politically subordinate to men, and despite the fact that Sierra
Leone [was] still a largely patriarchal society, many Sierra Leonean women [were]
nevertheless both resourceful and ingenious‖ in their daily survival.320 Educated women
from towns, suburbs, and the capital were also much more likely to divorce, although
rural women increasingly divorced their husbands if they were unable to provide for their
children. Thus, remarriage was common if potential suitors were willing to pay a ―bride
price‖ to the former husband, which was typically a considerable amount of money.321
Despite their resourcefulness, Sierra Leonean women were embedded in a highly
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patriarchal society, as evidenced by Sierra Leone‘s bottom ranking of socioeconomic
indicators for gender equity out of nearly 180 countries (see Figure 2.7).

GDI Score (1.0 being perfect equality)

Figure 2.7. Sierra Leone Gender-Related Development
Indicators
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Using Sanday‘s indicators on ―rape-free‖ versus ―rape-prone‖ societies, the study
finds that (1) women were predominately expected to rear children; (2) women‘s
sexuality was repressed via FGC and other patriarchal norms; (3) violence was
overwhelming perpetrated by men before and during the conflict; (4) males and females
were separated from a young age (e.g. women‘s and men‘s secret societies operated
independently of one another); and (5) as Sierra Leone was a highly patriarchal society,
men‘s status and experiences were systematically valued over women‘s. In short, Sierra
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Leone can be classified as a ―rape-prone‖ society before and during the conflict using
Sanday‘s analytical framework.
How were women‘s experiences in the RUF different and similar from those
experienced by female non-combatants? Approximately 7,500 women were forcibly
recruited into the ranks of the RUF which totaled 24.4 percent of RUF combatants.323
Women were coercively recruited into the RUF when it emerged in the Kailahun District
of Sierra Leone in March 1991—although in low numbers initially—to serve in large part
as domestic and/or sexual slaves to male cadre of the RUF. In many of their forty
interviews with women who had participated in the RUF, Myriam Denov and Christine
Gervais found that as RUF rebels entered villages and towns, they were ordered to join
the RUF at gunpoint. One young Sierra Leonean girl told Denov and Gervais that:
―During one of their numerous attacks, the rebels succeeded in driving the
progovernment forces from our community. We hid ourselves in our
house. The firing was so intense. Most people were running helter-skelter.
After the fighting and firing subsided, rebels entered our house and
forcefully picked me among my brothers and sisters… Who would dare
refuse? Not even if you were mad… So they took me away… I did not
know what we were heading for and what they wanted to do with me. I
was in total fear.‖324
Once captured by RUF cadre, many young girls were forced to do domestic labor,
including cooking, cleaning, washing, caring for young children, and carrying various
munitions (e.g., ammunition and small arms).325 A culture of violence within the RUF—
ranging from verbal abuse to horrendous acts of (sexual) violence against RUF members,
pro-government forces, and civilians—caused many women within the insurgency to
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become totally compliant with orders from male combatants. Not only was such violence
intended to ensure compliance from abducted women and girls, it served as a form of
―indoctrination into and desensitization to the RUF‘s campaign of terror.‖326 As a caveat,
it must be noted that some women—all reports come from the southern areas of Sierra
Leone—did in fact voluntarily join the RUF; however, Coulter and other scholars remain
skeptical about how ―voluntary‖ such cases were and point to the overwhelming number
of forced conscriptions of women and girls into the RUF ranks throughout the war.327
Because rural women in the rural south of Sierra Leone were disproportionately impacted
by the APC regime, Binta Mansaray argues that women may have joined the RUF for
gender equality and the ability to wield small arms—she portrays this as a ―revolt‖
against the feminization of poverty as well as patriarchal norms and customs.328
This skepticism over the issue of women‘s voluntarism is largely because of the
phenomenon commonly known in Sierra Leone as ―bush marriage‖ or ―AK-47
marriage,‖ which was a violent form of gendered relations within the RUF that amounted
to a form of sexual and domestic slavery.329 Women and girls captured by the RUF were
assigned ―husbands‖—usually commanders within the organization—who would then
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demand sexual favors and domestic labor from them. In the absence of their ―husbands,‖
these women and girls would commonly be raped by lower ranking combatants. One
young Sierra Leonean girl informed Denov and Gervais that:
―I was twelve years old at the time. There was one man, a commander,
who took me for his own. But the other rebels demanded sex from me too.
Whenever the commander was away, the other men would come after me
and rape me. Some were in full view of others. Sometimes they would
take me into the bush and rape me. They seemed to do it more often when
they were taking drugs.‖330
Such forms of sexual slavery often resulted in the pregnancy of women and girls in the
RUF, fathered by male RUF combatants.331
However, despite widespread sexual violence within the RUF, women and girls
were given small arms and light weapons, rudimentarily trained, and ordered to engage in
combat situations. This was a powerful form of resistance against male combatants who
sought to rape them, as their weapons provided them with personal security from sexual
violence. One girl said that ―I was eager to become a soldier and have my own gun so
that I would be able to resist threats and harassment from other soldiers.‖332 Still more
―bush wives‖ reported that they would hide food from their commanding officers and
male combatants in order to avoid hunger and malnutrition.333 The ―wives‖ of
commanders were also able to distribute food and military supplies to female combatants,
and in the absence of their ―bush husbands,‖ would command rebel bases, plan and
conduct reconnaissance missions, and raid villages and government depots for essential
supplies to conduct future combat operations. Another common form of women‘s
resistance was escape from the RUF while fetching water, supplies, or on combat
330
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missions.334 Those women who were successful in their escape left the bush for Freetown
or larger rural communities outside of rebel control; those who were recaptured would
often be executed as an example for other female (and male) combatants who dared to
desert the insurgency.335 A final form of resistance against intragroup violence was
women and girls‘ use of violence against civilians and progovernment forces to
legitimize themselves as integral personnel in combat squadrons and thus become subject
to less frequent sexual violence by male RUF combatants.336
Women were given the opportunity for promotion to leadership positions within
the RUF if they became respected combatants in the field, which usually meant that
female combatants who wielded indiscriminant violence against civilians and progovernment forces were often respected, shielded from sexual violence by male
combatants, and were promoted to the rank of unit commander. Often female
commanders were in command of a squadron of eight to ten female combatants, which
would operate separately from male RUF cadre (Coulter refers to this as a ―violent
meritocracy‖ in which women and young boys could become leader based on their
tenacity during combat).337 Women who were promoted to commander in the RUF were
often nostalgic about their accomplishments in the organization. One woman told Denov
and Gervais during an interview:
―Very violent and obedient soldiers were given positions as commanders.
You needed to show enthusiasm, be very active during combat and
terrorize and abduct civilians… I was very active in combat and also
captured a lot of people, including children. This contributed to my
elevation to the status of commander.‖338
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This meritocracy of violence in the RUF provided a means for women and girls to rise
through the ranks of leadership in the RUF, although there are no reports of women
exceeding the rank of unit commanders with 30 to 40 combatants under their command.
It is widely documented that drugs—such as alcohol, heroin, cocaine, crack,
methamphetamine, and marijuana—were given to girls who were part of the Small Girls
Unit. The Small Girls Unit, in coordination with the Small Boys Unit, employed the most
indiscriminant violence against civilians throughout the course of the war. Drugs were
viewed—even in interviews with young female combatants themselves—as the only
reason they were ―brave‖ during combat operations.339
Compounding gender inequalities within the RUF, the use of sexual violence
against female RUF combatants and furthered the institutionalization of gendered
differentiation and inequalities within the insurgent organization.340 This form of
violence—in addition to RUF-perpetrated (sexual) violence against civilian women and
girls—will be explored in the second part of the section below. Women and girls in the
RUF experienced a highly repressive organizational culture and widespread instances of
sexual slavery; however, these women were able to resist such oppressive conditions by
―marrying‖ high-ranking officers, escaping, wielding small arms and light weapons, or
employing violence so indiscriminate that commanding officers valued their safety for
future campaigns and considered them more fearless than male rebels.
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2.5. Variation of Wartime Sexual Violence among Armed Groups
The aim of this section is to uncover and analyze what Elisabeth J. Wood calls the
―repertoire of violence‖ by armed groups against civilians during the civil wars in Sri
Lanka and Sierra Leone.341 Although underreporting of wartime sexual violence may
have been widespread during the conflict, a ―repertoire of violence‖ as an analytical
framework compares the frequency of wartime sexual violence in proportion to other
documented forms of violence against civilian populations (e.g., kidnapping,
assassinations, massacres, torture, forced displacement, etc.).342

2.5.1 LTTE and SLA (1983-2009)
Wartime sexual violence varied dramatically throughout the 1983-2009 Sri
Lankan civil war as the SLA employed such violence in greater frequency than the
LTTE. The aim of this section is to briefly compare the use of violence—including
sexual and non-sexual violence—by the SLA and LTTE.

Sexual Violence Utilized by the SLA
The SLA employed sexual violence against Tamil civilians throughout the
conflict—in higher frequency in the early-1990s and slowly declining by the early 2000s
(according to data on reported instances of sexual violence). This is potentially due to the
prosecution and conviction of nine SLA soldiers for the rape and murder of Krishanthy
Kumarasamy in 1996 at a security checkpoint. The soldiers also killed her brother,
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mother, and neighbor who had been seeking here whereabouts.343 Although the data on
acts of wartime sexual violence by the SLA is glaringly incomplete, there are several
NGOs in Sri Lanka which have documented cases of sexual violence found in Tamil- and
Sinhalese-language newspapers. There is an absence of evidence which points to an
orchestrated policy (especially by senior leadership) of sexual violence by the SLA
against Tamil women; however, patterns appear systematic in the sense that rapes by the
SLA were committed in three common locations throughout the civil war: at checkpoints,
military barracks, and police stations. SLA leadership appears to have done little to halt
the frequency of rape by its personnel, and in acts of omission, tolerated sexual violence
against Tamil women and girls as part of its campaign against the LTTE and its
supporters.
The most common form of wartime sexual violence employed by the SLA was
the custodial rape and sexual torture of Tamil women, men, girls, and boys.
Disproportionately, Tamil women were targets of sexual violence throughout the civil
war—Sinhalese women were the targets of LTTE rape in only several documented
instances. The location of SLA-perpetrated sexual violence was commonly in police
stations and army bases. One woman was gang raped in a police station in the Amparai
district by SLA soldiers and was murdered by a grenade intentionally placed in her
vagina to erase the evidence of sexual violence.344
Another form of wartime sexual violence utilized by the SLA is the ―semicustodial settings of opportunity‖ or, more directly, rape of Tamil women and girls at
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security checkpoints on roads and highways.345 One high-ranking SLA officer,
interviewed by Wood, said that the frequency of checkpoint rapes:
―depends on the officer in charge… It depends on field commanders:
Good commanders don‘t allow it, keep tight rein on discipline. By and
large [SLA] troops adhere to that. Weak commanders lead to excesses. It‘s
a matter of professionalism. At road blocks and check points, rape
happens because of a lack of supervision and monitoring.‖346
This statement confirms that field commanders committed acts of omission by failing to
forbid the use of sexual violence against Tamil women and girls by their enlisted
personnel. The Women and Media Collective—a Sri Lankan women‘s media NGO—
found thirty seven instances of SLA-perpetrated rape in 1998. A Tamil nationalist
website listed seventeen cases in 1996, eighteen in 1997, three in 1999, one in 2000, and
six in 2001.347 In 1996, the infamous rape and murder of Krishanthy Kumarasamy
occurred at an SLA checkpoint. Nine members of the SLA cadre which perpetrated the
gang rape were charged and convicted with rape, which again may explain why reported
SLA rapes decreased so precipitously after the court ruling. Elisabeth J. Wood argues that
―sexual violence by state agents is decreasing, given the pattern of declining [reported]
cases and increased likelihood of reporting‖ because of the conviction of the nine
soldiers.348 However, there is little evidence that reporting would have increased after the
conviction because Tamil women overwhelmingly viewed rape by state security forces as
a free-for-all and believed they could not seek legal recourse for sexual violence in
Sinhalese-dominated judicial systems (particularly if they were accused of supporting the
LTTE).
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Repertoire of Violence Employed by the Tamil Tigers
In 1990, when SLA-LTTE violence was engulfing the northern Jaffna peninsula,
Mannar Island, and other areas of northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE forcibly displaced
75,000 Muslim civilians from these territories. This occurred as the IPKF withdrew and
left a power vacuum in the northern areas. The ethnic cleansing brought about more than
one hundred Muslim deaths in August 1990 alone, with extrajudicial killings the most
common form of violence against non-combatants by the LTTE. Muslims deemed to be
collaborating with Sri Lankan security forces were targeted and killed by the LTTE.
Although this may have seemed like an opportunity for LTTE cadre to engage in rape,
there were no reports of wartime sexual violence documented by human rights workers,
despite myriad cases of looting, murder, and torture in August 1990.349
The LTTE employed suicide bombing from 1987 through 2009 via its Black
Tigers suicide bombing division which contained 114 female personnel (compared to 464
men). From 1990 to 2000, the LTTE perpetrated 88 suicide attacks against SLA
personnel and Sri Lankan civilians (the highest concentration being in the capital of
Colombo). The first documented suicide bombing by the LTTE occurred on 5 July 1987
when Captain Miller, an LTTE member, rammed a truck bomb into SLA barracks in
northern Sri Lanka, killing 40 security personnel. The LTTE has also engaged in targeted
assassinations of Indian and Sri Lankan politicians, including the 1991 assassination of
former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a female member named Danhu of the
Black Tigers. The Black Tigers, also known as the Karumpuligal, were the most ruthless
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and violent wing of the LTTE, employing suicide bombers throughout the 1987-2009
period of the civil war.350
Tamil women who had been raped by the SLA were generally approached by
Black Tiger cadre and told that their sacrifice as a suicide bomber for the Tamil
nationalist cause would bring them martyrdom status and reestablish their family‘s
honor—a blatant form of extortion and a strategic manipulation of patriarchal norms in
Tamil society.351 For those who had not experienced sexual violence at the hands of the
SLA, LTTE leadership selected female recruits and indoctrinated them by pointing to the
importance of nationalism and martyrdom. In short, LTTE leadership extolled death as
the ultimate sacrifice for the national struggle. As a result, more than 100 female
personnel within the Black Tigers were killed in suicide missions (of the 4,000 women
were killed throughout the civil war), with a small minority of them being sexually
victimized by the SLA before joining the Black Tigers.352 Mia Bloom documents three
additional cases in which Tamil men, not associated with the LTTE, raped three Tamil
women who, several days later, were solicited by LTTE cadre to join the Black Tiger
suicide division of the LTTE to reclaim their honor by sacrificing their lives for an
independent Tamil Eelam.353
The February 2002 cease-fire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed
forces—brokered by the Norwegian government—held promise for a cessation of the
bitter conflict, which had cost some 60,000 lives (both civilian and military) in Sri Lanka
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from 1983 to 2002.354 Despite the ceasefire, the United Nations Children‘s Fund
(UNICEF) documented 3,516 new cases of underage recruitment by the LTTE in an
October 2004 report. By this time, the LTTE released only 1,206 children and ―of the
cases registered by UNICEF, 1,395 were outstanding as of November 2004.‖355
The International Crisis Group (ICG) documented various human rights abuses by
the LTTE during the 2005 to 2007 period of the civil war. Reprisal killings of Sinhalese
civilians increased dramatically during this time period (from 2002 levels which were
low due to temporary peace), the worst case occurring in the June 2006 bus bombing in
the north central town of Kebithigollewa in which 68 Sinhalese civilians were killed by a
LTTE suicide bomber.356 Extrajudicial killings of suspected Tamil collaborators and
Sinhalese opponents—mostly high-level Sri Lankan government officials—were also
documented by ICG researchers. For example, an LTTE sniper killed Sri Lankan Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgmar at his home on 12 August 2005.357 Throughout 2005 to
2007, the LTTE perpetrated kidnappings for ransom throughout Colombo, predominantly
targeting wealthy Tamil and Sinhalese businessmen. According to the ICG, the
kidnappings were not political, but designed to extract money from targeted individuals
in order to finance LTTE operations in the north and east.358
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During 2008 as the last year of conflict between the LTTE and SLA reached its
peak in the LTTE‘s northern stronghold, known as the Vanni, LTTE abuses against
civilians rose as they became cornered by the SLA in a continually-shrinking territory of
control. Human Rights Watch researchers found—by interviewing 35 civilians and
human rights workers—that during 2008 in the Vanni, LTTE violations against Sri
Lankan civilians included the forced conscription of civilians into LTTE ranks,
widespread use of forced labor, and heavy restrictions on civilians‘ freedom of movement
to and from the Vanni.359 The forced recruitment of adults and children into the LTTE
declined from 1,494 cases in 2002 to 166 in 2008 largely due to international pressure on
the LTTE to halt the forced recruitment of Tamil adults and children. However, in 2008
the LTTE began a widespread campaign to recruit forcibly children from the Vanni in
which LTTE cadre organized pro-LTTE rallies in northern villages and internally
displaced person camps, specifically urging 15 to 17 year-old Tamils to join the LTTE. In
several other documented cases, LTTE cadre went to different secondary schools in the
Vanni to recruit students between the ages of 14 and 17.360 The forced labor of civilians
by the LTTE was prevalent in the Vanni in late 2008. Civilians were required to pay
tributes to the LTTE, which often resulted in Tamil civilians participating in the
construction of bunkers, trenches, and other military defense infrastructure for the LTTE
because they lacked the ability to provide cash payments to tax-collecting LTTE cadre.
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By January 2009, the LTTE was essentially defeated by the Sri Lankan security
forces as the Tigers‘ operations were restricted to the Vanni in the northern tip of Sri
Lanka. Some 300,000 Tamil civilians were caught between a rock and a hard place as the
LTTE engaged in forced recruitment and a severe restriction of movement to and from
the Vanni and while the SLA intentionally shelled villages and hospitals with heavy
artillery weaponry and its air force. The resulting four-month intransigence of the conflict
was broken when the Sri Lankan security forces announced on 18 May 2009 that
Prabhakaran had been killed by an SLA cadre and subsequently declared the war over.361
The data above on the LTTE‘s repertoire of violence is instructive: while myriad
human rights violations by the LTTE were documented extensively, there were only a
few instances of sexual violence committed by the Tigers. However, the extortion by
Black Tiger cadre of Tamil women who experienced sexual violence points to the
manipulative tendencies of LTTE leadership to advance their cause despite weaving
norms and narratives of stigma surrounding survivors of sexual violence in their
nationalist rhetoric. Sexual violence by the LTTE was rare throughout the conflict yet the
frequency of other human rights violations paralleled or exceeded the SLA.

The Absence of Sexual Violence by the LTTE
What was the frequency of wartime sexual violence employed by the LTTE
against Tamil and Sinhalese civilians? While the data presented above traces the
―repertoire of violence‖ employed by the LTTE against civilians throughout the conflict,
two data caveats must be noted: first, instances of overreporting SLA rapes against Tamil
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women may be a large possibility.362 Second, human rights workers and researchers were
unable to document cases of (sexual) violence in conflict-ridden, inaccessible territory
controlled by the LTTE in the east and north of Sri Lanka. Cases of sexual violence by
the LTTE against Sinhalese women and girls appear, however, to be relatively low when
one compares reports of sexual violence with other forms of LTTE-perpetrated human
rights abuses. With this pattern of violence by the LTTE established, it is possible to
argue that the LTTE did in fact commit very little sexual violence during the war.
The LTTE has been implicated in very few cases of wartime sexual violence
throughout the 1983-2009 civil war. After a survey of various human rights reports
(including the ones carefully detailing SLA sexual violence and LTTE non-sexual
violence against civilians), the evidence suggests only a few instances of sexual violence
by the LTTE.363 The most detailed report of rape by an LTTE cadre occurred on 15 June
2002 when the cadre raped a young girl who attempted to escape forced conscription. He
was later killed as an example for other male cadre. In addition, an LTTE intelligence
chief was accused of the rape and murder of a woman in December 2003. He was
subsequently apprehended by an LTTE cadre and disciplined by his commanding
officers.364 Four other reports of sexual violence by the LTTE are reported by University
Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) in Bulletin Nos. 10 and 44 as well as Special Report
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7, but no further details are given about the context of the LTTE-perpetrated rapes.365 In
the few cases of richly documented instances of sexual assault by LTTE men, they were
severely punished for their actions, which most often resulted in deaths by firing squad
(and, even in instances where there was sexual consent, oftentimes both cadre were
lashed, forced into hard labor, and/or killed).

2.5.2. The RUF and AFRC (1991-2002)
Using Wood‘s ―repertoire of violence‖ analytical framework, this section presents
the various forms of sexual and non-sexual violence employed by the major actors—the
RUF-AFRC and RSLAF-CDF—throughout the course of the Sierra Leonean civil war.
The violent tendencies of these armed revolutionary groups serve as a ―worst case‖ of
wartime rape to juxtapose with the low variation of wartime sexual violence employed by
the LTTE and CPN(M) insurgencies. Also, the case of sexual violence in Sierra Leone
exemplifies a more orchestrated policy (i.e., acts of commission at the field commander
level)—within the larger framework of the RUF‘s campaign of terror—of sexual violence
by the insurgent group to disperse civilian populations. Overall, during the 1991-2002
war in Sierra Leone, an estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women and girls were targets of
sexual violence; such violence was committed by all armed groups involved, although the
RUF committed the majority of sexual violence (85.6 percent of documented cases; the
RSLAF and AFRC committed 8.3 percent of documented cases).366 There was a large
variation of wartime sexual violence throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone. Survey data
reveals that nearly 60 percent of rapes by all armed groups occurred between 1998 and
365

UTHR(J), Bulletin No. 10 (February 1996); UTHR(J), Bulletin No. 44 (March 13, 2007); and UTHR(J),
Special Report 7 (August 29, 1996). Cited in Wood, Elisabeth J. (2009) op. cit., p. 159.
366
Human Rights Watch (2003) op. cit., pp. 25-6.

122

1999 at the peak of the fighting between progovernment forces and the RUF-AFRC
coalition in Freetown and its surrounding areas.367 The remaining 40 percent of the sexual
violence committed throughout the Sierra Leone war was committed outside of the 19981999 period at a lower—yet still at an incredibly high ratio of sexual violence relative to
other conflicts (especially in Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Colombia, and Nepal).

Repertoire of Violence Employed by the CDF and RSLAF
The CDF, a progovernment militia, was implicated in only 0.4 percent of human
rights abuses against civilians in a Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) survey of 991
female households; the RSLAF, the government armed forces, were responsible for only
one percent of the total reported violations (whereas the RUF was responsible for 40
percent of reported human rights violations and 85.6 percent of rapes).368 The Kamajors,
an ethnic group of hunters from rural Sierra Leone, was the dominant ethno-linguistic
group in the CDF and was a relatively disciplined fighting force in comparison to the
RUF and AFRC, committing only 0.1 percent of reported rapes throughout the civil
war.369 The only documented instance of CDF-perpetrated sexual violence was reported
by Human Right Watch, which took place in the southern provinces of Sierra Leone
during 2000. CDF combatants, many who sought revenge against the RUF for the death
and rape of family members, raped women and girls who they deemed to be sympathizers
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to the RUF as 330,000 internally-displaced persons flooded into the southern provinces
of Sierra Leone.370 The CDF and RSLAF, however, also abducted children and forced
them to become soldiers, especially as the RUF and AFRC were surrounding Freetown
during the 1998 to 1999 period of the war and the need for additional combatants
increased. As evidence of this practice, over 3,000 children were released at the end of
the war by the RSLAF, CDF, and AFRC-RUF.371

The Use of Wartime Sexual Violence by the RUF and AFRC
The RUF was particularly committed to wartime sexual violence as an
organizational strategy of terror and was responsible for the majority (85.6 percent) of
wartime sexual violence during the Sierra Leone war.372 Rebel leadership launched
―Operation No Living Thing‖ and ―Operation Pay Yourself‖ during the 1998-1999 period
in which the vast majority of rapes were perpetrated by rank-and-file RUF-AFRC
combatants. Rebels often ―paid themselves‖ by looting villages and raping women and
girls in their areas of combat operations. During the war, the majority of reported rapes
were committed by RUF, RUF-AFRC, or merely ―rebel‖ combatants (as identified by
rape survivors to interviewers). One national survey revealed that nearly 84 percent of the
respondents identified AFRC-RUF combatants as the perpetrators of sexual violence
while 16 percent of respondents identified combatants from other armed groups.373
Sexual violence by the RUF took varying forms and was widespread throughout
the Sierra Leonean civil war. Gang rape typically occurred against young girls as male
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combatants would take turns on the victim; the rapes were often so violent that these
young girls commonly bled to death once the gang rape was completed.374 The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone ruled that:
―all of the armed factions, in particular the RUF and the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council, embarked on a systematic and deliberate strategy
to rape women and girls, especially those between the ages of ten and 18
years of age, with the intention of sowing terror amongst the population,
violating women and girls, and breaking down every norm and custom of
traditional society.‖375
Also, in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Prosecutors vs. Sesay, Kallon, and
Gbao (RUF Case) found all three former-RUF commanders guilty of crimes against
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention—and were found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to have orchestrated campaigns of sexual violence against civilians
(i.e., acts of commission).376 Documented in a cross-national survey of the Sierra Leone
war, 75.8 percent of rapes committed during the time period were gang rapes.377
Moreover, according to Cohen‘s findings, gang rape acted as a tool for the social bonding
of combatants—what she refers to as ―combatant socialization‖—who were forcibly
recruited into RUF ranks and relatively uncommitted to the RUF when initially
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abducted.378 Gang rape served as a bonding tool to increase rebels‘ loyalty to and trust of
fellow combatants and RUF commanders.
Contrary to conventional theories on wartime rape and traditional notions of
femininity, women in the RUF were also active participants in wartime sexual violence
against women and girls in the Sierra Leone war. Women comprised over 24.4 percent of
the RUF (as opposed to the SLA/AFRC at 8.8 percent and 1.9 percent of the CDF), yet
the RUF was responsible for more than 85 percent of rapes.379 Female rebels reportedly
held down noncombatant girls and women as they were raped by male combatants. Still
other reports describe female rebels raping female noncombatants with objects such as
knives, sticks, and the barrels of their AK-47s.380 Cohen argues that female rebels
participated in sexual violence against noncombatants to garner respect from male rebels,
gain loot such as jewelry for a reward, and ensure their value to the RUF leadership—in
fact, because they severely deviated from traditional norms of femininity, they were
deemed ―monsters‖ and deployed in the front lines of the RUF‘s campaigns of terror
against civilians.381
Young girls were the most common target of wartime sexual violence committed
by the RUF. This process of ―virgination‖—the rape of virgins—was in large part drawn
from values shared by many patriarchal, rape-prone societies around the world.
According to Sierra Leonean cultural norms, women and girls who were virgins were
deemed more marriageable relative to those who had already had sexual intercourse
(something that is also universal in socially-conservative, patriarchal societies).
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―Virgination‖ proved disastrously effective in dispersing entire communities and
destroying the social fabric of targeted communities (as rape survivors were stigmatized
by and exiled from their communities).382 Some of these girls and women were handpicked by rebels commanders to be their ―bush wives‖ while the majority were left to die
or suffer from their injuries incurred by the extreme brutality of the rapes.383
The RUF committed various forms of non-sexual violence against civilian
populations. Although sexual violence reached its peak from 1998 to 1999, the RUF
committed the vast majority of its human rights violations (which were more often nonsexual violence) during the 1993 to 1997 period. According to a PHR report, of 991
female-headed households, 40 percent had experienced some form of human rights abuse
at the hands of RUF cadre throughout the Sierra Leonean civil war.384 The RUF forcibly
abducted thousands of children to serve within the rank-and-file of the insurgency, often
providing them with drugs and small arms and light weapons before ordering them to
combat. Rebel combatants also cut off the limbs of women, men, and children in order to
prevent them from voting in national elections and working in agricultural jobs which
were many peoples‘ only livelihood.385
Despite the considerable amount of female RUF combatants, intragroup gender
dynamics permitted sexual violence against female personnel and ―bush wives,‖ although
there are instances of women who wielded small arms primarily for their own protection.
However, the RUF was a much more inhospitable insurgency to its own female personnel
than the LTTE and there was an absence of rhetoric for women‘s emancipation by RUF

382

Human Rights Watch (2004) op. cit., p. 28.
Coulter, Chris (2009) op. cit., pp. 130-1.
384
Amowitz, Lynn L. et al. (2002) op. cit., pp. 517 and 519.
385
Coulter, Chris (2009) op. cit., p. 54.
383

127

leadership. Also, in contrast to the LTTE, the RUF committed acts of commission by
orchestrating sexual violence against civilians, while the LTTE rarely committed sexual
violence (and those who were caught were severely punished). The importance of
variations among leadership prohibition of sexual violence and equitable intragroup
gender dynamics between the two cases will be analyzed in the following section.

2.6. Explaining the Variation of Sexual Violence among the LTTE and RUF
Four hypotheses were presented in chapter one as potential explanations for the
variation of wartime sexual violence: (1) leadership prohibition of sexual violence; (2)
intragroup gender dynamics which forbid or tolerate sexual violence; (3) macrosocial
gender norms and behaviors in which sexual violence is absent; and (4) insurgent groups‘
reliance on popular support of civilians populations which makes wartime sexual
violence counterproductive to realize organizational goals. This section seeks to analyze
the working independent variables in the LTTE and RUF cases in order to compile the
data necessary to build a theoretical explanation of the variation of sexual violence
perpetrated by the Tamil Tigers and RUF in chapter four. Why was wartime sexual
violence employed less frequently by the LTTE than by SLA combatants? And what
factors correlate with the RUF‘s use of wartime sexual violence on a widespread scale
vis-à-vis other armed groups during the Sierra Leone civil war?
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The LTTE’s Limited Use of Wartime Sexual Violence
The LTTE rarely engaged in wartime sexual violence throughout the Sri Lankan
war. What factors explain this variation in wartime sexual violence? What independent
variables were present throughout part of or all of the conflict?
The macrosocial variable—that cultural norms on relations between men and
women foster higher instances of sexual violence—appears to be present in the Sri
Lankan case. Sexual relations between unmarried persons, cross-caste intercourse, or the
rape of non-spouses are condemned in Tamil and Sinhalese cultures in Sri Lanka.386 But
both Sinhalese and Tamil macrosocial gender relations are analytically conceptualized as
―rape-prone‖ in this study, yet the LTTE engaged in few instances of wartime sexual
violence while the SLA systematically committed sexual violence at checkpoints,
barracks, and police stations.
On the other hand, equitable intragroup gender dynamics of the LTTE are present
throughout the Sri Lankan case. Female LTTE personnel gained respect from male LTTE
combatants in the late 1980s and such equitable relations continued until the end of the
civil war in 2009. However, female LTTE cadre were largely separated from male
cadre—in the guise of a ―separate but equal‖ LTTE policy—to prevent sexual relations
between male and female personnel. Despite some gains for women via their
participation in the Tamil Tigers, it is an exaggeration to claim that intragroup gender
dynamics were entirely supportive of women‘s emancipation; Tamil separatism remained
the primary goal of the LTTE throughout the conflict. Moreover, Tamil women who
participated actively in the insurgency adopted stereotypically masculine norms and
behaviors to effectively participate in LTTE combat operations—namely the suppression
386
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of weakness, demonstrations of bravery, and the use of small arms and light weapons.
Although Wood rejects the hypotheses that women‘s presence in an armed group is
associated with less frequent acts of wartime sexual violence, there is an additional aspect
of women‘s participation in violent insurgencies that she did not consider. It is not solely
the presence of women in the organization which is correlated with a low frequency of
rape, but it is how women are treated and participate in the organization vis-à-vis male
combatants.387 A low frequency of wartime sexual violence by the LTTE may best be
attributed to the fact that female LTTE personnel were respected by male combatants and
there was a strong need for additional recruits from civilian populations—many of whom
were Tamil women.
The LTTE‘s reliance on the popular support of Tamil populations in the north and
east of Sri Lanka did not prevent the organization from committing acts of non-sexual
violence against Tamil civilians. The LTTE‘s reliance on popular support was present
throughout the course of the conflict, although much of the financial support and
intelligence was coercively extracted from the Tamil population in Sri Lanka and the
Tamil diaspora in the U.S. and Canada. However, in order to attract female recruits, the
LTTE released various propaganda statements promoting women‘s equality and
deploring acts of rape by SLA security forces. Thus, LTTE leadership may have
intentionally prevented the use of wartime sexual violence in order to attract female
recruits to the organization.388
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Ethnic and political rivalry between the SLA and LTTE was strongly present
throughout the conflict, although Tamil-Sinhalese tensions did not lead the LTTE to
engage in wartime sexual violence against Sinhalese women and girls in a widespread
fashion or as an organizational strategy. However, the various other forms of violence
utilized by the LTTE—such as suicide bombing, assassinations, abductions, torture, and
murder—were framed as means to an independent Tamil Eelam. Tamil women who had
been raped by the SLA, however, were approached by the LTTE and pressured to join the
insurgency using patriarchal norms about honor—which exemplified the LTTE‘s
strategic manipulation of cultural norms to advance its organizational goal of an
independent Tamil Eelam. Ethnic and political cleavages were unnecessary and
insufficient conditions, despite being strongly present, to increase the LTTE‘s use of
wartime sexual violence against Tamil and Sinhalese women and girls.
Leadership prohibition of sexual violence and intragroup judicial mechanisms to
punish perpetrators of rape were strongly present working independent variables in the
case of Sri Lankan wartime sexual violence. There were several leadership statements
which condemned sexual violence against Tamil women and girls. The organizational
hierarchy of the LTTE was strong which allowed LTTE leadership to enforce a zerotolerance policy toward acts of LTTE-perpetrated wartime sexual violence against Sri
Lankan civilians. And finally, in the few cases in which LTTE cadre did commit wartime
rape, they were quickly punished by LTTE officers and made examples in order to
prevent future acts of LTTE sexual violence against Tamil civilians. This finding
confirms Wood‘s argument that ―the observed absence of sexual violence on the part of
LTTE cadre toward civilians is best explained by the theoretical framework‘s top-down
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implication: Such violence is banned by the leadership and the organization‘s strict
internal discipline enforces the prohibition [of sexual violence].‖389 The Sri Lankan
government also, in very rare instances, punished its own SLA soldiers who committed
acts of sexual violence against civilians. A case in point was the prosecution of nine SLA
soldiers after the rape of Krishanthy Kumarasamy at a security checkpoint in 1996. All
nine men were convicted of rape and served prison sentences. Wood notes that after this
judicial decision, cases of sexual violence decreased (and she further argues that there
was a strong likelihood of increased reporting due to a successful rape prosecution by the
state judiciary).390 However, it appears that SLA leadership, especially in the field,
committed acts of omission by looking the other way when rapes occurred by personnel
under their command. And compounding this issue, many Tamil women were fearful of
pursuing legal recourse for sexual violence because they doubted its efficacy and feared
being labeled LTTE sympathizers.

The RUF’s Widespread Use of Wartime Sexual Violence
Why did the RUF commit 85 percent of wartime rape throughout the Sierra Leone
war? What were the working independent variables which influenced the RUF‘s use of
wartime sexual violence?
Inequitable macrosocial gender relations were present before and throughout the
course of the civil war in Sierra Leone and analytically fit with Sanday‘s ―rape-prone‖
societal indicators. Gendered norms and behaviors ensured that men were dominant as a
group over women in Sierra Leone. Additionally, Sierra Leone‘s GDI score placed it at
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the bottom of 180 countries in regards to women‘s aggregate social and economic
equality to men (at a mean of 0.18 throughout the conflict while Sri Lanka scored a mean
of 0.71, with 1.0 being perfect gender equality). Sexual stereotypes about women and the
need for combat socialization to build solidarity via gang rape socially warranted the
widespread use of sexual violence against women and girls.391
Hypermasculine intragroup gender dynamics of the RUF was a highly present and
powerful mechanism for the use of sexual violence by the RUF. The abduction of women
and girls as domestic and sexual slaves (―bush wives‖) was commonplace, and many of
these women and girls committed acts of violence—even sexual violence—against
civilian populations. Cohen‘s theory of combatant socialization argues that the RUF
employed sexual violence on a widespread scale to socialize and indoctrinate newlyabducted combatants, whether they were male or female, who were uncommitted to the
RUF.392 Indiscriminate violence and hegemonic masculinity was highly valued within the
organization and the expert use of violence against civilians and pro-government forces
provided opportunity for promotion to RUF leadership positions for both male and
female rebels.
The RUF‘s reliance on popular support from civilian populations was absent, as
rebels often committed acts of sexual violence to relocate forcibly entire communities
through campaigns on terror in order to gain access to alluvial diamond deposits or basic
commodities (e.g., food and shelter) to sustain their insurgency against government
armed forces. The external support of the RUF by President Charles Taylor of the
Liberian NPFL also allowed the rebels to maintain autonomy from the popular support of
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civilian populations. Newly acquired combatants were predominately abducted rather
than recruited, further decreasing the RUF‘s reliance on popular support to sustain its
revolution against the state. Weinstein argues that when a group neither relies on popular
support nor intends to govern that population in the future, groups will be more likely to
commit violence against civilian populations. This is because such groups may rely on
the trafficking of valuable commodities—such as alluvial diamonds—and/or external
actors for financing to continue their combat operations in the absence of popular
support.393
Contrary to the Sri Lankan conflict, an ethnic rivalry was absent throughout the
course of the Sierra Leone war. Politically, the RUF was an ―oppositional‖ movement
intended to destroy the status quo and assume power of the Sierra Leonean state. This
was largely because of excessive patronage wielded by the Stevens and Momoh regimes
before and at the outset of the civil war. In regard to ethnicity, the Mende-Temne rivalry
seems to have dissipated by the start of the civil war as ethno-linguistic categories did not
prevent Mende and Temne from joining either rebel or government forces, so its effect
appears to be minimal. Rape occurred in both ethno-linguistic geographical locations—
among the Mende in the south and east and the Temne in the north. An absence of ethnonational rhetoric by the leadership of armed groups further confirms the minimal effect of
ethnicity during the civil war. According to Cohen, this empirical pattern offers little
support for the hypothesis which predicts increased levels of rape as ethnic tension
increases.394 Ethnic polarization as a cause of the proliferation of rape was not the case in
Sierra Leone.
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Leadership prohibition of wartime sexual violence was absent throughout the
conflict. Upon searching leadership statements and interview data by Cohen, low-level
RUF leadership only proscribed sexual violence during wartime because of the risk of
contracting sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Soldiers who became infected with
STDs—such as gonorrhea, syphilis, and HIV/AIDS—were reportedly shot by fellow
combatants because of their inability to fight in combat due to debilitating symptoms.395
Patterns of sexual violence during the war suggest that rape was used at the cadre level to
promote combatant socialization in the RUF as many abducted men, boys, women, and
girls were initially uncommitted to the RUF.396 At the peak of the fighting during the
war—when the AFRC-RUF junta battled the RSLAF, CDF, ECOMOG, and UNOMISL
for control of Freetown in 1997 through 1999—67 percent of all instances of sexual
violence were committed. This increase in wartime sexual violence was asymmetrically
employed by the RUF during the time period, which suggests that mid- to high-level
rebel leadership ignored the use of sexual violence (i.e., acts of omission) yet did not
directly order the use of sexual violence as a strategy of war.397
Intra- and extra-group judicial mechanisms to punish perpetrators of sexual
violence were entirely absent throughout the course of the Sierra Leone war within the
RUF and in the state apparatus. According to a Human Rights Watch report:
―[l]ack of faith in the system, as the few women who have decided to
prosecute non-conflict-related rape, is fully justified. The judiciary—
which, prior to the conflict, barely existed in the provinces, and in
Freetown was only accessible to those who had sufficient funds—
completely collapsed during the war. Many lawyers fled the conflict, and
much of the infrastructure, including the law courts in Freetown, was
395
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destroyed. The low salaries of personnel working in the judiciary have
meant that magistrates, lawyers, and judges are easy targets for bribery
and/or intimidation.‖398
Further compounding impunity, the state was constantly in flux, the regime type and
strength of the state varying wildly throughout the beginning and end of the Sierra Leone
war. Prior to the start of the conflict, the APC regime was a one-party state that eroded
state infrastructure—judicial mechanisms included—through its patronage policies.
The RSLAF were implicated in 8.3 percent of wartime rape (which contrasts
sharply with the RUF‘s 85.6 percent). A highly unprofessional military force, RSLAF
combatants were poorly trained and paid—if they were paid at all. This led many RSLAF
personnel to defect to the AFRC and/or act as sobels (i.e., soldiers during the day, rebels
at night). There are no reported instances of RSLAF leadership reprimanding its
personnel who were found culpable of sexual violence against women and girls.

2.7. Conclusion
This chapter traces the history of the Sri Lankan and Sierra Leonean civil wars,
explains the formation of the two principal insurgencies, analyzes their repertoire of
violence vis-à-vis government armed forces, and considers six independent variables as
influencing the variation of sexual violence between the two cases and among armed
groups within each case—(1) macrosocial and (2) intra-group gender dynamics; (3)
political, ethnic, and/or class rivalries; (4) accountability mechanisms; (5) (non-)reliance
on civilian support; and (6) leadership prohibition. The data presented here informs the
hypotheses testing and theory development found in chapter four. This thesis now turns
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to the variation of wartime sexual violence by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)
and Royal Nepalese Army during the 1996-2005 Nepalese civil war.
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3. Wartime Sexual Violence in Nepal
Chapter three examines variations of wartime sexual violence—both in frequency
and type—between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) (CPN[M]) and Royal
Nepalese Army (RNA) during the 1996-2005 civil war. It first presents a history of Nepal
prior to the conflict, considers the armed groups involved, analyzes the interaction of the
six independent variables, and compares and contrasts variations of wartime sexual
violence among the CPN(M) and RNA. Chapter three concludes with an analysis of the
six independent variables—(1) macrosocial and (2) intragroup gender dynamics, (3)
ethnic, national and/or class rivalries, (4) judicial mechanisms, (5) level of popular
support, and (6) leadership directives—that may have impacted the variation of sexual
violence in the Nepalese civil war. This final empirical chapter will provide data for the
hypotheses testing, theoretical development, and policy recommendations presented in
chapter four.

3. 1. The Historical Foundations of the Nepalese Civil War
Unlike Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, Nepal resisted colonial domination by the
British Empire yet the policies of the Ranas and the monarchy created a fragile, corrupt
state which fostered a milieu ripe for armed rebellion by the 1990s. This section traces
the historical processes of Nepal from the eighteenth century to the 1990s which set the
stage for insurgent mobilization by the CPN(M) by 1996 in reaction to a corrupt,
unresponsive government.
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Situated in the Himalayan mountain range between India and China,
contemporary Nepal contains a synthesis of Tibetan Buddhist and Hindu sociocultural
traditions which has facilitated a unique and sometimes explosive sociocultural
environment. But the current unitary political system of Nepal is only a recent
development of the past three centuries and ethnic and regional cleavages still persist.399
The name Nepal is derived from the Kathmandu valley in which to be ―Nepali‖ refers to
inhabitants of the capital‘s valley, whereas most individuals still identify with regions—
e.g., Pahari (―hill people‖) and Madheshi (―plains people‖)—or ethnic groups—e.g.,
Magar, Gurung, Limbu, Rai, Tamang, Sherpa, Tharu, Newar, etc.400 Ethno-religious
divisions may be conceptualized in two broad categories: (1) the hill areas east of Nepal
are influenced by Mahayana Buddhist culture closely related to Tibet and contain Sherpa,
Bhotia, Thakali, and other ethnic groupings; and (2) the hill areas west of Nepal are
heavily influenced by the Hindu plains areas located in the south in which Pahari and
Indian ethnic groups dominate. However, the geophysical landscape of Nepal severely
complicates such generalizations due to the relative isolation of ethnic groups from one
another.401
According to 2001 census data, Nepal contains 29 million people. Of that
population, 80.6 percent practice Hinduism, 10.7 percent practice Buddhism, 4.2 percent
practice Islam, and 3.6 percent are of the shamanistic Kirant faith. While no ethnic group
numerically dominates, Nepal contains 15.5 percent Chhettri, 12.5 percent Brahman-Hill,
7 percent Magar, 6.6 percent Tharu, 5.5 percent Tamang, 5.4 percent Newar, 3.9 percent

399

Rose, Leo E. and John T. Scholz (1980) Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom. Boulder: Westview
Press, p. 1.
400
Rose, Leo E. and John T. Scholz (1980) op. cit., pp. 1-2.
401
Ibid.

139

Kami, 3.9 percent Yaday, and 35.5 percent mix of various ethnic identities.402 The
divides between these ethnic groups were formed with territorial unification in 1789 by
political elites who promulgated the first national caste system in Nepal (before 1789
three regional caste systems were present). However, in an ethnographic study of Nepal‘s
caste system, Nancy E. Levine notes that the caste and social systems in Nepal have been
malleable rather than static:
―…ethnic divisions in Humla District, in Nepal‘s far northwest Karnali
Zone, are characterized more by interaction, interdependence, and
mobility than contrasts and boundaries between groups. In Humla,
individuals and entire villages readily change their ethnic affiliation and
their position in the caste system. There, too, ethnic groups are linked by a
regional economic and social system, and changes in a group‘s ethnic
affiliation are coincident with changes in their economy and style of life.
Finally, the case of Humla reaffirms what other scholars have noted [about
Nepal‘s caste system]: ethnic relations today are the outcome of a
historical process of accommodation between regional ethnic systems and
the policies of a centralizing state‖ (emphasis added).403
While ethnic divisions persisted before and during the conflict, the caste and social
systems of Nepal were much less rigid than those found in Sri Lanka and India. The caste
system was implemented after territorial unification by the Shah and Rana family elites
who sought to protect their status as upper-caste Brahmans.
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Figure 3.1. Map of Ethnic Groups in Nepal

404

What are the historical processes of Nepal which led to the rise of a revolutionary
peasant movement in 1996? How did Nepal resist British colonial domination, unlike Sri
Lanka and Sierra Leone, yet still perpetuate a corrupt, unresponsive state that sowed the
seeds of the 1996-2005 Maoist rebellion? The three-hundred-year history leading up to
the Nepali civil war created dire socioeconomic conditions before the Maoist rebellion
and, in response to these conditions, forged the Maoists‘ ultimate goal of creating a
republican, multiparty state.
The rise of the Shah kingdom of Gorkha—of Hindu Brahman caste and Pahari
ethnicity—led to the unification of contemporary Nepal in the late eighteenth century.405
Prithvi Narayan Shah, the king of the Gorkha kingdom, launched a military quest from
the hill region of Gorkha in which his army conquered and absorbed various city-states in
404
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the central and eastern Himalayas. In 1816, territorial expansion by the Shah kingdom
was thwarted by the British East India Company (BEIC), which was operating
contiguous to the swampy, malaria-ridden Tarai region in Nepal (and this geographic
boundary played a large part in Great Britain‘s failure to colonize Nepal). The BEIC
sought to open trade routes with Tibet through the Himalayas to sell Indian goods on the
Chinese market.406 At the same time, China was cracking down on Tibetan autonomy and
sought to gain de jure suzerainty over Tibet and its trade routes to boost its economic
position vis-à-vis Great Britain.407
By the mid-1840s, a royal family later known as the Ranas—of middle-caste
Hindu origins—rose to power in Nepali politics after the Kot Massacre in which
powerful elites were killed or exiled by members of the Rana family. Jang Bahadur
Kunwar, the leading patriarch of the Rana family who ruled as an absolute dictator after
the death of Nepal‘s former Prime Minister Bhim Sen Thapa in 1837, legitimized his rule
when the honorary title of ―Rana‖ was granted by King Surendra in 1858. The title of
Rana was adopted henceforth as the official family name of the Kunwars. 408 As prime
minister, Jang Bahadur was in control of the domestic and foreign policies of Nepal and
succession in the office of prime minister was now hereditary within the Rana family.
Because of this legitimation by the monarchy, granted because of Jang Bahadur‘s
autocratic rule which threatened monarchical rule, the Rana family rose in status within
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the caste system and was able to intermarry with the royal Shah family to consolidate its
position in Nepali politics.409
Although territorial and political unification of Nepal was complete by 1789,
three regional caste systems, a Tibetan population on its border with China, and extreme
geophysical divisions created a highly divided territory. To unify Nepali society, a
process of Sanitization (also known as Hinduization) was undertaken by the Rana
family—and other elite families vying for power—in which high caste, Brahmanistic
legal and social codes were adopted to create a national caste system. Unlike the caste
systems in India, non-Hindu hill and mountain peoples were placed in the middle of the
caste hierarchy, despite their deviation from Sanskritic cultural norms and values. They
were ranked above the Hindu service castes (Dalits) but were ranked below Hindu,
Nepali-speaking hill peoples (i.e., Brahmins), Newars, Cheteris, and the plains people of
the Tarai contiguous to northeastern India.410 The centralization of the caste system
allowed the Rana family to consolidate its power in Nepali politics via patron-client
relations and hereditary succession of the prime minister and cabinet.
Despite the autocratic rule of the Ranas and the monarchy, factionalization drove
Nepali politics after its unification. Although in theory Nepal was an absolute, divine
monarchy, in practice the monarch was limited in power. The monarchy was considered a
manifestation of the Hindu god Vishnu in which decision making on various issues was
delegated to castes as ―a right, not a privilege.‖411 The Bharadari, a deliberative political
institution, was set up in the post-1770 period and consisted of high government officials
and elders of nearly 200 elite national families. For the Shah monarchy, approval from
409
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the Bharadari was essential for the legitimacy of its rule and provided an arena for elite
families to impact the decision making processes.412 It was also through the Bharadari
and the monarchical court systems where members of the Rana family gained
predominance in Nepali politics.
During the 1846-1851 period, the royal and familial elites developed an
accommodation with the British which left Nepal free from de jure colonial arrangements
present in Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone; British influence, however, was still present in de
facto terms throughout Nepali politics because of trade restrictions (e.g., tariffs) imposed
by the British on Nepali goods. Nepal eliminated an insurgency in Oudh of the Indian
colony (in the contemporary Terai territory) with 8,000 Gurkha troops in 1856. The
British Governor-General of India subsequently granted this former territory of Oudh to
Nepal, which had failed to usurp from the BEIC in 1816 during the expansionary
campaigns of the Shah kingdom of Gorkha. From 1860 onward, the Tarai region and its
peoples—predominantly Indian in national origin—resisted integration into the political
system of Nepal which ―was probably the most serious failure in the Shah dynasty‘s
policy of integrating highly diverse areas and communities.‖413 The British had set up a
Residency in Kathmandu and British imperialism was consistently on the political agenda
of Nepali elites, with both pro- and anti-British factions vying for power. The former
sought to use Britain to gain power while the latter played off widespread anti-India
sentiment which was pervasive until the 1850s to entrench its socioeconomic and
political power arrangements. However, only in a few instances—unlike in Sri Lanka and
Sierra Leone—did the British succeed in dividing these factions for its own benefit in
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Nepali politics, particularly regarding trade relations with Kathmandu.414 The inability of
British to colonize Nepal was in large part due to the inhospitable geophysical
environment of the thickly forested and swampy Tarai (which troops were unable to
cross) that stretched across 500 miles of Nepal‘s border with India.
Once their power was solidified, the Ranas embarked upon modernization and
centralization processes of the bureaucracy, military, and judicial systems throughout the
1850s and 1860s. A merit system, comparable to contemporary versions found in
bureaucracies, was established along with new rules and procedures for each institution
within the national bureaucracy. The legal code of Nepal was written in 1954 and
regional courts were separated from centralized administrative units in Kathmandu.415 As
prime ministers of Nepal, Jang Bahadur (1846-1877) devised the modernization and
centralization schemes, Chandra Shamsher (1901-1929) consolidated the system and
Juddha Shamsher (1932-1945) implemented Nepal‘s first economic reforms.416 The
military was monopolized by the Rana family which appointed junior members of its
family to high-ranking officer positions to prevent the politicization of the military and
ensure its loyalty (while senior members gained powerful position in the prime minister‘s
cabinet). As the power of the Ranas grew—and they continued to intermarry with the
royal Shah family—they effectively isolated the power of the monarchy and Shah family
in Nepal.
The greatest threat to the rule of the Rana family was neither domestic nor
external, but within the family itself. As the number of Ranas grew and lineage became
more complex with intermarriage among the Rana and Shah families, succession became
414
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more difficult to determine and was commonly contested. Chandra Shamsher, prime
minister of Nepal from 1901-1929, divided the Ranas into A, B, and C classes—based on
caste purity and lineage—with A Ranas determined as the highest caste Brahmins. In
1934, Juddha Shamsher, prime minister of Nepal from 1932-1945, banned all B and C
Ranas from hereditary succession, thereby creating a strong opposition force in Nepali
familial politics as the Ranas factionalized. Although there were several attempts by B
and C Ranas to subvert A Rana rule, these plots were foiled by the military and police
forces loyal to the A Ranas until the marginalized B and C Ranas linked with anti-Rana
opposition movements during the 1950s.417
The centralized political model of Nepal left little room for political opposition
yet a strong anti-Rana movement began to form in the early 1900s because of (1) a new
generation of Nepalis studying abroad in India and Britain, (2) the return of Gurkha
regiments after World War II who had witnessed diverse cultures during their service for
the British, and (3) the proliferation of the Indian national movement led by Mahatma
Gandhi which inspired educated elites in Nepal.418 Two leaders of the 1950-51 anti-Rana
movement—who also happened to be brothers—Bishweshwar Prasad and Matrika Prasad
Koirala, were schooled in Indian universities and were sympathetic to the socialist wing
of the Indian National Congress party. Other important players in the 1950-51 democratic
movement were also members of the 200 families which monopolized government
employment under the Rana regime.419 In addition, many members of the B and C Ranas
aligned with the anti-Rana movement in opposition to the increasingly authoritarian
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character of the A Ranas. Two opposition movements—the Prachanda Gurkha and Praja
Parishad—were established in India with the intent of overthrowing the Ranas and
imposing democratic reforms in Nepal.420
Although Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of a newly independent India
supported the opposition movement in Nepal, the focus of the Indian National Congress
was to build domestic political institutions and avoid creating an unstable Nepal which
New Delhi viewed as a geostrategic buffer against China. However, an independent India
did not support the anachronistic Rana regime and thus provided an opportunity for the
anti-Rana movement to remobilize against the Ranas without Indian intervention. In 1946
the Nepali National Congress—which had strong links with the Indian National
Congress—was set up in Banaras, India and the Nepali Democratic Congress was formed
in 1948 in Calcutta, India by Nepali political exiles. Both opposition movements formed
the Nepali Congress and launched an insurgency against the Rana regime with Indian
territory as its base of operations. King Tribhuvan, who was also increasingly
marginalized by the Ranas, allied with the Nepali Congress in an attempt to end Rana
patrimony in Nepal. On 6 November 1950, King Tribhuvan, Crown Prince Mahendra,
and the king‘s grandson Birendra—three generations of monarchical succession—entered
the Indian embassy in Kathmandu to claim asylum and four days later they were flown to
New Delhi.421
The Delhi Compromise was brokered by India on 7 February 1951 after the
Nepali Congress insurgent wing (with the support of King Tribhuvan and disgruntled B
and C Ranas who were marginalized by the Ranas) and the Rana regime waged a low420
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scale conflict that resulted in the capitulation of an autocratic Rana system.422 The
Compromise included King Tribhuvan, the Ranas, and the Nepali Congress. Under the
terms of the Delhi Compromise: (1) the monarchy would be restored to power with its
original mandate (which had been eroded under Rana rule); (2) the Ranas and Nepali
Congress would form a power-sharing interim government; and (3) the Ranas and Nepali
Congress would hold elections for a constituent assembly to draft a democratic
constitution. The Nepali Congress, like the Indian Congress Party, was a centrist
umbrella party which in a liberal democratic fashion incorporated various socialist,
centrist, and conservative factions that were committed to democratic reforms in Nepal.
The Rana-Nepali Congress government proved short-lived when in November 1951,
factionalization in the Nepali Congress—centering on a dispute over the appointment of
Matrika Prasad Koirala as prime minster rather than his popular younger brother,
Bisheswar Prasad Koirala—split the party. Because of the inability of party leaders in the
Nepali Congress to foster party discipline, a decade of unstable, although democratic,
politics ensued in Nepal.423 By 1959 the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal was
drafted which granted absolute power to the monarchy— now King Mahendra after the
death of Tribhuvan in 1955—coupled with faux democratic institutions. The Nepali
Congress won nearly two-thirds of the vote in the relatively free and fair general election
of February 1959 yet only two years later did King Mahendra invoke emergency powers
in which he dissolved the parliament and arrested important Nepali politicians, such as
Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala, head of the Nepali Congress, based on the rationale that the
Nepali Congress ―had failed to maintain law and order and was endangering the
422
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sovereignty of Nepal.‖424 Thirty years of autocratic rule under Kings Mahendra and
Birendra would follow.425
Without initial opposition to his implementation of emergency powers, King
Mahendra promulgated the 1962 constitution of Nepal which called for Panchayat
democracy (literally translated as ―assembly of five‖ in Hindi) which forbade the
participation of political parties.426 At the village and town levels, Nepalis were able to
directly elect representatives while those elected representatives formed electoral colleges
to select district representatives amongst themselves. District representatives then
appointed delegates amongst the pool of district representatives to the national legislature
(Rastriya Panchayat)—the remaining delegates were either selected by the government
bureaucracy or nominated by the monarchy. Pressure mounted against the Panchayat
system because mass political participation was banned and Nepal remained severely
underdeveloped despite the monarchy consistently paying lip service to economic
development. Private industry was unable to expand the economic output of Nepal which
led to the nationalization of many industries from eight in 1961 to 64 in 1989—which
greatly increased rent-seeking behavior among business elites—yet only a handful of
these industries were generating profits (and nearly 13 percent of the development budget
was allocated for subsidizing insolvent national industries).427 To quell growing
discontent, the monarchy expanded national development schemes from $12.48 million
in 1962 to nearly $507 million by 1990 yet economic growth remained dismal and
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corruption vastly increased among nationalized industries which were the ―most rapidly
expanding sector in the economy.‖428
When King Birendra ascended to the crown in 1972, he consolidated the powers
of the monarchy—because of the instability of Nepal‘s political landscape during his
ascension and the embarrassment of anti-establishment being elected to district and even
national councils—by ensuring that he had the constitutional powers to vet and nominate
candidates for all levels (i.e., town, district, and national) of the Panchayat system.429 On
2 May 1980, after opposition against the Panchayat system gained momentum, King
Birendra allowed a national referendum to determine a continuance of the status quo or
the return of multiparty democracy. With a vote of 2.4 million for the Panchayat system
and 2 million against—along with reported instances of widespread vote rigging by the
government—the status quo was upheld. Because of a fraudulent national vote, political
opposition from banned political parties and student movements continued to mount
against King Birendra and his Panchayat system.430
In sum, although Nepal did not experience colonization by the British, 104 years
of autocratic rule under the Ranas and 30 years of corruption and patronage under the
Panchayat system rotted the government bureaucracy and led to economic stagnation and
inequality. Economic growth remained at around two percent until the 1980s, when it
rose to five percent, yet Indian imports had nearly quadrupled since the 1960s (severely
hampering domestic industries), national currency reserves were depleted, and the rupee
was devalued in 1985. Nepal‘s national account deficits rose from $16 million in 1975 to
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$296.2 million in 1989 and external debt increased from $3 million in 1970 to an
astounding $1.16 billion in 1988.431 Because of these economic conditions, Nepal took a
structural adjustment program (SAP) to qualify for additional loans from the World
Bank. With government spending decimated by the 1985 SAP, it is estimated that 7 to 9
million of Nepal‘s 19 million citizens were unable to obtain their daily calorific
requirements in 1991. In addition, Nepal ranked 152nd out of 173 countries in the 1993
UN Human Development Report, which the report credited to worsening economic
inequality and low levels of government spending.432
Opposition against the Panchayat regime grew in the form of a people‘s
movement (jan andolan) that was spearheaded by the Nepali Congress and United Left
Front (consisting of seven communist parties) and ultimately led to the peaceful
overthrow of the system by April 1990. Starting in February 1990, opposition had grown
against the Panchayat system because of worsening economic conditions exacerbated by
a trade and transit agreement with India that asymmetrically benefited Indian exporters.
In response to peaceful demonstrations, however, the government‘s police forces killed
six unarmed protesters in Patan and Kirtipur as well as arresting thousands of protesters
throughout the urban centers of Nepal. The people‘s movement was in large part
successful because it quickly attracted Nepali professionals as well as women and
children who joined mass protests in Kathmandu which led to the capitulation of the
Panchayat regime because protesters began to call for a violent revolution in reaction to
431
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the government‘s crackdown.433 In a conciliatory move by the monarchy to end mass
demonstrations, a democratic constitution was adopted in November 1990 which
established a bicameral parliament and relegated the monarchy to a ceremonial role. The
Nepali Congress came to dominate multiparty elections, forming a government from
1991 until its collapse in 1994 over divisions within the large umbrella party that lacked
the party discipline found in the Indian Congress. Party politics remained volatile, as
more than half a dozen fragile coalition governments were in power from 1994 through
1999 as the Nepali Congress sought to forge coalitions with the Communist Party of
Nepal (CPN) and other leftist parties that ultimately undermined initiatives by Nepali
Congress politicians.434
The three centuries leading up to the 1996-2005 civil war—despite the absence of
overt British colonial influence which created conflict-prone environments in Sri Lanka
and Sierra Leone—laid the groundwork for intense, and eventually violent, opposition
movements in Nepal. The root causes of the conflict included: (1) 104 years of corrupt,
autocratic rule under the Ranas; (2) two failed democratic experiments undermined by the
monarchy; and (3) widespread underdevelopment and glaring socioeconomic
inequalities. Gaining momentum in the early 1990s due to popular discontent with
Nepal‘s second failed democratic experiment, the Maoists would launch their revolution
in the rural hill districts of Nepal on 13 February 1996.
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3.2. The Formation and Hegemony of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
The CPN(M) was the armed insurgency which sought to overthrow the Nepali
monarchy and replace it with a republican, multi-party democracy during the 1996-2005
civil war. This section traces the Maoist split with the non-violent Communist Party of
Nepal (CPN), its ideological objectives, and the organizational structure of the
insurgency.
The CPN, backed by Indian communists, first met in January 1954 at Patan and
articulated its opposition to the 1950 Delhi Compromise and called for a republican state,
formed by a constituent assembly, to replace the ―feudalistic‖ monarchical system in
Nepal.435 In the 1959 general election, the CPN only won four out of 109 seats in the
parliament, with the Nepali Congress winning nearly two-thirds of the seats. However,
deep divisions emerged over the issue of peasant class involvement in future
revolutionary movements—largely an ideological disagreement in which Maoists favored
peasant participation and, contrarily, Marxists favoring urban worker participation—with
―revolutionary‖ elements arguing for their full participation and ―revisionist‖ factions
arguing for their exclusion and rather the incorporation of workers and unionists.436
Another point of contention was a pro-monarchy statement drafted by moderate CPN
members in order to gain political legitimacy and lift the ban on the party; however, a
radical faction led by Pushpa Lal Shrestha, an original founder of the CPN, voiced their
opposition to the statement because it conflicted with ideological goals of the CPN (i.e., a
republican state formed by a constituent assembly). After the CPN had split into three

435

Thapa, Deepak (2004) ―Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists,‖ in Hutt, Michael (ed.)
Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion pp. 21-37. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p.
24.
436
Thapa, Deepak (2004) op. cit., p. 25.

153

separate factions by the third convention of the party in April 1962, Pushpa Lal Shrestha,
the most radical leader within the central committee, formed and served as the secretary
general of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) that publically extolled violence as
the only means toward democracy in Nepal. The principal goal of the organization was
―to identify feudalism and imperialism as the chief enemy and act accordingly to build a
disciplined revolutionary party that will work mainly among peasants‖ which strongly
mirrored Maoist revolutionary ideology in China.437 By his death in 1982, Pushpa Lal‘s
party experienced similar factionalization and ideological incoherence that had plagued
the CPN during its first three conventions.438
While mainstream political elements of the CPN were jockeying for political
power within the party framework, an armed Maoist faction influenced by Communist
Party of India (Marxist) and the Chinese Communist Party—known as the Jhapa
rebellion—broke from the CPN system and initiated an insurgency to eliminate ―class
enemies‖ in May 1971.439 The insurgency was inspired and aided by the Indian Naxalites
which had waged a protracted insurgency against New Delhi with some success in
India‘s eastern provinces. However, the Jhapa rebellion was eliminated by Nepal‘s armed
forces only several months later after a total of seven ―class enemies‖ were assassinated
by the first unsuccessful Maoist insurgency.440
Throughout the 1980s, communist factions of the CPN vied for political
legitimacy and the fourth convention of the CPN called for a people‘s movement to be
followed by an armed rebellion to overthrow the Panchayat system. Despite this claim,
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mainstream elements within the CPN were wary of acting on such a radical ideological
objective. The radical communist elements of the CPN formed the CPN Unity Center
which called for a People‘s War to be launched to overthrow what they viewed as an
unresponsive Nepali Congress government and a feudalistic monarchy.441 One recentlyformed faction, the CPN (Masal), was led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (alias ―Prachanda‖)—
who would later lead the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2005—as general secretary and
Babu Ram Bhattarai—who would become the theoretician of the Maoists—as the chief
party ideologue, called for an armed revolution to overthrow the monarchy. Contrary to
its radical ideological rhetoric, the CPN (Masal) also participated in the 1991 general
elections in which the Nepali Congress formed a largely unsuccessful and divided
government which was to rule until 1994.442
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN[M])—the insurgency that
launched the 1996-2005 civil war—was formed in 1994 under the leadership of
Prachanda and Bhattarai after they split with more moderate factions of the CPN Unity
Center. When the CPN(M) boycotted the general election of 1994, Prachanda called for a
People‘s War to be launched and the CPN(M) leadership and party cadre withdrew to the
hill districts of Rolpa and Rukum in the midwestern hill districts of Nepal as its base for
mobilizing the revolution.443 The Kahm Magars, a low-caste, indigenous ethnic group
predominant in the midwestern hill districts of Nepal, were attracted to the Maoists
because of their demands for ethnic autonomy, republican democracy, and the
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elimination of the caste system.444 In fact, the majority of the CPN(M)‘s recruits in the
1990s were drawn from the Magar community.445 In September 1995, the Central
Committee of the CPN(M) argued that the insurgency:
―…would be based on the lessons of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism
regarding revolutionary violence. On the occasion of formulation of the
plan for initiation of the process that will unfold as protracted People‘s
War based on the strategy of encircling the city [i.e., Kathmandu] from the
countryside according to the specificities of our country, the Party once
again reiterates its eternal commitment to the theory of People‘s War
developed by Mao as the universal and invincible Marxist theory of
war.‖446
The top leadership of the Nepali Maoists also sought to legitimize the use of violence to
realize their ideological goals:
―The aim of the armed struggle is to solve the basic contradictions
between feudalism and the Nepali people, imperialism—mainly the Indian
expansionism—and the Nepali people, comprador and bureaucratic
capitalism and the Nepali people, and in the immediate term the
contradiction between domestic reaction which is made up of a
combination of feudal and comprador and bureaucratic capitalist classes
and backed by Indian expansionism and the Nepali people. This way it is
clear, the target of the armed struggle will be confiscating the lands of
feudals and landlords and distributing them amongst the landless and
poor peasants on the basis of land-to-the-tiller theory and to attack them
for the purpose…‖ (emphasis added).447
Prachanda, the undisputed leader of the CPN(M), served as general secretary throughout
the Nepali civil war. The ―Prachanda Path‖ is the ideological grounding of the CPN(M)
which ―assumes a kind of revolution that would be a fusion of the Chinese model of
444
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protracted People‘s War strategy (to expand from villages to towns) and the Russian
model of general armed insurrection.‖448 Such an ideological blend is idiosyncratic to
Nepal because politics in Nepal were Kathmandu-centric before and during the civil war:
historically, rural social movements have had less political impact than urban movements
in the capital city.449 While the CPN(M) received covert support from Indian intelligence
agencies, including arms, training, and territorial safe haven, there were no reported
instances of Beijing aiding the Maoists in insurgent operations despite their ideological
similarities.450 The CPN(M) also retained aspects of the original 1954 ideological goals
of the CPN, including the demands for a constituent assembly to form a republican,
secular state and the elimination of the monarchy.451
The organizational structure of the Maoists was split into three prongs—the party,
the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), and various united fronts—with Prachanda as
primus inter pares of the armed revolutionary movement with the title of general
secretary of the CPN(M) standing committee. Under the standing committee (which was
the most important decision-making body throughout the civil war) of the party
apparatus, the hierarchy of the party, in order of importance and political reach, were as
follows: the politburo, central committee, regional bureaus, sub-regional bureaus, district
committees, area committees, and cell committees. The standing committee contained no
448
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more than ten members who were the primary decision makers for the Maoists; yet when
the committee was unable to meet due to security concerns, Prachanda was responsible
for all party and military decisions.452
The PLA was initially a 5,000-strong force (which grew to 30,000 by the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006) that was the most powerful
military wing of the Maoists which was comprised predominantly of Kahm Magars,
Dalits, and other marginalized indigenous nationalities and caste groups.453 The central
military commission functioned as the central decision-making apparatus of the PLA and
Prachanda served as the chief decision maker of the commission. Similar to the party
structure, there were also regional, sub-regional, and district-level military commissions
that coordinated military operations throughout Nepal. In ascending order, the levels of
military units included the squad (9-11 members), the platoon, the company, and the
battalion. Each military unit was comprised of a military commander and a political
commissar who linked military operations with the party ideology by indoctrinating
recruits and espousing Maoist propaganda in the areas the PLA operated. Under the PLA,
the People‘s Militia—comprised of thousands of poorly trained and armed villagers of
marginalized indigenous, caste, and gender identities—occasionally took part in guerilla
activities on an as-needed basis.454
While many mainstream parties in Nepal had shied away from identity issues, the
CPN(M) formed various regional, caste, and ethnic united fronts to incorporate all
segments of society into the ranks of the Maoists. Indigenous national minorities, Dalits
452
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(i.e., ―untouchables‖), and women were particularly attracted to the Maoists because of
their ideological goals of ending caste and gender discrimination. Well over a dozen
ethnic- and caste-based united fronts were formed to represent and incorporate these
marginalized groups into the Maoist insurgency, such as the Madhesi National Liberation
Front, the Nepal Dalit Liberation Front, the Kirant National Liberation Front, etc.455
Ethnic- and caste-based fronts, however, were largely ineffective throughout the
civil war and their impact was marginal at best. This is exemplified by the dissolution of
the United People‘s Front by 2000, which ineffectively linked and coordinated the
myriads of fronts with the party and military wings.456 Another example is when the
Madhesi National Liberation Front (MNLF)—which sought to link the Madhesh (―plains
people‖) ethnic groups of the eastern Tarai with the Maoists. It failed to integrate the
Madhesh because it lacked ―practice rather than advocacy [and rhetoric].‖457 The Maoists
subordinated the MNLF to the role of regional organizer and recruiter for the Maoists in
the eastern Tarai; this infuriated the Madhesh, who have been historically more involved
in democratic movements of 1951-1960 and 1990 rather than leftist politics. Because the
Maoists failed to understand the intricacies of ethnic, regional, and political dynamics of
the Madhesh, the MNLF was ineffective and resistant to Maoist integration.458 The two
most effective specialized organizations of the Maoists were the All Nepal National Free
Students‘ Union (Revolutionary) (ANNFSU[R]) and the All Nepal Women‘s Association
(Revolutionary) (ANWA[R]). Both organizations integrated university students and
455
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women, respectively, within the organization of the CPN(M) from the outset of the
conflict.459 Because the individuals within the ANNFSU(R) and ANWA(R) were, in
general, of revolutionary mindsets, they were integrated much more successfully than
ethnic and regional fronts, which were ―eclipsed‖ or ―associated‖ with the CPN(M) rather
than given autonomy and decision-making powers.460
In areas of Nepal that were out of the reach of Kathmandu, the Maoists formed
people‘s governments (or committees) in 21 districts in Nepal by the height of its
influence in 2005. Such governments were present at the ward, village, area, and district
levels. The Maoists, however, were unable to form a shadow, central people‘s
government—which would have competed with Kathmandu for political legitimacy—
before the end of the civil war because of the deployment of the RNA in 2001 which
greatly disrupted Maoist operations.
Figure 3.2. Map of Maoist-Controlled Areas in Nepal by 2005
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As the Maoists gained vast swaths of rural territory outside of the capital and major
towns, they eliminated state police stations and village development committees and
replaced them with Maoist cadre, united fronts, and people‘s committees. Local people‘s
committees were charged with economic development by providing banking services and
agricultural programs as well as extracting tax revenues from Nepalis near Maoist
strongholds.462 The state infrastructure that did remain—including schools, health
centers, agricultural offices, and post offices—was tolerated by the Maoists because it did
not interfere with the daily operations of the People‘s War.463
Similar to the Tamil Tigers, the CPN(M) established vast shadow government
infrastructure throughout the civil war, raised a formidable military force, and espoused
ideological propaganda throughout the rural areas under its control. Pranchanda served as
the absolute leader of the party, military, and united front of the trifurcated structure of
the Maoists. The Maoists recruited heavily from the midwestern hill districts in which the
Kahm Magars—a highly impoverished and ostracized indigenous nationality—were the
dominant group within the CPN(M) ranks. The ideology of the Maoists was based in a
nexus of Chinese and Soviet communism and goals of the insurgency included (1) the
formation of a constituent assembly to craft a republican state, (2) the elimination of class
enemies, including elites and the monarchy, and (3) the end of caste, ethnic, and gender
discrimination.
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3.3 Government Armed Forces in the Civil Wars
This section examines the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), the government armed
forces that combatted the CPN(M) and its PLA from 2001 through 2005 which consisted
of approximately 53,000 combatants. From 1996 through 2001, nearly 20,000 Nepalese
Armed Police Force (NAPF) personnel played a marginal and ineffective role early in the
conflict because of their rudimentary firepower and unprofessionalism. Because of the
NAPF‘s failure to quell the Maoist insurgency, by 2001 the monarchy deployed the RNA
to counterbalance the Maoist insurgency which had easily routed the NAPF during the
first six years of the civil war.464
The RNA had been established in 1748 by King Prithvinarayan Shah to expand
his Ghorka kingdom throughout contemporary Nepal and Tibet. Mahendra Lawoti and
Ashok K. Mehta lucidly describe the RNA‘s loyalty to the monarchy:
―The RNA was very loyal to the monarchy. The structural and historical
loyalty of the RNA to King and Palace was a legacy of the past when its
forebears were used by the Rana and Shah rulers to prop up their feudal
interests. The culture made state security synonymous with the security of
the institution of monarchy (and national unity) and the security policy
was fashioned by the Palace-monarchy-RNA trio.‖465
The RNA was fiercely loyal to the monarchy because of its long relationship with the
Shah and Rana families as well as high-caste Chhetris—all of which were embedded in
the high-ranking leadership of the RNA. It would not be until an agreement to abolish the
monarchy was reached in late 2007 that the RNA—by then renamed the Nepalese
Army—shifted its loyalty to a civilian-led and democratically-elected Constituent
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Assembly in April 2008.466 The RNA was 53,000-strong when it was deployed in late
2001 after the Maoists had gained considerable momentum both politically and militarily.
Because there was a lack of consensus as to how to address the Maoist insurgency,
several civilian governments failed to deploy the RNA earlier in the conflict as the
monarchy mistakenly viewed the CPN(M) as a ―law and order problem‖ that could be
eliminated by the NAPF.467 The unprofessional and underfunded NAPF was dispatched
in the countryside, towns, and villages throughout Nepal to address the Maoist threat
which led to its considerable growth without a serious military challenge until 2001.
Figure 3.2 below shows the increase in military spending after 2001 by the Nepali state
when the RNA was finally deployed. To ensure an end to the Maoist insurgency,
additional funding was allocated to the RNA by the monarchy to counterbalance the
progressively professional and effective PLA.468
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Figure 3.3. State Military Spending in Nepal as a
Percentage of GDP
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By 2005, the RNA had grown to nearly 90,000 personnel. The distribution of
personnel across Nepal included: (1) one brigade, a Royal Guards brigade, and ten
Special Forces brigades in Kathmandu; (2) three brigades in the Midwestern Division; (3)
two brigades in the Far West Division; (4) three brigades in the Eastern Division; (5)
three brigades in the Central Division; and (6) three brigades in the Western Division.470
The heavy concentration of the RNA in Kathmandu exemplified the armed forces‘
primary commitment throughout the 1996-2005 civil war: The regime security of King
Gyanendra, who was considered a reincarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu.471 Of the 25
operational brigades of the RNA, by 2005, 15 were combat-ready while the other ten
provided logistical support during instances of conflict with the Maoists which were
mostly concentrated in the midwestern hill districts. It must be noted that, upon searching
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various sources and databases, no reports of female personnel in the RNA could be
verified.
The RNA received vast amounts of external military support from India, the US,
and the UK after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in which the monarchy
opportunistically branded the Maoists a ―terrorist force‖ to fit in the framework of the socalled global war on terrorism.472 New Delhi crafted the India-Nepal Bilateral
Consultative Group of Security Issues (INBCGSI) in 2003 to modernize the RNA as it
sought to suppress the Maoists. By the end of 2005, the RNA‘s capabilities had increased
considerably because of military exchanges—including human, technical, and financial
assistance—within the INBCGSI framework which met twice a year to discuss RNAmodernization procedures.473 Indian military assistance to Nepal totaled nearly $70
million throughout the conflict. The transfer of Indian military technology included ―two
helicopters soon after the emergency was proclaimed and followed up with two more
helicopters, nearly 100 mine-protected vehicles, 25,000 Indian-made rifles, and a number
of military transport vehicles, all at heavily discounted prices.‖474 The Bush
administration provided two installments of $17 million and $14 million to Nepal,
respectively, in early and late 2004 as part of its broader strategy of the global war on
terror. The US also provided 5,000 M-16 assault rifles as a separate package to the RNA.
The United Kingdom allocated £6.7 million from its conflict prevention fund to Nepal
which was used to purchase military technologies that were essential for revitalizing
Nepal‘s outdated and underfunded internal intelligence services.475
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While the RNA embarked upon a military modernization program once it became
involved in the civil war from 2001 to 2005, the royal army was mired by political
conflict between the monarchy and fragile coalition governments which greatly
challenged its loyalty. Despite political setbacks, the RNA was able to bring the Maoists
to the negotiating table by 2005 after a military stalemate thwarted an outright victory for
either the RNA or Maoists.

3.4. Gender Dynamics of the CPN(M)
What were the macrosocial gender dynamics of Nepal before and during the civil
war? And how did women participate—in particular what were the qualities of intragroup
gender dynamics—in the Maoist movement? This section compares and contrasts the
experiences of women inside and outside of the Maoist insurgency throughout the civil
war in Nepal.
In general, Nepal is a highly patriarchal society both legally and culturally
because of the integration of Hindu values throughout the country by past monarchical
regimes.476 In fact it was this ―Hindu patriarchal model that shape[d] Nepal‘s statebuilding and development policies.‖477 The highly unequal status of Nepali women is
articulated in a common Nepali saying: ―If my next life is to be a dog‘s life and I can
choose, I‘d rather be a dog than a bitch.‖478 Women from Tibeto-Burman ethnonationalities who were relatively more equal with men prior to Sanskritization—
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including the Kahm Magars, Gurungs, and Rais from the midwestern hill districts who
asymmetrically participated in the Maoist movement—saw their relative socioeconomic
independence erode as Hindu sociocultural values were institutionalized by the state.479
The Hindu patriarchal model implemented by the state severely curbed the status
of all women in Nepal, although inequalities among women varied because of regional,
class, and caste identities. In fact, Nepal was classified as the most gender inequitable
state in South Asia before and during the People‘s War. The macrosocial data confirm
this claim: Nepalese women‘s lifespan was two-and-a-half years shorter than men‘s;
women were responsible for four times the domestic work than that of men; literacy rates
for women were 21.3 percent compared to men‘s 54.3 percent; and maternal mortality
rates were 905 per 100,000 live births (compared to 60 in Sri Lanka and 1,800 in Sierra
Leone during the civil wars).480 Before the conflict in rural Nepal, 12 percent of women
classified as middle class were literate whereas only five percent of women from lower
classes were literate. This is largely due to educational participation, which in 1979 only
23 percent of girls in the countryside attended primary school while the rest participated
in household and agricultural labor.481
Despite Nepal‘s accession to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Nepalese women faced 21 discriminatory laws before and during the

479

Machanda, Rita (2004) op. cit., p. 245.
Gautam, Shobha, Amrita Banskota, and Rita Manchanda (2001) op. cit., pp. 221-2; Machanda, Rita
(2004) ―Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Radicalizing Gender Narratives,‖ Cultural Dynamics, 16(2/3): 23758, p. 245.
481
Shrestha, Gajendra Man, Sri Ram Lamichhane, Bijaya Kumar Thapa, Roshan Chitrakar, Michael
Useem, and John P. Comings (1986) ―Determinants of Educational Participation in Rural Nepal,‖
Comparative Education Review, 30(4): 508-22, p. 510.
480

167

conflict. 482 Abortion was illegal throughout the civil war. Citizenship was passed only
through male lineage. In Nepal‘s civil code, a woman could not inherit property unless
she remains unmarried until age 35; if a woman was married, she forfeited her claim to
parental property inheritance. A bill that ensured women‘s right to inheritance was
defeated in the Nepalese parliament in 2001 because the majoritarian opposition argued
that it would undermine Hindu values.483 In theory, the 1990 Constitution of the
Kingdom of Nepal guaranteed that ―all citizens shall be equal before the law… No
discrimination shall be made against any citizen in the application of general laws on the
grounds of religion, race, sex, tribe or ideological conviction or any of these.‖484 In
practice, however, women were discriminated from the time of their birth because of the
prevalence of patriarchal Hindu values among Nepali society.485
Yet such a generalized picture of macrosocial gender dynamics simplifies the
reality that myriad communities of women faced in Nepal before and during the civil
war: ―It is clear that not all women in Nepal have been sequestered in the realm of the
domestic, nor has wage-labor, business and other realms of ‗the public‘ been uniformly
imagined only as masculine; neither has the sexuality of women been consistently and
narrowly regimented.‖486 Upper-caste, Hindu women faced the most extreme forms of
gender discrimination (although they were privileged based on their caste and class
identities), including the inability to remarry if widowed or divorced because their
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identity as a woman was defined by patriarchal Hindu values. In contrast, female Janjatis
are able to remarry if widowed or divorced because it ―does not entail a loss of ritual
status‖ in Janjatis communities, although they faced socioeconomic discrimination based
on their lower class and caste statuses relative to upper-caste Hindu women.487
Another deviation from patriarchal norms was women‘s role in entrepreneurial
activity among the Magar (who would later become the largest demographic of women in
the Maoist insurgency). Female Kahm Magars asymmetrically participated in informal
entrepreneurial activities, such as the production of raski (country liquor), but they did
not hold similar legal and political rights that were granted to Magar men. Because Nepal
relies heavily on remittances, the migration of males is widespread, particularly in the
Magar community (nearly one in two Nepalese households participate in seasonal
migration for employment). This enabled Magar women to make many household
decisions in the absence of their husbands, fathers, and other male relatives.488 Magar
women also challenged men in local elections to posts on village development
committees because of their relatively equal status vis-à-vis Magar men and the absence
of men who sought employment out of the country or fled conflict areas (because they
were often labeled Maoist sympathizers by the government and vice versa).489 In contrast
to the rural milieu, women‘s groups in Kathmandu—many of the participants had at least
attended primary school and were of high-caste Brahmin status—were politically active
in advocating for the social and legal equality of women. Yet by the time the conflict
engulfed much of Nepal, paradoxically, women‘s groups were marginalized in the
political sphere until after a peace settlement was reached in 2005 because of a lack of
487
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democratic outlets during the last years of the monarchy (which was intransigent toward
challenges of patriarchal Hindu values).490 Interestingly, little difference existed between
rural and urban literacy rates for Nepali women; however, literate women in Nepal were
disproportionately of high caste and class statuses.491
Figure 3.4. Nepal Gender-Related Development Indicators
GDI Score (1.0 being perfect equality)
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Violence against Nepali women was prevalent before and during the conflict in
Nepal with instances of sexual violence by the RNA increasing dramatically after it was
deployed outside of Kathmandu in 2001. Domestic violence was commonplace
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throughout Nepal, especially in rural areas, as it was not uncommon for unemployed men
to drink raski and then violently beat their wives and children. (Many women who were
drawn to the Maoist cause reported that they initially joined because of ANWA[R]‘s antialcohol and domestic violence campaign; Maoist cadre would also punish men who beat
their wives and children.)493 In a random and representative survey of 587 women and
girls in Nepal, 35 percent had experienced intimate partner violence by a husband,
boyfriend, or male relative.494 Trafficking in persons for the sex trade in India was also
widespread in Nepal with 5,000-7,000 women and girls (20 percent of them under the age
of 16), predominately from indigenous groups and the Dalit castes, trafficked each year
across the border.495 Despite having two national laws to deter the perpetration of sex
trafficking—e.g., the Human Trafficking Control Act (1987) and the Special Provisions
of Human Trafficking Act (1996)—Nepal‘s judicial system systematically failed to
investigate cases in a quick manner and provided no protection for witnesses, including
trafficked women and girls.496 Sexual violence against women is widespread, particularly
in the rural areas of Nepal. In a cross-sectional survey of young married women (age 1425) in rural Nepal, 46.2 percent reported that they had experienced some form of sexual
violence in their lifetime.497
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Many harmful traditional practices were common in Nepal. Child marriage was a
prevalent harmful traditional practice in Nepal, with 25 percent of girls in the 10-14 age
group married in 1961 although this number dropped precipitously to seven percent by
1991. The highest prevalence of child marriage was in the Tarai plains of Nepal—as high
as 26 percent in several Tarai districts in 1995—in which traditional Hindu practices are
widespread.498 Although the 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal banned
polygamy, it was reported in a 2001 survey that 4.4 percent of women live in polygamous
marriages. Domestic violence would often increase if women resisted polygamous
marriages.499 Dowry is common in the Tarai region. Families from lower socioeconomic
status are expected to pay $100-200 to marry their daughter—which is oftentimes more
than a year‘s salary for impoverished Nepalis. If a man is a highly educated professional,
families of the bride are expected to pay $2,000 (for secondary education) or $5,000 (e.g.,
an engineer) to $15,000 (e.g., a medical doctor).500
The women‘s wing of the Maoists created in 2001 as part of the Prachanda Path,
ANWA(R), was led by Hsila Yami, the wife of the chief ideologue of the insurgency,
Baburam Bhattarai. Yami was the primary feminist ideologue of the Maoists. She argued
that:
―Women are the most deprived in the existing feudal system despite their
role in Nepal‘s agro economy. They are denied parental property although
they run rural households on their own when their husbands are away
earning money. When the men return they marry other women and the
wives are forced to leave… If the women marry someone else, they
become outcastes… the CPN Maoist is reversing this feudal practice
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through its People‘s War. It is leading the new revolution to implement
ideas like equal rights for parental property and tillers as landowners.
Women are fascinated with this change. The People‘s War has liberated
women who otherwise had to spend their lives solely on domestic matters.
Because of Hindu philosophy, girls are married off at an early age. They
become grandmothers before they even reach menopause. The People‘s
War has brought women out of the vicious cycle of living as reproductive
machines… Rural women who were once deprived of their rights are now
at the forefront of the People‘s War fighting as commanders. Now women
are deciding not only when they live but also when they die…‖501
Despite the obvious generalization of Nepalese women‘s perceptions of the Maoist
insurgency—because many women did not support the Maoists even in their base areas—
Yami articulates the ideological propaganda of the Maoists regarding women‘s
emancipation and female Maoists‘ fight to end the Hindu patriarchal model in
conjunction with creating a communist, republican state of Nepal. In fact, according to
Yami, women‘s emancipation could not be achieved until ―the freedom of all other
communities and classes‖ was ensured by the People‘s War.502 Prachanda argued in 1997
that women:
―were not only fighting with the police or reactionary feudal agents but
they were also breaking the chains of exploitation and oppression and a
whole cultural revolution was going on among the people. Questions of
marriage, questions of love, questions of family, questions of relations
between people. All of these things were being turned upside down and
changed in the rural areas.‖503
Despite this rhetoric, Yami argued that women‘s issues were rarely discussed by the
standing committee of the CPN(M) and, because of the absence of discourse on gender,
the standing committee ―neglect[ed] to implement programs developed by women‘s mass
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fronts [e.g., ANWA(R)].‖504 Yami, providing an interesting internal critique of the male
Maoist leadership, claimed that:
―While women cadre have the problem of asserting themselves, men cadre
have the problem of relinquishing the privileged position bestowed upon
them by the patriarchal structure. This is manifested in many ways. This is
mainly seen in the form of formal acceptance of women‘s leadership,
while in essence not accepting their leadership. Thus there are delays
made in establishing women’s leadership in the Party, PLA and United
Front. This also results in their being impatient with women‘s mistakes
and general lack of skills in fields from which women have been excluded.
Often they relegate women’s issues to women as if it does not concern
them. This is manifested in not reading literature on women‘s issues, and
not taking part in implementing programmes given by the women’s mass
front‖ (emphasis added).505
Interestingly, Yami‘s critique highlights the fact that in many circles of the Maoist
leadership, gender roles were reinstitutionalized by male leadership because they were
socialized in a patriarchal Hindu society that devalued the role of women in so-called
men‘s work, particularly in the highly masculine PLA.
Why were Nepali women drawn to the Maoist insurgency? It appears that the
class struggle—the main ideological objective of the CPN(M)—was the principal reason
women and girls joined the insurgency. The majority of women who joined the Maoists
were from marginalized indigenous groups from the hill districts such as the Kahm
Magars and Tamangs as well as from lower caste groups, such as the Dalits.506 In
particular, Hisila Yami articulated a sentiment widespread among female Maoists from
socioeconomically oppressed backgrounds:
―It is time and again seen that women masses do come in a tide to
participate in revolutionary movements producing some potential women
leaders. But this tide along with prospective women leaders seems to
504
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recede once the revolution is completed or is defeated. The chief reason
behind this phenomenon is the existence of the concept of private
property. As long as private property remains women will always have to
go back to tend individual household activities, maintaining private
property for men, no matter how many social revolutions take place.
Hence the concept of continuous revolution until one reaches communism
has strategic relevance for women, because it is only then that private
property get abolished, unleashing the creativity of women‖ (emphasis
added).507
This was a common theme in interviews with female Maoists in the Rolpa district of the
midwestern region of Nepal, the epicenter of the Maoist revolution.508 However, there
were many other reasons that women joined the Maoists aside from the class struggle,
because ―similar statements have been made and similar positions adopted by many other
political parties and civil society groups for a long time in Nepal.‖509
Another primary reason women and girls joined the Maoists was because it
provided an opportunity for their empowerment. Yet many female cadre reported that
were more keen to join combat units—rather than propaganda or party committees—
because it provided them an opportunity to be ―useful‖ in overthrowing a patriarchal,
feudal system whereas party and propaganda committees were known to reinstitutionalize
gender inequality by placing women in support roles.510 Some women also reported that
they joined the PLA to prevent future acts of gender violence against themselves and
other women, and those who participated in combat felt powerful and equal with male
cadre. It was a widely held belief that the Maoists empowered women. A woman who
was elected to a village development committee at the urging of Maoist cadre said:
―There are so many atrocities committed by the police in our village. The
Maoists do not harm us. They are the people of our own village. These
507
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days they visit door to door and conduct classes on many issues for us. We
now know how to talk to people, why the Maoists are against the
government and why it is important to support the Maoists.‖511
Another young female cadre said that ―I feel powerful with a gun.‖512 In Maoistcontrolled areas in rural Nepal, according to a report by the CPN(M) daily, The Worker,
in 2003:
―Women owned land for the first time… Arranged marriages, polygamy
and other feudal traditions oppressive to women are no longer practiced.
Wife beating and rape are severely punished by the People‘s Courts.
Women are given the right to divorce, go to school, are equal participants
in the new economic, political, and social life of the villages.‖
This statement is confirmed by numerous journalistic stories that report the Maoists
punished men who took dowries, married more than one woman, committed rape,
abandoned their wives, or married young girls.513 Women and girls joined the Maoists
irrespective of caste or ethnic background and most had shattered the myth that women
could not do men‘s work (because of their absence due to the conflict or seasonal
migration) and became frustrated by the feminization of the agricultural sector. Because
their confidence grew in absence of their male relatives, many women joined the
insurgency to fight for the rights of oppressed classes, castes, and themselves as
women.514
The third reason for women‘s mass participation in the Maoists was that cadre
required every family in CPN(M)-controlled areas allow one member to join the
movement—families, because of boy preference, were more willing to permit their
daughters to join the movement. Binita and Jumna, two female Maoists interviewed by
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Rita Manchanda in rural Nepal, reported that they had been given by their parents to
Maoist cadre while their two brothers attended secondary school.515 This was indicative
of the pervasiveness of Nepali culture that seeped into the Maoist organization despite
attempts by the leadership to ameliorate gender inequality.
Another reason women joined the Maoists was because of its strict enforcement
of an alcohol ban throughout Maoist-controlled territory. Through ANWA(R), the
Maoists initiated an anti-alcohol campaign that was intended to reduce domestic violence
perpetrated by husbands against women and children. One young female Maoists said:
―My father is an alcoholic. After taking alcohol he assaults me and my
mother. Every day we are scared when he goes out for a drink. Two of my
brothers left home for India to escape this situation. It is embarrassing for
me too. I joined the women‘s organization to join the anti-alcohol
campaign.‖516
Domestic violence is often catalyzed by men drinking alcohol. While men often spend
hours playing cards, drinking alcohol (usually raski), and gossiping, women are tasked
with agricultural work, collecting firewood, tending cattle, and taking care of children.
Many female Maoists viewed the anti-alcohol campaign as a component of their
liberation from patriarchy.517
Revenge was another reason women joined the Maoists. Many women reported
that they had lost their husbands, brothers, or other male relatives to state-perpetrated
violence. One female Maoist cadre from the Rolpa district said that:
―Whenever the army enters the village, we a get a few new women joining
the militia… Whenever the army enters the village they don‘t just eat and
take away the chickens and food the villagers have, they also torture
women and rape them. They burn the houses and terrify the people. Those
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poor people do not have any place to go to seek justice. So they come and
join the party, in order to retaliate.‖518
Maya Chaudhary, a female Maoist from Udayapur, reported that:
―The police arrested my husband from the room. I was sleeping next to
him when they came to arrest my husband. I asked for the reason and they
told me that they were taking him for interrogation and would release him
after some days, but next day they killed him. I lost the hope that I could
get any justice from this system.‖519
The excesses of the RNA and NAPF—against women and men—proved a salient issue
for Nepali women and led many of them to join the Maoist cause for revenge. They took
up the gun because state violence had destroyed their families and livelihoods by killing
male relatives suspected of Maoist participation.520
What were Maoist women‘s roles in the daily operations of the People‘s War?
Despite the vast amounts of rhetoric on women‘s emancipation, non-Maoist women in
Maoist-controlled villages would commonly participate in traditionally feminine
activities, e.g., fetching water or cooking, while male and female cadre would patrol
outside of villages. In the top echelons of leadership such as the Politburo there were no
women and during the 2001 and 2003 peace processes the Maoists did not have one
female representative to negotiate with the government. But within the district-level party
committees, women were oftentimes in charge of party operations. Hsila Yami led
ANWA(R), the women‘s wing of the CPN(M), and Pampa Bushal was co-leader of the
United People‘s Front until it was disbanded in 2000 due to its ineffectiveness.521 Yami
was from the Buddhist merchant Newari community (which was upper caste) and Bushal
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was from the upper-caste Brahman community—in fact, the majority of top female
Maoist leadership was drawn from upper-caste groups—while lower-caste, non-Hindu
women were more likely to participate in the PLA as combatants or in the CPN(M) as
lower-level party members. Women widely participated in the central committee as party
secretaries, office holders in village-level people‘s committees, as area commanders in
the PLA, and in Maoist militias as squad commanders. It must be noted that at the district
level in mid-2001, no woman led a people‘s committee within the party infrastructure
although four women did serve as vice chairs.522
Because of the classist and sexist nature of Nepali society, it appears that the
Maoists—despite their rhetoric and female tokenism which garnered widespread popular
support from female noncombatants and served as a recruiting tool—built an
organization that was a classist and patriarchal microcosm of the broader society,
although to a lesser extent. The impact of patriarchal Hindu values seemed to have a huge
impact on the intragroup dynamics of the organization similar to the reinstitutionalization
of patriarchy and classism found within the intragroup dynamics of the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka.
Of the 19,602 cadre in the PLA during the civil war, the United Nations (UN)
found that 3,846 of its personnel were women by the end of 2005. The Maoist leadership
would often claim that this number was closer to 40-50 percent, although in reality it was
approximately 20 percent. 523 The CPN(M), at the start of the People‘s War in February
1996, mandated that every combat unit of nine to 11 personnel contain at least two
women. Rita Manchanda argues that this mandate may have ―served as a check against
522
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excesses against women‖ by Maoist cadre throughout the civil war, but other scholars,
such as Elisbeth J. Wood, reject the hypothesis that the presence of women pacify male
combatants‘ use of sexual violence against noncombatants.524 Women in combat units
were able to transcend gender stereotypes more so than their female counterparts in the
party apparatus. They cut their hair short, wore plain kurta surals, and carried small arms
and light weapons. Many women served as unit commanders of nine to 11 cadre, both
male and female; several even served as area commanders of four combat units (i.e., 40
cadre at their command). As opposed to the LTTE in Sri Lanka, female Maoists were
integrated with male combatants—women and men in the Maoists trained, patrolled,
fought together, and intragroup punishments for sexual promiscuity were very harsh and
often enforced. María V. Ariño argues that although the Maoists employed sexual
violence, ―the existence of strict codes of conduct in the armed group in order to prevent
misbehavior, including that of a sexual nature, may have contributed to the lower
incidence of this kind of violence‖ vis-à-vis the RNA‘s repertoire of sexual violence and
the deployment of other forms of violence against noncombatants by the Maoists.525
Similar to the organizational structure of the Tamil Tigers, there are also reports that allfemale fighting units were deployed by the Maoists by 2001 until the conflict‘s end.526
Women participated in many specialized agencies as leaders, as members of the
central committee of the party, and thousands of women (estimated at nearly 3,000)
participated in the PLA as full combatants. While the Maoists paid lip service to
women‘s emancipation to garner popular support from and recruit Nepali women and
girls, only in the PLA did women and girls claim they had become more equal with their
524
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male combatants—although not entirely equal as Yami argued when criticizing the
failure of the Maoist leadership to prioritize women‘s issues.527 In the upper leadership of
the party there were no women. Deviating from the organizational structuring of the
Tamil Tigers, female Maoists were not separated from male cadre and many women led
combat units into battle with the RNA and NAPF.

3.5. Variation of Wartime Sexual Violence among Armed Groups
This section analyzes the Maoists and RNA‘s ―repertoire of violence‖ by
comparing non-sexual violence (e.g., kidnappings, torture, assassinations, etc.) with
instances of sexual violence by both actors. While the RNA appears to have committed
widespread sexual violence, few documentations of Maoist sexual violence exist (yet the
Maoists committed widespread non-sexual violence against civilians as well as NAPF
and RNA combatants).

Sexual Violence by the RNA
Extensive survey data and field research in the districts of Banke, Bardia, Doti,
Achham and Rolpa—where the majority of the conflict took place during the war—was
documented by the Institute of Human Rights Communication, Nepal (IHRICON) in
2006. In the Doti district, after the RNA was deployed in 2001, many noncombatant
women and girls reported that security forces raped those who were gathering firewood
or fetching drinking water for their families. The RNA leadership was known to protect
officers and enlisted combatants from judicial punishments who engaged in sexual
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violence against women and girls.528 Women in Nepal were skeptical of the judicial
system to ensure that perpetrators of sexual violence were held accountable:
―Ms. Spana Pradhan Malla, Director of the Forum for Women, Law, and
Development (Nepal), added to the discussion striking examples of
women‘s lack of faith in the legal system due to violations by police and
security forces, cultural connotations of shame, lack of judicially
acceptable evidence, and cases in which women were denied justice.‖529
This in large part bred a culture of impunity in which RNA personnel disregarded the
legal consequences of committing sexual violence. For example, in a highly-publicized
case, a major and two lower-ranking officers in the RNA raped and tortured two Muslim
girls in Rautahat in 2003.530 In this case, as in many, these two girls were allegedly
Maoist sympathizers and sexual violence served as a form of punishment for association
with Maoist cadre. There are no reports of the RNA leadership orchestrating systematic
sexual violence against women and girls; yet the culture of impunity as well as the
widespread and systematic nature of RNA-perpetrated rapes leads one to believe that the
upper hierarchy of the leadership at least implicitly (if not explicitly) condoned the use of
rape (act of commission). In addition, most of the women and girls who were targeted by
the RNA were suspected of supporting the Maoist insurgency which exemplifies the
highly political nature of sexual violence perpetrated by RNA combatants. One woman
from Rolpa reported that:
―[t]he Security forces used to treat us badly in the name of Maoists. Many
young girls were afraid of being raped by the security forces. Army men
used to misbehave and tease girls also in the name of Maoist [sic]. When
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one girl retaliated in response to such behavior, she was taken by the army
and her status is still unknown till [sic] date.‖531
Young girls were frequently abducted by the RNA to be raped:
―While sleeping in her own home, a 13-year-old girl from Doti District
was taken away by the security forces when no one was present. The
young girl was raped and later released the following day. Despite local
organizations reporting the case, it was dismissed by the security forces
who gave an amount of money to the poor family. The issue became
accepted in society afterwards and the matter did not proceed any
further.‖532
A Maoist woman from the Rolpa District said:
―Whenever the army enters the village, we get a few new women joining
the militia…Whenever the army enters the village they don‘t just eat and
take away the chickens and food the villagers have, they also torture
women and even rape them.‖533
The areas surrounding RNA barracks or security checkpoints fostered an environment
where RNA personnel committed sexual violence against women and girls with
impunity. IHRICON reports that as:
―The army presence increased in the district headquarters [of the Doti
District], the incidence of torture and rape cases had also increased. We
were told that they used to hide in the areas of soil harvesting, fodder
collection and abuse young girls, such as through touching sensitive body
parts. The Army were [sic] also involved in the looting of private
properties and all levels of army personnel were involved in those acts. It
was reported that ‗people are not safe here,‘ and women and children were
mostly affected. It was reported that all levels of army personnel are
involved in the act.‖534
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When non-governmental organizations, such as IHRICON, attempted to approach
women and girls who allegedly had been raped, these women were told to be silent by the
RNA or otherwise face execution after human rights workers left the vicinity.535
Women and girls were also tortured by the RNA to extract intelligence about
Maoist operations. The most publicized case was the torture and murder of Maina
Sunuwar who was captured by squad of 12 RNA cadre on the morning of 17 February
2005 despite there being no evidence that linked her to the Maoists. She was repeatedly
held under water and received electroshocks by army personnel in order to reveal
information about Maoist activities, which she vaguely admitted that she was involved in
such activity for ―a couple of months.‖536 She was dead by 11:00 p.m. from the injuries
she had received throughout her day-long torture. Maina was put into a burlap bag and
buried 50 meters from the RNA barracks where she was tortured. The RNA reported to
the public that ―Maina was arrested, tried to break the security cordon in Hokse and jump
out of the vehicle... She was shot by the security forces while doing so, and died.‖ Many
other ―encounters‖ with civilians suspected of Maoist activity was commonplace after the
RNA was deployed in 2001.
Not only did the RNA commit systematic and widespread rape, its personnel were
often reported to abduct young girls as sex slaves or child brides. Girls between the ages
of 14-17 were most vulnerable to such exploitation by RNA combatants. A young girl
spoke of her marriage to a police officer in the NAPF: ―He persuaded me to marry him
which I did not agree. He then came to my home and asked my parents to marry me.
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They accepted the offer and I got married with that police man.‖537 Because most girls
were from the lowest castes (particularly Dalits), indigenous groups, or marginalized
socioeconomic backgrounds, some family members believed that their daughters had the
opportunity to improve their socioeconomic conditions via marriage to RNA personnel.
However, in many instances, these girls were later abandoned as RNA combatants
reneged on their promises after they were redeployed elsewhere in Nepal; such women
and girls were often stigmatized by their family members for bringing dishonor upon the
family (because of the prevalence of patriarchal Hindu values and a pervasive familial
honor culture).538

Repertoire of Violence by the CPN(M)
The Maoists also committed myriad forms of violence against civilians
throughout the 1996-2005 civil war. Within their repertoire of violence, the CPN(M)
committed forced disappearances, recruited child soldiers, assassinated landlords and
other local elite, and executed members of the police and security forces. However,
unlike the RNA, violence was employed selectively by the Maoists and when specific
units did commit atrocities against civilians, CPN(M) leadership was quick to apologize
and punish offending officers and cadre—this allowed the Maoist to ―avoid large scale
resistance‖ from noncombatants or anti-Maoist militias.539 Of the 13,190 documented
deaths as a result of the civil war, 1,114 were civilians and it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the percentage killed by the Maoists. (In comparison, 1,962

537

The Institute of Human Rights Communication, Nepal (2006) op. cit., p. 11.
Ibid; Ariño, María V. (2008) op. cit., pp. 7-8.
539
Lawoti, Mahendra (2010) op. cit., p. 14.
538

185

security and police forces were killed while 9,270 Maoist cadre were killed during the
civil war.)540
On 13 February 1996, the Maoists initiated the People‘s War by attacking six
different targets, such as police posts in Rukum, Rolpa, Gorkha, and Sindhuli as well as
an agricultural office in Ghorka. As they expanded their areas of control, government
workers were assassinated by cadre unless the pledged support to the People‘s War. Fear
and intimidation of civilians by the Maoists was common. The CPN(M) killed or tortured
wealthy local elites to garner support from socioeconomically oppressed groups in rural
villages. One villager noted:
―We heard that Maoists were starting to break into the houses of wealthy
people, tax collectors and moneylenders, stealing their money and
property and distributing it to the poor… We heard that the Maoists were
breaking the arms and legs of moneylenders and tax collectors in the west
of the country and were taking control of villages.‖541
Because of the threat of violence—and the Maoists‘ ability to mobilize and deploy
quickly in rural areas—civilians were fearful of reprisals for aiding security forces,
refusing to feed and house Maoist units, and/or pay taxes to Maoist cadre for
protection.542 At the outset of the People‘s War, the CPN(M) avoided attacking the RNA,
which was largely stationed in Kathmandu and other major towns and village in Nepal;
rather, the Maoists fought and killed police forces who were less professional and ill-
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equipped vis-à-vis the RNA. It was not until late-2001 that the Maoists attacked the
RNA, after they had grown into a considerable threat to the monarchy and Nepali state.543
During a short and abrupt peace when the RNA was deployed and peace talks
ensued in 2001, the government declared a state of emergency in which civil and political
liberties of all civilians were severely curbed (e.g., indefinite detention without a criminal
charge). Despite the state of emergency, Maoist violence intensified. The Maoists
attacked the town of Mangalsen in western Nepal which resulted in the deaths of 100
civilians on 21 February 2002. Additionally, in April 2002 an estimated 48 policemen
were killed by the CPN(M). In May 2002, 130 security force personnel were killed in
combat by the Maoists in Rolpa district. The escalation of violence was so severe—and
the government‘s inability to address the Maoist threat was a harsh reality—that on 29
January 2003 the Maoists declared a ceasefire to begin the second round of peace
negotiations. A comprehensive peace deal could not be reached and by 29 August 2003
the cease-fire was broken.544
To gain recruits, the Maoists implemented a one-child-per-household policy in
which each family must give one child to CPN(M) cadre to ensure the continuance of the
People‘s War. This guaranteed that the PLA had enough combatants, but, most
importantly, it ensured that families in the rural districts of Nepal would support the
Maoist movement because of their personal ties with the insurgency.545 Children were
either abducted or deceived by the prospect of attending Maoist schools in villages which
in reality were propaganda and recruitment forums. Human Rights Watch documented
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nearly 3,500-4,500 child soldiers in the Maoist ranks by the end of 2005. These child
soldiers often served as messengers, porters, domestic servants, sentries, or even as fullfledged combatants. Girls as young as 12 or 13 were present in the party apparatus or
served in support roles for the PLA.546 Children active in combat were reported to be as
young as 14.547 There were reports of sexual abuse of some child soldiers, especially
young girls. The Maoists were allegedly still forcibly recruiting child soldiers by the time
the 12-Point Agreement was signed by the Maoists and Seven Party Alliance on 22
November 2005.548

The Infrequency of Sexual Violence by the Maoists
The Maoists were not guilty of widespread sexual violence against women and
girls yet there are several reported instances of sexual violence by Maoist cadre.
According to IHRICON, ―the sexual violence committed on part of the Maoists was
much less than that of the security forces.‖549 One woman reported, in an ethnographic
study conducted in Maurigaun, that women ―feel that they are more at risk from the
security forces as they have heard stories of the mistreatment of civilian women by the
army.‖550 Rita Manchanda confirms this pattern of Maoist sexual violence by arguing that
―there appear to be few reports of sexual violence by the Maoists.‖551 However, there are
reported cases of Maoist combatants wielding their weapons and subsequently raping
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women and girls in rural areas. Like the RNA, Maoist commanders were also known to
take sexual slaves. Women who refused sexual relations with Maoist combatants were
sometimes tortured and killed, although such reports remain rare to date. However, when
young girls were forcibly recruited into the Maoist ranks, such girls were raped and
tortured by enlisted combatants while their unit or area commanders turned a blind eye
(acts of omission) as opposed to the RNA which appears to have systematically
orchestrated sexual violence against women and girls labeled as Maoist combatants or
sympathizers.
Despite several reported instances of sexual slavery or rape by the Maoists, one
focus group conducted by IHRICON reported that ―Maoists behave normally. They have
punished the culprit involved in rape cases.‖552 In a case of sexual misconduct concerning
Papmpa Bushal, leader of the United People‘s Front, with a male comrade named
―Badal,‖ Bushal was punished by suspension from her political post and sent to a rural
village post for ―re-education.‖553 Badal was suspended yet quickly climbed the ranks to
become head of the PLA. Bushal was later appointed to the Central Committee, although
her re-ascension in the Maoist ranks took much longer than Badal‘s.554 Despite their
rhetoric on women‘s emancipation, the Maoists also punished female cadre and
noncombatants who were victimized by sexual violence: ―A Maoist in a responsible post
had sexual relations with a lady and made her pregnant when her husband was working in
an Arab country. The lady became pregnant and was receiving discipline by the Maoist
Party for having immoral relations.‖555 In another documented case: ―A Maoist cadre
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made a lady pregnant and left her. That lady later gave birth and killed her baby. The
Maoist Party took action against her on the proposed crime.‖556 It appears that the strict
policies on discipline within the Maoist insurgency—particularly regarding sexual
misconduct—was much more lenient toward male cadre relative to female cadre who
were engaging in consensual sexual intercourse (while those found to have committed
rape or sexual harassment were severely reprimanded). A double standard appears to
have been present as noncombatant women who engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse were severely reprimanded by Maoist cadre who were, in essence, policing
women‘s sexuality in areas under their control.

3.6. Explaining the Variation of Sexual Violence by the CPN(M)
What factors are correlated with the infrequency of wartime sexual violence by
the Maoists when the RNA committed sexual violence on a widespread and systematic
scale? This section seeks to trace the working independent variables in the Maoist case in
order to compile the data necessary to build a theoretical explanation of the variation of
sexual violence perpetrated by the Tamil Tigers, RUF, and CPN(M) in chapter four. The
six independent variables include: (1) macrosocial and (2) intragroup gender dynamics;
(3) popular support; (4) ethnic, class, or caste rivalries; (5) leadership directives on sexual
violence; and (6) judicial mechanisms.
Inequitable macrosocial gender dynamics were present before and during the civil
war in Nepal. Women were culturally, economically, and legally subordinated to Nepali
men. The findings fit with Sanday‘s analytical conceptualization of ―rape-prone
societies.‖ Women were primary caretakers of children, were responsible for the bulk of
556
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domestic labor (nearly four times as much work relative to men), and participated in a
feminized agricultural sector. A Hinduization of society—codified through legislation—
by the Nepali state reinforced women‘s subordinate status. Nepal‘s GDI average was 0.45
throughout the civil war (with Sierra Leone being 0.18 and Sri Lanka 0.7; a score of 1.0
is perfect gender equality while a score of 0 is perfect inequality in the socioeconomic
sphere). While Nepali society was inequitable for women in the socioeconomic sphere
and because of widespread patriarchal Hindu practices, the Maoists and the RNA treated
women differently when they were engaged in conflict with one another. While one
would expect the PLA and RNA to treat women the same—including engaging in
wartime sexual violence—the frequency of sexual violence varied greatly between the
two armed groups. Therefore, intragroup gender dynamics may provide a more
compelling explanation as to why the CPN(M) committed sexual violence less frequently
than the RNA.
Equitable intragroup gender dynamics were weakly present in the Maoists
throughout the course of the civil war. Women trained, ate, patrolled, and engaged in
combat with male cadre and there was not a separation of the sexes as there was in the
Tamil Tigers (although there are several reported instances of all-female Maoist cadre).
Women were able to participate in leadership positions within the PLA, although they
never achieved a level higher than area commander (i.e., in charge of four units for a total
of 40 combatants). Intragroup and regional judicial mechanisms—in the form of
punishment by commanding officers or Maoist people‘s courts, respectively—were
present throughout the civil war in the Maoist insurgency. There were only several
documented instances of sexual violence committed by top leadership of the Maoists—
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even these individuals were not immune from punishment, signaling the robustness and
legitimacy of these judicial mechanisms in ameliorating a culture of impunity. Sexual
misconduct was prohibited by the top leadership of the CPN(M) to attract female recruits.
Despite this reality, some female Maoists—especially those under the age of 20—faced
instances of forced sex or sexual slavery from commanders and enlisted cadre. However,
if cadre were caught committing rape or other forms of sexual violence, they were
severely reprimanded by many commanding officers; other reports show that
commanders turned a blind eye to the rape of female Maoists and noncombatants (e.g. act
of omission). The data suggest that PLA commanders were more likely to punish their
combatants who committed sexual violence rather than turning a blind eye (in order to
enforce discipline among the personnel under their command). Despite the rhetoric in the
party apparatus, traditional gender roles were reinforced and women and girls had fewer
options for empowerment within the party vis-à-vis female combatants in the PLA.
The Maoists relied heavily on popular support of rural villagers throughout the
conflict, and such a strategy—the Prachanda Path—enabled the CPN(M) to recruit
individuals and extract resources from populations surrounding its base areas in midwestern Nepal. However, when villagers failed to comply with Maoist demands for food,
shelter, taxes, and/or child recruits, they were often beat, tortured, or killed to serve as an
example to other villagers. This created a culture of fear and respect for the Maoists that
ensured that the populations in its stronghold would comply with Maoist demands for
recruits and other resources. Additionally, the PLA relied on civilian militias to support it
when it was engaged in heavy combat with the RNA although the capacity of the
People‘s Militia was limited due to their lack of professionalism and modernized
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weaponry (despite their unprofessionalism, there are no documented cases of sexual
violence committed by People‘s Militia cadre). Yet despite relying heavily on civilian
support, many civilians were killed by the Maoists—either intentionally or through
friendly fire—throughout the 1996-2005 civil war.
There was a class rivalry present in the Nepalese civil war. The Maoists labeled
the state as ―feudalistic‖ and ―imperialist.‖ The logic of Maoist violence was to eliminate
class enemies and many landlords, tax collectors, and other business class elites were
assassinated by the CPN(M) so that they would gain popular support from lower-class
peasants throughout rural Nepal. Framing the conflict in terms of class rivalries also
allowed the Maoists in recruit widely from lower castes or marginalized ethnonational
groups throughout rural Nepal, especially in its western stronghold. Popular support and
mass mobilization on behalf of Maoist ideological thinking was important for justifying
the legitimacy of the People‘s War and guaranteeing the sustainability of the insurgency.

3.7 Conclusion
This chapter traces the history of the Nepalese civil war, explains the formation of
the principal insurgency, analyzes the Maoists repertoire of violence vis-à-vis
government armed forces, and considers six independent variables as influencing the
variation of sexual violence between the two cases and among armed groups within each
case—(1) macrosocial and (2) intra-group gender dynamics; (3) political, ethnic, and/or
class rivalries; (4) accountability mechanisms; (5) (non-)reliance on civilian support; and
(6) leadership prohibition. The data presented here informs the hypotheses testing, theory
development, and policy recommendations found in the following chapter.

193

The intragroup gender dynamics of the RNA and CPN(M) were in stark contrast
from one another throughout the civil war, with the Maoists providing opportunities for
women and girls to participate in party politics, combat, and propaganda campaigns while
there are no reported instances of women participating in the RNA, even in support roles.
The Maoists committed sexual violence in a less frequent and non-systematic manner visà-vis the RNA which employed sexual violence against suspected Maoist women and
girls near barracks, at security checkpoints, and while on patrol. Thus a combination of
equitable intragroup dynamics and leadership prohibition of sexual violence within the
CPN(M)—which were positively correlated with a lower frequency of wartime sexual
violence—provides the most compelling explanation for the infrequency of wartime
sexual violence committed by the Maoists during the 1996-2005 Nepalese civil war.
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4. Conclusion: Explaining Variations of Wartime Sexual Violence
―We realize the crime of sexual assault erodes the very fabric of our profession… It’s
based on trust, and this particular crime erodes that trust.‖ – Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey557
4.1. Introduction
This final chapter (1) tests the four hypotheses presented in chapter one using
empirical data found in chapters two and three; (2) develops a theory on why intragroup
gender and leadership dynamics correlate with the frequency and pattern of wartime
sexual violence; (3) suggests policy prescriptions regarding combatant socialization in the
U.S. military, government armed forces, and multilateral peacekeeping operations
(PKOs); and (4) concludes with suggestions for future research on wartime sexual
violence.

4.2. The Congruence Method: Hypotheses Testing
This section employs the congruence method to test four hypotheses drawn from
the literature that have been utilized by scholars to explain the variation of wartime
sexual violence in frequency and type across or within conflicts. Each hypothesis is
applied to the cases of Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and Nepal with a concluding analysis that
either rejects or fails to reject the hypothesis under question. The congruence method
compliments the method of process-tracing used in chapters two and three. Alexander L.
George and Andrew Bennett contend that utilizing a comparative case study with the
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congruence method and process-tracing addresses the problem known as
underdetermination or the degrees of freedom problem—i.e., ―too many variables, too
few cases.‖558 This is important considering that the study has three cases, with one
dependent variable and six independent variables in each case.

(H1) When the macro-cultural norms of societies are gender equitable, sexual violence
during combat is less frequent and vice versa.559
If a society is highly patriarchal, is sexual violence more widespread and
systematic by the armed groups involved in civil war? And, conversely, if a society is
more gender equitable, does sexual violence occur less frequently by armed groups
during civil war? If confirmed, one would expect sexual violence to be low in more
gender equal societies and higher in more patriarchal societies during civil war.
Sri Lanka was classified as a patriarchal society throughout the 1983-2009 civil
war yet the LTTE employed sexual violence against women and girls at a much lower
frequency than the SLA. Because both Sinhala and Tamil cultures were patriarchal and
categorize as ―rape prone,‖ one would not expect the variation in frequency of wartime
sexual violence between the LTTE and SLA if they existed within the same territorial
space. However, relative to Sierra Leone (with around 250,000 women and girls who
were targets of sexual violence), sexual violence was employed less frequently by all
armed actors during the Sri Lankan civil war. Sierra Leone was the most patriarchal
country—according to the Gender-Related Development Indicator (GDI) as well as other
measures such as maternal mortality rates, women‘s representation in parliament, and
ethnographic data such as that presented in chapter two—during the 1991-2002 civil war.
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Yet the RUF was responsible for more than 85 percent of instances of sexual violence
during the civil war whereas the RSLAF and CDF committed far fewer acts of sexual
violence. Furthermore, 60 percent of reported acts of sexual violence fell within the
1998-1999 period of the war, suggesting that sexual violence was used as a deliberate
strategy by the RUF-AFRC alliance during its bid to prevent the takeover of Freetown by
the RSLAF and CDF.560 In Nepal, GDI data suggest that the society was highly
patriarchal but the RNA committed the majority of sexual violence against women and
girls while the CPN(M) was implicated in only several documented cases of sexual
violence. Both CPN(M) and RNA combatants were products of a patriarchal Nepali
society yet sexual violence was disproportionately committed by the RNA.
Based on the macrosocial data which suggest that all armed actors existed in
patriarchal societies (although at varying levels) during their respective conflicts, this
study rejects the hypothesis (H1) that suggests the (non-)patriarchal societal variable
correlates with the (non-)use of wartime sexual violence by armed groups because of the
disproportionate use of sexual violence by one group when others rarely employed this
form of violence despite existing within the same patriarchal sociocultural environment.
This variable may explain why sexual violence occurs at a greater frequency across
conflicts but it does not account for why sexual violence varies in frequency and type
among armed groups within the same conflict. Other variables and causal mechanisms
appear to have been present during each civil war that provide a more compelling
explanation of the variation in frequency of sexual violence among armed groups within
the same civil war.
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(H2) Group leadership may prohibit or authorize wartime sexual violence, which may
explain the low and high frequency, respectively, of systematic rape by armed groups
during conflict.561
If group leadership forbids sexual violence against women and girls, is an armed
group less likely to commit sexual violence on a widespread scale? And on the other
hand, if group leadership condones or orchestrates wartime sexual violence, is that armed
group more likely to commit widespread sexual violence against noncombatants?
In Sri Lanka, the LTTE leadership forbade the use of sexual violence against
women and girls in order to gain female recruits and garner female noncombatant support
of the Tigers‘ goal of Tamil national liberation which also included calls for Tamil
women‘s emancipation from patriarchal oppression. The LTTE was implicated in very
few occurrences of sexual violence and those LTTE cadre who were culpable of wartime
rape were reprimanded by commanders in the Tigers. In addition, the LTTE leadership
hierarchy was centralized around Prakbaharan who was able to enforce decisions such as
the prohibition of wartime sexual violence. In both acts of omission by the top leadership
and acts of commission by low- to mid-level officers of the SLA, the Sri Lankan armed
forces were guilty of the majority of wartime sexual violence during the 1983-2009 civil
war. This appears to have been part of an organizational strategy to terrorize the Tamil
population and prevent the movement of women and girls from the territory surrounding
LTTE strongholds.
The leadership of the RUF during the Sierra Leonean civil war, particularly Foday
Sankoh, encouraged combatants to terrorize civilian populations using violent tactics in
which sexual violence was deemed a powerful tool of terror for targeting female
561
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noncombatants. However, there is no available data which suggest that RUF leadership
directly ordered sexual violence to be employed in the insurgency‘s repertoire of
violence. There were no reports of RUF combatants who were disciplined after they had
committed sexual violence against women and girls. In contrast, the RSLAF and CDF
committed very few acts of sexual violence vis-à-vis the RUF (around one percent) and
were much more disciplined than the RUF.
In Nepal, the CPN(M) employed relatively little sexual violence compared to the
RNA and NAPF and Maoist cadre who were found responsible for sexual violence were
harshly reprimanded by commanding officers (although there are reports of several rogue
officers who committed sexual violence). Even commanding officers who were found
culpable of sexual violence against female cadre or noncombatants were punished by
demotion and ideological reeducation. In the official ideology and rhetoric of Maoist
leadership, they explicitly prohibited violence against women in order to attract female
recruits and gain female noncombatant support. In addition, several women were in top
positions of leadership within the Maoists and were able on many occasions to influence
male leadership on issues of gender equality and violence against women. Because of the
strong internal discipline of the CPN(M) fostered by Prachanda and other high-level
leadership, it appears that sexual violence was utilized less frequently than the RNA and
NAPF. In contrast, the RNA committed widespread and systematic sexual violence at
security checkpoints, near barracks, and on patrols in Maoist-controlled territory.
Commanding officers in the RNA were known to shield their enlisted combatants from
punishment after they had engaged in sexual violence against suspected female Maoist
sympathizers.
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The data presented in chapters two and three points to a strong correlation
between leadership prohibition of sexual violence and the infrequency of sexual violence
by the Nepali Maoists and Tamil Tigers. On the other hand, it also highlights acts of
omission and commission by RNA, SLA, and RUF leadership and the high frequency
and systematic patterns of sexual violence against women and girls in each respective
civil war. This study, therefore, fails to reject (i.e., supports) the leadership hypothesis
(H2) as a positive correlation between the leadership variable and wartime sexual
violence is present. Further study of these two variables is warranted to further the
understanding of variation in frequency and type of wartime sexual violence.

(H3) When armed groups depend on the ―provision of support‖—supplies, ideological
support, and intelligence—from civilian populations and intend to govern them, such
groups do not engage in widespread sexual violence against civilians.562
If an insurgency depends on civilian populations for sustaining its combat
operations, is sexual violence against noncombatants rare? When an insurgency is
externally backed by a foreign government or transnational organization, is sexual
violence against noncombatants more frequent and widespread?
The Tamil Tigers relied on popular support to finance their insurgency against the
Sri Lankan government yet much of this financial support was coercively extracted from
Sri Lankan Tamils as well as the Tamil diaspora in the U.S. and Canada. As far as its
ideological objectives, the Tigers sought to overthrow the Colombo regime in Tamil
Eelam via its revolution and govern the northeastern territory of Sri Lanka. The LTTE
also employed non-sexual violence against Tamil civilians as it sought to outbid
competing Tamil insurgencies in the 1980s and during the 2007-2009 period of the war
562
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as its control of northeastern Sri Lanka was eroded by the SLA. Despite this reality, the
LTTE implemented a propaganda campaign to attract female recruits by calling for
women‘s emancipation and deploring rape and other sexual misconduct by the SLA.
Tamil women‘s support of the LTTE was vital for its strategic and ideological objectives
throughout the civil war.
In the Sierra Leone civil war, the RUF did not rely on popular support from the
civilian population but was rather externally backed by Charles Taylor‘s National
Patriotic Front of Liberia and, eventually, the Taylor regime in Liberia. It was also able to
finance its campaign through the illegal mining of alluvial diamond deposits found in the
Kono district and the forcible extraction of resources—food, shelter, and recruits—from
civilian populations. The RUF did intend to govern Sierra Leone, but Foday Sankoh
would likely have autocratically ruled Sierra Leone if the insurgency was successful.
Because the RUF was able to sustain its operations in the absence of ideology or popular
support, it was able to wage gruesome and widespread (sexual) violence against Sierra
Leoneans during the civil war.
The Nepali Maoists, in accordance with the Prachanda Path, relied heavily on
rural popular support—particularly in the midwestern hill districts of Nepal—to surround
Kathmandu and overthrow the monarchy. The PLA would often enter villages and extract
resources such as food, shelter, taxes, and recruits from civilian populations (although
recruitment was rarely done forcibly, as opposed to the RUF). The Maoists also received
military support from People‘s Militias that would mobilize during heavy combat with
the RNA in the latter half of the civil war. However, the PLA was known to employ
violence against Nepali noncombatants who were (1) viewed as ―class enemies‖
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(particularly intellectuals and business elites), (2) suspected of collaborating with the
RNA and Kathmandu government, or (3) caught in the middle of firefights between the
CPN(M) and RNA.
It appears that the popular support hypothesis (H3) in part explains variation in
wartime sexual violence by the Nepali Maoists and Tamil Tigers which both relied on
popular support from civilian populations and intended to govern them after the
realization of their respective revolutions. In contrast, the RUF, despite intending to
govern Sierra Leoneans, neither sought nor needed the financial, human, and ideological
support of noncombatants. Therefore, this study fails to reject (i.e., supports) the popular
support hypothesis.

(H4) Insurgent groups with (a) high numbers of female combatants, (b) an equitable
sexual division of labor, and (c) female combatants in leadership roles engage less in
wartime sexual violence and vice versa.563
When an insurgency equitably integrates women into its ranks of combatant and
leadership positions, is wartime sexual violence less frequent by that respective armed
group? And, conversely, when armed opposition groups have few female cadre, relegate
them to support roles, and lack female leadership, is wartime sexual violence more
frequent by such insurgencies?
The Tamil Tigers began integrating women into its ranks two years after the start
of the civil war and female cadre participated in combat operations until the Tigers‘ May
2009 defeat by the SLA. Female cadre gained respect from their male colleagues through
their participation in combat and their adoption of hypermasculine traits such as the
suppression of emotion, ferocity in combat, and expertise in the tactics of war. However,
563
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to appeal to conservative Tamil supporters, the LTTE separated female and male combat
units to avoid fraternization between the sexes which was believed to lead to immoral
sexual relations according to Hindu patriarchal norms. But because female cadre were
respected as capable combatants and leaders as well as the LTTE‘s need for additional
recruits, intragroup gender dynamics were more equitable than most armed insurgent
groups and government armed forces.
During the Sierra Leonean civil war, women and girls were integrated into the
RUF but the interactions between male and female cadre were unequal and extremely
violent. Women and girls were often abducted and served as sex slaves (―bush wives‖),
domestic servants, and combatants (e.g., the Small Girls Unit). The majority of women in
the RUF filled subservient roles as sex slaves or domestic servants while a minority
participated in combat. The RUF operated based on a stringent meritocracy of violence
among enlisted combatants in which several reports document that female combatants
were able to rise to low-level field commander positions. (High ranking officers in the
RUF were promoted because of their unwavering loyalty to Sankoh, not necessarily by
their use of heinous forms of violence.) Yet female cadre were unable to rise to the midto high-level leadership positions in the RUF because of hegemonic masculine values
within the top leadership. Women in the RUF were known to commit egregious forms of
violence against civilians and even raped female noncombatants with guns, knives, and
other blunt objects or held victims down while male cadre committed sexual violence.
But because few men in the RUF respected female cadre, it was commonplace for them
to commit sexual violence against female (non)combatants throughout the civil war.
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Women and girls were, in general, equitably integrated into the ranks of the
Nepali Maoists. Female and male Maoist cadre ate, trained, patrolled, and fought together
contrary to the separation of the sexes found in the LTTE. (Although there were reports
of several all-female PLA units that were deployed after 2001 in the midwestern hill
districts.) In the PLA, many female cadre were able to reach the rank of area commander
in which they directed 40 personnel. Within the CPN(M), women were able to obtain
higher positions of authority, although they were often relegated to ANWA(R)—the
women‘s wing of the party apparatus—in which they would launch propaganda and
recruiting campaigns that addressed women‘s issues such as domestic violence, sexual
violence by the RNA, etc. While women were respected as equals during combat
operations among enlisted personnel, female Maoists were unable to obtain mid- to highlevel leadership positions in the PLA and within the CPN(M) women engaged in much of
the support work similar to the RUF (which was a reinstitutionalization of gender roles
within the Maoists).
Rather than merely focusing on the presence of women within insurgent groups
(which Elisabeth J. Wood aptly dismisses as a supportable hypothesis because of the
presence of women in the RUF), the gender dynamics hypothesis (H4) examines the
quality of women‘s experience within the three insurgencies under question. In the Tamil
Tigers and Nepali Maoists, female cadre were respected by their male colleagues after
they had trained and engaged in combat operations with one another. Women were able
to rise to low-ranking field commander positions in which they commanded both male
and female cadre. Women and girls also wielded small arms and light weapons and had
considerable success during combat which garnered male cadre‘s respect. Few women
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and girls in the LTTE and CPN(M) were exposed to sexual violence by male cadre.
Because of the need for additional recruits within both insurgencies, the leadership
framed women‘s participation as vital for achieving the ideological and strategic
objectives of the insurgencies. In contrast, the RUF forcibly conscripted women and girls
and they were subjected to various forms of sexual violence by male cadre. The top
leadership neither valued the presence of women and girls within the organization nor did
they believe female cadre to be integral to realizing the strategic and ideological
objectives of the insurgency. Therefore, this study fails to reject (i.e., supports) the
intragroup gender dynamics hypothesis (H4) as equitable intragroup gender dynamics are
correlated with the infrequent use of sexual violence by armed opposition groups while
inequitable gender dynamics are correlated with a high frequency of wartime sexual
violence against women and girls among the three cases.

4.3. Bringing Intragroup Gender Dynamics into Wartime Sexual Violence Theory
This section briefly theorizes as to why wartime sexual violence was rarely
employed by the Tamil Tigers and Nepali Maoists, focusing on an overlooked causal
pathway in the existing literature. It is important to understand that small-n comparative
case studies do not permit parsimonious theorizing that is generalizable to a large number
of cases as in the case of large-N studies; however, the small-n comparative method
allows researchers to develop middle-level theories that can be applied to a handful of
other similar cases. In short, the theory below may be applied to other cases in which
wartime sexual violence varied in frequency among armed groups within the same civil
war (e.g., Colombia, Peru, Libya, etc.). Elisabeth J. Wood highlights this underspecified
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explanation of women‘s presence in insurgencies in which this study attempts to expand
into a testable hypothesis:
―[A]n explanation sometimes made for the absence of sexual violence on
the part of some armed groups is the presence of many female cadre.
However, the causal mechanism is not well specified; candidates include
the following. On is the substitution argument: The presence of female
combatants means that male combatants do not ―need‖ to rape. Another
approach assumes that female combatants eschew sexual violence, but that
is not the case as they actively engage in it in some conflicts, as in Sierra
Leone and Rwanda. Moreover, some armed groups with significant
numbers of female combatants do engage in high levels of sexual
violence; the RUF of Sierra Leone is an example. Or perhaps the presence
of women disrupts male bonding through misogynistic training practices,
practices that are thought by some scholars to make sexual violence more
likely. However, the experience of female soldiers in U.S. forces is that
such practices continue in more muted and covert form, despite their
official banning. An organization might prohibit sexual violence by its
cadre for fear that the enemy would retaliate in kind, threatening its own
female cadre. Or an organization may pursue a strategy or ideology (for
example, recruitment based on sexual violence by enemy forces) that both
appeals to female recruits and also promotes the prohibition of sexual
violence‖ (emphasis added).564
The final ―candidate‖ of explanations for the variation of wartime sexual violence is the
most compelling explanation yet Wood found less evidence to causally link the variable
of intragroup gender dynamics into her leadership prohibition hypothesis. This is likely
due to her single-case study of the LTTE which prevented the contrast and comparison of
wartime sexual violence across conflicts as well as among armed groups that is possible
with the comparative method.
This study‘s empirical evidence leads one to theorize that when leadership
prohibits sexual violence, enforces strong internal group discipline, and frames women’s
(equitable) participation as integral for achieving the broader ideological and strategic
goals of the insurgency (i.e., nationalist, leftist, etc.), sexual violence against women and
564
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girls is less frequent during civil wars by armed opposition groups vis-à-vis government
armed forces. In the cases of wartime sexual violence in the Nepali and Sri Lankan civil
wars, the leadership of the CPN(M) and LTTE prohibited the use of sexual violence as a
tactic of war, fostered a group culture which was highly disciplined (which oftentimes
group leadership punished cadre who were found culpable of sexual violence), and
framed the participation of women and girls as capable actors who would help ensure that
the strategic and ideological objectives of the insurgencies were realized.
The importance of ideological ―frames‖ by insurgent leadership cannot be
understated as a causal mechanism that led to the infrequency of wartime sexual violence.
Because both the Tigers and Maoists linked women‘s emancipation with the broader
nationalist and leftist goals, respectively, of their revolutions, this created intragroup
dynamics that valued women as unit commanders, cadre, and support personnel.
(However, as David Snow notes, it is a common pitfall of scholars of collective action
framing to assume perfect adherence of members‘ behavior with group ideology—this
may explain why some commanders and cadre in the LTTE and CPN[M] committed
sexual violence against female cadre and noncombatants despite the official rhetoric and
ideology championed by top leadership.)565 Such a middle-level theory drawn from this
study‘s three-case comparative methodology explicitly links leadership prohibition with
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the military‘s prior and explicit agreement and consent." Cited in Jamail, Dahr (23 December 2010)
―Military Sexual Abuse ‗Staggering‘,‖ Aljazeera, accessed at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2010/12/20101223113859171112.html.
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equitable intragroup dynamics as the two most important necessary conditions for the
infrequency of sexual violence by armed opposition groups.
This causal pathway provides an additional (and more complex) hypothesis that
may be tested on other cases of wartime sexual violence rather than merely testing for the
presence of women in armed groups. It contributes new insight into the existing literature
because it links the intragroup gender dynamics of insurgencies with leadership
prohibition of wartime sexual violence that could not be uncovered with Wood‘s singlecase study of the Tamil Tigers.

4.4. Policy Implications
Since sexual violence is not inevitable during wartime (and in fact, ―boys will not
be boys‖ during certain conflicts), there is greater grounds for holding groups
accountable that do commit widespread and systematic violence against noncombatants.
This section considers policies that may be implemented by government armed forces to
prevent wartime sexual violence by their combatants with a particular focus on the U.S.
military. It also reviews the recent conviction of Charles Taylor of Liberia by the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) as an example of how group or state leadership may be
deterred from employing or supporting widespread and systematic violence against
noncombatants.

Combatant Socialization and Leadership Prohibition
The empirical evidence and theory development provided in this study point to
the importance of the intragroup dynamics of armed forces whether they be opposition
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groups or government armed forces. A study of intragroup processes that permit sexual
violence within the ranks of the U.S. military and United Nations PKOs is beyond the
scope of this study yet such a research project is warranted to understand why such a
systemic failure occurs and continues to be unaddressed by the Pentagon and the UN.
However, based on the empirical findings of this thesis, the following section considers
policy options that may be implemented by the U.S. armed forces and UN PKOs in order
to eliminate sexual violence against female personnel as well as female noncombatants in
Afghanistan, U.S. military bases throughout the globe, and among PKOs in post-conflict
environments.
Sexual violence against male and female personnel within the U.S. military is
estimated to occur around 19,000 times per year, although reported sexual violence were
3,192 in 2011 and 3,158 in 2010 due to underreporting by survivors because of their fear
of discharge from the military, harassment by male colleagues, male biases in military
courts, etc.566 The prosecution rates are also dismal because of: ―3,158 reports of military
sexual assaults [in 2010], only 529 alleged perpetrators were convicted, while 41 percent
were acquitted or had charges dismissed.‖567 While female officers who are sexual
assaulted are able to leave the armed forces if military courts fail to reach an equitable
decision, enlisted female personnel are unable to leave and oftentimes, especially in
combat zones, have to continue their service alongside their perpetrator(s). A recent peerreviewed study indicated that nearly one in three deployed female personnel in the U.S.
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at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/09/2011916112412992221.html.

209

military are sexually assaulted by male personnel during their period of service. 568 In
2011, women comprised more than 11 percent of active duty personnel deployed in
Afghanistan and Iraq and 15 percent of the total military ranks (around 200,000).569 The
Department of Defense (DoD), despite continually paying lip service to sexual violence
prevention within U.S. military ranks, has failed to ameliorate the high frequency of
sexual violence against female personnel. The DoD implemented the Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) in 2006 which tracks sexual assaults among
all branches of U.S. military within the entire DoD. Yet SARPO, in the Report of the
Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military December 2009, compiled by the
U.S. Congress, has consistently been underfunded and has failed to work with judicial
arm of the DoD which have gave ―its reports and findings little muscle.‖570
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, however, has recently announced several
policy changes that will provide greater justice for female personnel who are sexual
assaulted (if the policies are implemented). The most important change is that cases of
sexual violence will be reported to a colonel or Navy captain who has court-martialing
authority as opposed to lieutenants and noncommissioned officers who have been widely
known to shield perpetrators from punishment.571 Several other changes include: (1)
enlisted personnel must be taught the sexual assault codes within 14 days after they
become active duty; (2) the establishment of a special victims‘ unit within each branch of
the armed forces; (3) annual assessments of officers to ensure that they are fostering an
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environment that promotes a zero tolerance of sexual assault; and (4) new training for
military officers to handle sexual assault cases.572
Based on the empirical findings of this thesis, there are several policy
recommendations that may be implemented by the U.S. military, UN PKOs, and other
government armed forces to reduce the frequency of sexual violence by its personnel
against noncombatants and male and female personnel within their own ranks. The U.S.
military, UN PKOs, and other government armed forces must:
Emphasize the importance of female personnel in the achievement of
strategic goals and their record of success in combat which has been
demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan;
Eliminate military codes which prohibit female combatants from
participating in active combat in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations;
Integrate women into combat units as enlisted and officer personnel
provided that they meet the existing requirements of physical, technical,
and combat training;
Appoint high-level female officers with experience and training in
(sexual) violence advocacy to leadership positions that enforce codes of
sexual assault and have the ability to court martial perpetrators of sexual
violence;
Challenge and alter hegemonic masculine socialization among military
personnel that is found in the initial stages of training in the military;
Incorporate a zero tolerance policy for sexual violence against
noncombatants as an essential aspect of ―winning the hearts and minds‖ of
populations surrounding counterinsurgency campaigns comparable to
conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan;
Enact harsher penalties for perpetrators of sexual violence in the armed
forces to deter such violent crimes within the armed forces and against
noncombatants;

572

Ibid.

211

Increase the funding of SAPRO within the DoD to increase its consistency
in the tracking of sexual assault cases against male and female personnel
and link its work with military courts and other bodies with the ability to
court martial perpetrators;
Educate all personnel about rape myths (e.g., ―she asked for it‖ because
she was drinking or wore revealing clothing off duty), the impact of sexual
violence (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder), and the damage that it
causes to group solidarity and overall unit effectiveness particularly while
in combat;
Allow individuals targeted by sexual violence the ability to pursue cases in
the civilian court system if their cases are dropped by the military judicial
process;
Expand the call for an end to sexual violence within the ranks of the
military and against noncombatants similar to recent statements by
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey; and,
Urge the U.S. Congress to pass a federal law that mandates the above legal
and procedural changes as well as federal funding to SAPRO so that
sexual violence policy in the U.S. military is consistent despite changes in
the executive administration.
These are policy recommendations that were drawn from the empirical findings of the
infrequency of sexual violence by the LTTE and CPN(M) juxtaposed with the RUF. They
are by no means exhaustive and the recent steps within the DoD appear promising
although many feminists believe that Panetta is only paying lip service to the prevention
of sexual assault within the military. However, the DoD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S.
Congress must move past rhetoric and implement policies that will eliminate sexual
violence within the U.S. armed forces and against noncombatants.

Conviction of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone
On 26 April 2012 Charles Taylor—the former leader of the NPFL and expresident of Liberia—was convicted by the SCSL for ―arming, supporting, and guiding‖
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the RUF during its brutal campaign against Sierra Leoneans and their government.573 The
SCSL found Taylor guilty of ―crimes against humanity and war crimes, including
murder, rape, slavery and the use of child soldiers‖ in the first conviction of a former
head of state since the Nuremburg trials after World War II.574 On 30 May 2012, the
Court sentenced him to 50 years in prison at a facility in the United Kingdom.575
Such a conviction and sentencing of a seemingly untouchable figure in African
politics sends a clear message to other leaders of non-state actors or governments that
commit widespread violence against civilians: they will be held accountable under
international law once they are indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Because this study demonstrates that leadership plays an important role in shaping a
group‘s repertoire of violence, it is imperative that states sign, ratify, and implement the
Rome Statute which gives the International Criminal Court legal jurisdiction in the
territory of ratified states. While legal deterrence does not address the root causes of
wartime sexual violence and other crimes against humanity, it serves as a legal apparatus
that may prevent the occurrence of future Sierra Leones.

4.5. Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research
This study has uncovered new insight as to why wartime sexual violence varies in
frequency among armed group within the same conflict. As a new subfield of the study of
wartime sexual violence, this avenue of research must be expanded upon by scholars.
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The research design of this study has provided a comparative, three-case study on
wartime sexual violence in which there is a variation in value of the dependent variable—
wartime sexual violence—which avoids the pitfall of selection bias (i.e., selecting cases
with only one value on the dependent variable) that prevents the positivistic, social
scientific testing of hypotheses drawn from the existing literature. More comparative
research must be conducted in which two or more cases that juxtapose instances of
widespread and systematic wartime sexual violence with cases where sexual violence
was less frequent by armed groups. This provides the ability to compare and contrast
cases in a manner that deepens our understanding of causes of sexual violence (and
conversely, its absence). If scholars employ such a research design, they may provide
additional insights on variation that are beyond the scope of this study.
There are other cases of wartime sexual violence in which the variation in
frequency and type have been understudied—e.g., Colombia, Libya, Bangladesh, the U.S.
occupation of Vietnam, etc., are notable and understudied cases on the variation of
wartime sexual violence. Scholars of wartime sexual violence must explore these cases
(especially as more data becomes available in the case of Libya) to strengthen our
understanding of the causal pathways and variables which are correlated with a lower
frequency of sexual violence vis-à-vis government armed forces. Cases of wartime sexual
violence are also in sore need of additional data. Field research will be a crucial avenue to
understand why wartime sexual violence varies in frequency and type across conflicts as
well as among armed groups.
A new independent variable has been identified in this study: intragroup gender
dynamics. Future studies of wartime sexual violence may be strengthened by integrating
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this variable into the research process to better understand why some armed groups rape
and others rarely employ such violence. Compared to macrosocial indicators of gender
(in)equality within cases of wartime sexual violence, intragroup gender dynamics—
linked with leadership dynamics and group hierarchy which was a variable identified by
Elisabeth J. Wood—allow for more externally valid measures of group dynamics that
explain the variation of sexual violence within the same conflict (while macrosocial
indicators explain why sexual violence varies in magnitude across conflicts). Researchers
are able to measure intragroup gender and leadership dynamics by drawing upon
ethnographic studies as well as conducting their own original field research via
interviews with ex-combatants and leaders of insurgent groups.
The role of ideological frames within armed groups appears to have an influence
in the variation of wartime sexual violence in the three cases presented in this study.
Scholars must engage in comparative case studies of the (in)frequent use of wartime
sexual violence by insurgencies sharing similar ideological frameworks (e.g., Peruvian
Maoists and Nepali Maoists). This may better explain how ideology impacts certain
groups‘ repertoire of violence relative to this study which does find an impact of group
ideology despite their differing ideological frameworks and goals (i.e., Maoist in Nepal
and nationalist in Sri Lanka).
Using process-tracing and the congruence method in a comparative, three-case
study of sexual violence during the civil wars in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and Nepal, this
thesis finds that when leadership forbids sexual violence by its combatants, imposes
robust internal group discipline, and frames female cadre‘s equitable participation as
essential for realizing the broader ideological and strategic goals of the insurgency (i.e.,
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nationalist, leftist, etc.), sexual violence against (non)combatant women and girls is less
frequent during civil wars by armed opposition groups vis-à-vis government armed
forces. It is a myth that sexual violence is an inevitable byproduct of war. This study
demonstrates that not all armed groups employ rape in their repertoire of violence during
conflict situations. It provides a theoretical and practical extension of scholars‘
understanding of the variation in frequency of wartime sexual violence across conflict as
well as among armed groups. Since not all armed groups commit widespread and
systematic wartime sexual violence, scholars and policy makers have begun to provide
evidence and policy prescriptions that may greatly reduce the frequency of sexual
violence by armed groups such as leadership prohibition, strong intragroup discipline and
judicial mechanisms, gender equity within the ranks of combat units, etc. In short, the
recent literature and this study validate that, in fact, boys will not always be boys.
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